The EU has just made sure its biggest bargaining chip in the negotiations over Ukraine's future is no longer subject to national vetos. And that is even true independently of the fate of the reparations loan because now a qualified majority is required to unblock the funds again. Well done.

If the EU doesn‘t want to become a (high-carbon) industrial museum, the time to act is now.There‘s a lot of pressure from tariffs and Chinese production, but EU clean tech has every chance to survive and thrive through this if supported by the right policies. We also show that this varies by sector.

Faced with China's distortions, US tariffs, and the IRA rollback, should the EU stay in the clean tech race or throw in the towel? A hugely important paper - with a lot of novel data - tackles that question. By Elisabetta, @imlucascarvalho.bsky.social @etiennehoera.d-64.social and Philipp Jäger

If the EU doesn‘t want to become a (high-carbon) industrial museum, the time to act is now.There‘s a lot of pressure from tariffs and Chinese production, but EU clean tech has every chance to survive and thrive through this if supported by the right policies. We also show that this varies by sector.

The takehome message here isn't 'the Commission needs to toughen up for the geoeconomic age'. There needs to be buy-in from the member states and a way to bring companies in (or make them play along). This will happen over and over again if there's no real political ownership, including the costs.

New policy brief with Thieß Petersen @bst-europe.bsky.social : More and deeper EU trade agreements would only bring moderate growth effects - around 0.6 percent of EU GDP in five years, even under very optimistic assumptions (more in some sectors). Why this matters and what to do now: 🧵

New policy brief with Thieß Petersen @bst-europe.bsky.social : More and deeper EU trade agreements would only bring moderate growth effects - around 0.6 percent of EU GDP in five years, even under very optimistic assumptions (more in some sectors). Why this matters and what to do now: 🧵

No wonder we're not making progress on China trade policy if we keep putting the cart before the horse: It makes sense to bring the US in to make EU strategic measures more effective, not to approach this as just a bargaining chip to keep the US engaged. EU industry's stakes are too high for this.

Feels like the strategic autonomy debate all over again these days: endless scoping, definitions, etymology debates. Let's just focus on solving a threat: Call an emergency on REEs, put all possible trade and security (3Ps) on the table, see how each could help solve the emergency, and go implement

Can definitely recommend the programme! Good think tanking - bringing evidence to policy - isn't easy in the current context. There's no A to Z guide, but the think tank school is a space for figuring things out with others from a variety of contexts. Grateful for this. @merics.bsky.social @dgap.org

Read @etiennehoera.d-64.social’s & my opinion on why the current simplification agenda is weakening the EU: bst-europe.eu/de/wettberwe... And how the simplification agenda could be improved: bst-europe.eu/competitiven... 4/4

This is bad policy and extremely bad politics. Especially as so many rules are now under external pressure - the EU just can't afford to rewrite rules that took years to negotiate within a few months, or having an EP where centrists can't work together.

Wenn das so kommt, sieht es von hier aus dem Nachhaltigkeits-Omnibus sehr ähnlich (und das ist kein gutes Zeichen): sehr weitreichender KOM-Vorschlag, der unter extremem Zeitdruck und politischem Druck entsteht, übliche Prozesse wie Konsultation von Zivilgesellschaft fallen weitgehend aus.

Wenn das so kommt, sieht es von hier aus dem Nachhaltigkeits-Omnibus sehr ähnlich (und das ist kein gutes Zeichen): sehr weitreichender KOM-Vorschlag, der unter extremem Zeitdruck und politischem Druck entsteht, übliche Prozesse wie Konsultation von Zivilgesellschaft fallen weitgehend aus.

New analysis with @cdgeiser.bsky.social: The EU’s current drive to cut red tape at all costs is weakening Europe. Last week’s failed vote on the Sustainability Omnibus in the European Parliament was the culmination of extreme pressure, poorly designed proposals and political polarisation. Thread:

New analysis with @cdgeiser.bsky.social: The EU’s current drive to cut red tape at all costs is weakening Europe. Last week’s failed vote on the Sustainability Omnibus in the European Parliament was the culmination of extreme pressure, poorly designed proposals and political polarisation. Thread:

High time to get rid of the 'bazooka' framing. The ACI is not a magic weapon. It's a new procedural way of threatening retaliation and then imposing it. The effect really depends on the threats the EU is willing to make. Currently we're mainly deterring ourselves with the military analogies.

Tariffs on steel are good for steel makers, but bad for anyone making things from steel - also in 🇪🇺. Evidence from Trump I: steel tariffs created an estimated 1000 jobs in steel making and cost 75000 downstream (carmaking, machinery…) - with much more added value. econofact.org/steel-tariff...

New vicious cycle unlocked: France is unable to act, is outvoted, unpopular outcomes drive anti-EU sentiment, this makes France less able to act.

Ohne private Kommunikation entsteht eine Atmosphäre der Selbstzensur. „Wir schaffen damit eine Infrastruktur, die autokratische Staaten in und außerhalb Europas zur Verfolgung von Oppositionellen und zur Unterdrückung von Kritik nutzen könnten“, so @sveawindwehr.bsky.social #ChatkontrolleStoppen

Online launch event today 14:00 CEST, register here: bertelsmann-stiftung-de.zoom.us/webinar/regi...

#Moldova votes today - a choice between European integration and Russian influence, and a crucial decision for the EU's Eastern neighbourhood. With the #GEOII, we have been mapping the #geoeconomic dimension of this systemic competition in the EU's neighbourhood. Our results show:

Everyone talks about #geoeconomics, we’re mapping it: Together with colleagues @bst-europe.bsky.social @wiiw.ac.at, ECIPE, we created the Geoeconomic Interconnectivity Index, measuring the EU's trade, finance and policy footprint in its neighbourhood, compared to China, Russia & US. Main findings 🧵

Everyone talks about #geoeconomics, we’re mapping it: Together with colleagues @bst-europe.bsky.social @wiiw.ac.at, ECIPE, we created the Geoeconomic Interconnectivity Index, measuring the EU's trade, finance and policy footprint in its neighbourhood, compared to China, Russia & US. Main findings 🧵

Draghi not mincing his words, but where are active policymakers on this? Improving things is hard if the official line still is that the EU got a great deal and other great opportunities await. Diversification through FTAs is good, but we really shouldn’t expect this to replace US demand.

To the trade people on here: I'll be at the @wto.org public forum in Geneva next week, happy to connect!

How did this not make it into SOTEU?

Some thoughts on trade in #SOTEU: Aftermath of the EU-US trade deal is the biggest theme (also keeping in mind upcoming votes). VDL: EU got the 'best deal', better than 'competitors' (JP, KOR, UK?). Alternative would have been trade war 'chaos'.

Great point on the contradictory messaging from VDL: Rubbing other countries' noses in the "best deal" the EU got with the US vs trying to convince those same countries that the EU is the last-standing reliable partner

Some thoughts on trade in #SOTEU: Aftermath of the EU-US trade deal is the biggest theme (also keeping in mind upcoming votes). VDL: EU got the 'best deal', better than 'competitors' (JP, KOR, UK?). Alternative would have been trade war 'chaos'.

We‘re hiring: Für unser Projekt „Generation Z(eitnwende)“ suchen wir eine*n Projektmanager*in in Teilzeit (50%). Mach mit uns sichtbar, was junge Menschen über Außenpolitik denken! Bewerbungsschluss 7.9 #jobalert polis180.org/wp-content/u...

It's Commission predecessor birthday! 🎉🥳

Nuanced take by @aslak.bsky.social - it's just very difficult to bargain when the other side does not believe in negative consequences, and convincing them that they do exist has a disproportionate cost.

Here we go again. EU just isn't dealing with a good-faith actor on the other side. The lack of interest in anything stable, permanent or predictable doesn't fit into EU's mental model. Ultimately it's about incentives - if there's no negative consequence, US is always going to come back for more.

I hope the Commission made it clear that the €600 billion figure of course refers to current prices - and that most of it will be mobilised through EIB loans, with a leverage ratio of approximately 1:19.

This is insane. Queue the point that I keep on banging on about: tariff negotiations with Trump are not a one-time occasion (and there is no such thing as a deal yet). His last sentence on pharma being excluded from 15% ceiling will bring some renewed worries to EU (and especially Ireland).

15% tariffs, breaches of WTO rules, more tech dependency – the US deal is a far cry from what the EU wanted. This was not a one-off accident, but exposes longstanding structural weaknesses in EU trade policy that will affect any future negotiation. My analysis🧵 bst-europe.eu/economy-secu...

EU‘s challenge now is to play both games: not just turning the other cheek when it comes to coercion and other hostile stuff in trade, but also remaining able to build mutually beneficial cooperation with others. There‘s a very interesting feminist foreign policy angle here too (’macho exercise‘).

EU‘s challenge now is to play both games: not just turning the other cheek when it comes to coercion and other hostile stuff in trade, but also remaining able to build mutually beneficial cooperation with others. There‘s a very interesting feminist foreign policy angle here too (’macho exercise‘).

Worth looking into not just for budget nerds - your favourite EU policy (and a lot out there in real life) depends on getting this right. Great job to the team for making this complicated stuff accessible.

Worth asking what ’others have it worse‘ should mean for our assessment. No need for defeatism, but we did see real & substantial weaknesses in the EU‘s approach to this (member states blaming Brussels, inconsistent messaging etc.), which can and should be fixed for when the US comes back for more.

Macron says EU wasn't "feared enough" to get a better deal. True: As things stand, EU isn't particularly scary. But: This is not a cosmetic problem that could be solved through more tough talk. EU's inability to deter in trade comes down to structural flaws, and member states are partly to blame.

15% tariffs, breaches of WTO rules, more tech dependency – the US deal is a far cry from what the EU wanted. This was not a one-off accident, but exposes longstanding structural weaknesses in EU trade policy that will affect any future negotiation. My analysis🧵 bst-europe.eu/economy-secu...

Important takeaway for the next round of this: by itself, COM isn’t equipped to manage the domestic politics of this, it needs stronger backing from capitals. Convenient for member states to hide behind it and then blame it for the outcome (sometimes more than they blame the US I feel).

An absolute comms failure- this could have been a moment of ’we‘re in this together‘. And a failure in substantial policy - there‘s no EU plan at all for those countries that are hit the hardest (Lesotho won‘t be the only case where impacts are devastating). All of this while cutting aid spending.

Good point by Aslak: US won’t be able to substitute many imports domestically, esp without good industrial policy. Question is then where those imports come from -cue relative tariff levels. I would add demand elasticity: Tariffs will make some things so expensive that people don’t buy them anymore.

This. No surprise that those involved now praise what objectively is neither great nor a reliable deal with the US. EU should‘t be misguided by its own comms, the 15% ceiling can only hold if it‘s backed up by credible threats of retaliation.

More on the EU-China summit: It‘s unsurprising that there wasn‘t a breakthrough, main contentious issues like overcapacity are structural and the result of 🇨🇳 policy choices, highly costly to change even if 🇨🇳 wanted to. 🇪🇺 created new trade instruments precisely because of that, more measures likely.

Meine Gedanken zum EU-China-Gipfel: An den Rändern gibt es Verhandlungsspielraum (etwa 🇨🇳-Strafzölle auf Cognac). Grundproblem Überkapazitäten bleibt, 🇪🇺sollte auf keine Änderung hoffen, weil Kosten für 🇨🇳 sehr hoch wären. Spricht für mehr Zölle in strategischen Industrien und aktive Industriepolitik.

Stimmt. Ich glaube, manche sehen die Risiken durchaus – sind aber defaitistisch. Warum glauben so viele in Berlin, Deutschland könne Chinas Industriepolitik nichts entgegensetzen? Dabei haben wir riesige fiskalische Spielräume und eine starke industrielle Basis. 1/