Important piece on Russia's constant efforts to undermine Western democracies - including the UK. Successive governments have done too little, both defensively and offensively, to make it less attractive for Russia to keep doing this.

Congratulations to @thomasmaddock.bsky.social, Clara Marina O'Donnell fellow at @centreeuropeanref.bsky.social, on a very good piece on the need for the EU & Turkiye to improve ties, in the interests of both of them. (reposted because of a glitch with the link)

I have been making a similar point for some years: if Putin says Russia is at war with NATO, it doesn't matter if NATO says it isn't at war with Russia: they are at war. How you fight the war is a different matter, but if you keep pretending you're at peace, you're in trouble.

“To go from being the sort of number one person in the government and in the system, to one of a number of vice presidents of the Commission, may not be the easiest transition,” said @cerianbond.bsky.social, deputy director of the @centreeuropeanref.bsky.social. www.politico.eu/article/eeas...

Plenty of good quotes from the work of my @centreeuropeanref.bsky.social colleague @sandertordoir.bsky.social & Brad Setser on China Shock 2.0 & its challenges.

In 2016 hardly anyone in the Leave campaign paid any attention to Brexit's possible effects on Northern Ireland, despite warnings from John Major and Tony Blair. Where do things stand ten years later? Hear from @otoolematthew.bsky.social & @adampayne26.bsky.social at @centreeuropeanref.bsky.social.

CER's own @cerianbond.bsky.social writes about Brexit has affected cooperation on foreign and security policy. Britain and the EU face the same shared external threats, but being outside the room has reduced Britain’s institutional access and influence. www.cer.eu/publications...

Pero en cierto sentido, Vladimir Putin y Donald Trump han hecho más por acercar al Reino Unido y a la Unión Europea que años de negociaciones sobre el Brexit. Porque pese a todo, señala @cerianbond.bsky.social comparten los mismos riesgos estratégicos. elpais.com/internaciona...

Something symbolic about Keir Starmer's resignation speech with the EU anthem in the background: much of UK's recent political instability came fm inability to accept being a normal European country, not a global power; & many of the limits on what Labour cd do in power flowed fm Brexit's econ harm.

Britain says rejoin

Neil Kinnock at #RejoinMarch showing he's still quite an orator, as he tells the crowd that outside the EU the UK is in limbo, & standing still means slipping backwards - rejoining the EU is our imperative: "Argue for it with reason, campaign for it with energy, but do it!".

We’re on our way!

“The uptick is coming” = “The cheque is in the post”.

The Telegraph covers our paper.

The FT headline isn't quite right. It was always clear EU Leads would give guidance today to the Commission to work on a pla to bolster trade defences over the summer, and prep for Chinese retaliation. It's not a real delay, in that sense. But there's a risk. 1/ www.ft.com/content/e220...

Our country is not growing. Our country has to get serious about defence. The only way to turn things around is by fixing our relationship with Europe.

@james-r-green.bsky.social, a research fellow at the @centreeuropeanref.bsky.social, said China’s export-led growth model had amplified Europe’s wider economic difficulties, including high energy costs and US President Donald Trump’s sweeping tariffs on EU exports to the US. buff.ly/Jc2J6kz

Thank you to @lukepollard.bsky.social, UK Minister of State for Defence Readiness and Industry for speaking at our breakfast meeting yesterday morning on 'The future of Britain's defence industry: A role for Europe?' Thank you to Airbus for hosting the event.

Armed forces’ stringent physical entry requirements currently screen out people who would be fit to serve in roles essential in modern conflict such as cyber and drone operations, logistics management and data analysis, warns a new @centreeuropeanref.bsky.social policy brief. buff.ly/rwfLU1S

You can read his speech here: buff.ly/mo8qE6W

Thank you to Olaf Sleijpen, President of @dnb-nl.bsky.social, for speaking at the @centreeuropeanref.bsky.social/Calibrate Management dinner yesterday on 'From fragmentation to partnership: Building Europe's Savings and Investment Union together'.

Important research showing econ damage done by Brexit. The choices are politically difficult - try to join the single market without a vote, like Norway, or admit Brexit was a mistake & apply to rejoin the EU. Govt needs to start a frank debate on how to fix Brexit's economic & political harm asap.

The question is what the UK is doing to increase the cost to Russia of such activity. More help for Ukraine is part of it; more disruption of Russian economic operations in the UK (eg everything to do with maritime services) is another. What about more offensive cyber & info ops, not just defensive?

"The real choice is between a just & durable peace & a false peace that merely prepares the ground for another war." I agree with Marko Mihkelson. Nothing will change for the better in Russia as long as the regime believes it can win by eroding its adversaries' will. It must lose & know it has lost.

“What impact do you think the changing American role is having on German public opinion, and German policy-making when it comes to the defence and security of Germany?” @cerianbond.bsky.social asked Michael Martin Richter in the #CERpodcast. Listen here: buff.ly/yKHfhrU

Congratulations to Ukraine and Moldova. Incredible to think that the sequence of events that led to this point began in 2013 when Putin pressured the then-Ukrainian president into backing out of an EU Association Agreement because he didn't like Ukraine getting any closer to the EU.

I fully agree. Worth emphasising that it was the PM’s commitment at the NATO summit last year that the U.K. would spend 3% by 2030, not John Healey.

I enjoyed this wide-ranging discussion of what Europe can do in the short term to strengthen its defences. Thanks to @armida.bsky.social & Michael Richter.

John Healey is right. The UK is spending too little & failing to learn from Ukraine’s experience of modern war. And the Treasury shows no sign of interest in whether the UK can defend itself or not. A PM's priority should be to ensure the country's national security.

'Re-arming Europe: Short-term priorities for personnel, public support and procurement': @armida.bsky.social of @centreeuropeanref.bsky.social introduces her timely paper tonight in co-operation with Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung at the Bavarian Representation in Brussels. share.google/IjoMy2y0sUmh...

@centreeuropeanref.bsky.social puts it bluntly in a new study: Germany is the epicenter of the 'China Shock 2.0.' Unlike in the 2000s, Beijing is no longer just targeting the fringes of the global market, but is now aiming directly at the industrial heart of the German economy. buff.ly/ofTqdEW

An important piece of work by my @centreeuropeanref.bsky.social colleague @armida.bsky.social . The apparent collapse of the FR-GE-ES FCAS aircraft project shows again the gap between Europe's rhetoric & its performance in rearmament. This paper offers some potential quick wins.

Excellent! European leaders meeting Zelenskyy in the UK today need to read this: stop talking about negotiations, step up the military and economic pressure on Putin.

Absolutely right. Russia has observed no red lines (not even those laid down by international humanitarian law and the laws of war); so why on earth should Ukraine's Western partners force Kyiv to handicap itself? UA is doing better now it's ignoring nervous Westerners & targetting what it needs to.

Europeans should have woken up long ago to the risk that the US under Trump would leave them exposed to Russia. Now they will need to rearm and fill gaps at speed. And -looking at the UK, for example - finance ministries can't be allowed to decide whether a nation is defended or not.

He’s right. Russia’s daily war crimes are being presented as a new normal. It’s not normal and we must, as he says, lean in harder.

These accidental and not-so accidental incursions test NATO's collective defence. Failure to respond proportionately invites both repetition and escalation - what's an accident now, may not be next time.

I have argued for a long time that NATO air defence should be extended to cover at least the Western part of Ukraine, so that drones can be brought down as early as possible. That would protect both Ukrainian & NATO citizens & infrastructure. Western fear of escalation only leads to RU escalation.

Important thread, on how West can disrupt Russian missile production, including by stricter controls on RU imports of W dual-use items via third countries. My proposal: copy rules on strict liability for firms for eg labour violations in supply chains, impose strict liability on end-use control.

Up to 2007: It's Ukraine's decision to join 2007-2014: Ukraine join but we have to allow it cos anti imperialism 2014 -to now: We got a promise they would never join. The past changes so quickly you have no idea what will happen yesterday. The above quote on the Kremlin's own website.

OTD in 2002 the NATO-Russia council was founded in Rome. At the event your Prez said it was Ukraine's choice to join NATO & it "could not cloud relations with Russia". Notice how our story has changed?

Excellent @kyivpost.com editorial on the need to stand firm in the face of Russia's "gangster diplomacy". The best responses to Russian threats are more help for Ukraine & more military & economic pain for Russia.

„The European cars made in China“. Worthwhile FT long read with some reflections from my side on the core dilemma Europans now face. That includes incentivising their ‚own‘ firms to not haul off completely to China. 1/

important study for German economic growth debate! Chinas Exports hurt much more than expected Imo We need to overcome the classic left right fights and start looking at C: @spdfraktion.de @taz.de @faznet.bsky.social @sdullien.bsky.social @clemensfuest.bsky.social @bachmannrudi.bsky.social

Ian hits the nail on the head here. The question is not whether Chinas overcapacities are costly for China - they are. The question is whether swathes of German and European manufacturing can stay solvent for longer than China can stay irrational.

Extremely important research & analysis by Brad Setser of @cfr.org & my @centreeuropeanref.bsky.social colleague @sandertordoir.bsky.social . Maybe at some point market forces will take revenge on China; but it's not happening yet, & by the time it does it may be too late for European industry.

Germany risks getting pushed into a low productivity trap, where the engineering sectors that have long been the hallmark of its innovation, productivity and growth shrink, and replaced with lower-end services. That has consequences - something I warned about 2 years ago already in Politico. 4/4

Excellent piece by @rafaelbehr.bsky.social .

We always say Trump TACO. But my god does it look like the European leaders do the same thing. What exactly has Putin done that warrent beginning talks?

Exactly. And she did nothing to stop Nord Stream. She may not be quite as compromised as Schröder, but her willingness to accommodate Russia makes her quite unsuitable to speak for the EU in current circumstances.