Zeigt sehr deutlich, wie verengt die handelspolitische Debatte ist: Die Frage sollte sein, welche Werkzeuge unsere Probleme lösen (extremer Wettbewerbsdruck aus China, Zwangsmaßnahmen, Chaos in den USA). „Welche Abkommen brauchen wir?“ ist eine Folgefrage von vielen, und nicht die dringendste.

China shock latest - this should get a lot more attention. It's even worse than the year on year data suggests as the deficit jumped by almost 20% 2024 -> 2025 already.

If you care about any EU policy, chances are that money is involved. Great primer on the long-term budget and what to expect in the negotiations.

Jetzt beginnen die ersten Verfahren gegen die EU und andere wegen angeblich unfairer Handelspraktiken - Ersatz für die vom Supreme Court annullierten Zölle. Die USA sind daran interessiert, die EU weiter unter Druck zu setzen, nicht an einer Einigung.

It's almost treated as though breaking our own taboos (local content, joint ventures, investment conditionality) would already solve the problem. EU can do things that look radical when compared to the past *and still undershoot*.

And a salient point by @etiennehoera.d-64.social at the end - it's only going to get picked apart from here. So it would have been better if it had been more ambitious before EP / council got their hands on it...

Good debate between Nils and Shahin!

The Industrial Accelerator Act is out. On public procurement in strategic sectors, it tries to square the circle: keep trusted partners in and China out. A few thoughts on the Commission’s approach in the proposal and the problem of China's transnational footprint:

The Industrial Accelerator Act is out. On public procurement in strategic sectors, it tries to square the circle: keep trusted partners in and China out. A few thoughts on the Commission’s approach in the proposal and the problem of China's transnational footprint:

Nach dem Merz-Besuch in den USA noch aktueller: Trump droht Spanien, das für (völkerrechtswidrige!) Angriffe gegen Iran Militärbasen nicht zur Verfügung stellen will, mit Handelssanktionen. Es wäre fahrlässig, jetzt den Zolldeal zu ratifizieren.

This undermines all other norms in intl law too. E3 can forget accountability for smaller violations (e.g in trade) if they ignore breaches of fundamental norms. And raises rule of law doubts internally: Intl law anchors the 🇩🇪 constitution (Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit), or used to. This is bad.

This undermines all other norms in intl law too. E3 can forget accountability for smaller violations (e.g in trade) if they ignore breaches of fundamental norms. And raises rule of law doubts internally: Intl law anchors the 🇩🇪 constitution (Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit), or used to. This is bad.

Weitere treffende Analyse von @etiennehoera.d-64.social zu Handelsbeziehungen EU-USA & was die EU nach dem Zollurteil des Supreme Court nun tun sollte.

EP is now the backstop of the EU's strategic position. Who would have thought, just a few weeks after the MERCOSUR debacle?

Was kommt nach dem Zollurteil des Supreme Court auf die EU zu? Deals sind allenfalls Risikomanagement. Die Aufgaben für die EU: geoökonomisch glaubwürdig werden, sich nicht von Dritten ausspielen lassen, Abhängigkeiten abbauen. Heute in @faznet.bsky.social Weltwirtschaft: www.faz.net/pro/weltwirt...

We know that new FTAs wouldn't add a lot of growth for the EU - a deeper internal market potentially would. Read @cdgeiser.bsky.social on how to make more of one of the Commission's flagship initiatives, a 28th regime for companies 👇

Auch industriepolitisch fatal: Wärmepumpen sind eine der Branchen, in denen Deutschland auch in Zukunft global wettbewerbsfähig sein könnte. Das wird aber nicht gehen, wenn es den heimischen Markt versenkt. Wir haben letztes Jahr untersucht, was Trumps Politik für Clean Tech aus der EU bedeutet:🧵

Unabhängig von den klimapolitischen Konsequenzen ist die Entkernung des Gebäudeenergiegesetzes industriepolitisch ein großer Fehler. Etienne erklärt, warum 👇

Auch industriepolitisch fatal: Wärmepumpen sind eine der Branchen, in denen Deutschland auch in Zukunft global wettbewerbsfähig sein könnte. Das wird aber nicht gehen, wenn es den heimischen Markt versenkt. Wir haben letztes Jahr untersucht, was Trumps Politik für Clean Tech aus der EU bedeutet:🧵

Really worth your time if you‘re interested in how the EU should fund innovation!

Great stuff at such short notice. I would be surprised if this isn’t the end of the deal. The US side can’t (and won‘t) make any credible commitments, the legal case was always very shaky and this will not change by circling through all the different sections of the Trade Act.

Great stuff at such short notice. I would be surprised if this isn’t the end of the deal. The US side can’t (and won‘t) make any credible commitments, the legal case was always very shaky and this will not change by circling through all the different sections of the Trade Act.

Will (some of) the tariffs be back? Probably. Will there be more chaos, especially if several instruments are used in ways they weren't meant to be used in? No doubt about it. Doesn't detract from the fact that this is a major loss for the US tariff agenda. Being able to take a win is important.

Easy to imagine the backlash, hard to see why this should be more problematic than what happens in a lot of legislative processes. Trilogue conclusions don't exist in 24 official languages.

Größte Wirtschaftsdelegation seit Merkels erster Amtszeit begleitet Merz. Doch die Ähnlichkeit trügt. Heute sind Unternehmen wie VW & Mercedes auch chinesische Unternehmen. Was ihrer "in China, for China & rest of world"-Strategie zugute kommt, hilft deutschen Arbeitern nicht unbedingt.

Sure isn‘t a legislative accelerator act

Another middle power moment, but not groundbreaking: EU-CPTPP have a lot in common and there's scope for closer cooperation. Fundamental limitations are still there, and it certainly won't be an 'anti-Trump trade alliance'. Why and what still can be done 🧵

In normal times these technical details would prevail in shaping the narrative. But in Trump times where things only have a tennous connection with reality & narratives don't depend on delivery, that 'we can diversify', 'there's other things in the world besides US' feel like signal matters a lot

Another middle power moment, but not groundbreaking: EU-CPTPP have a lot in common and there's scope for closer cooperation. Fundamental limitations are still there, and it certainly won't be an 'anti-Trump trade alliance'. Why and what still can be done 🧵

It'a systemic problem, but one in which China has a lot of agency now. This just shouldn't mean waiting for China to do something meaningful about it (which it won't in the foreseeable future).

It'a systemic problem, but one in which China has a lot of agency now. This just shouldn't mean waiting for China to do something meaningful about it (which it won't in the foreseeable future).

Spot on - good that there's political momentum now, but there just isn't a ton of issues where smaller states drag their feet (and many where Germany would need to move).

On my (of course delayed) way to #MSC2026 - do reach out if you‘re in town!

Can the EU reduce dependencies and attract foreign investment at the same time? Hot topic at today's informal European Council - my thoughts for @carnegieendowment.org 's 'Taking the Pulse': carnegieendowment.org/europe/strat...

Simplification will continue until morale improves

Simplification will continue until morale improves

Bazookas are, of course, well known for solving all problems.

At last!

Big weeks for EU trade – MERCOSUR signed but in a limbo, India concluded, deepening with Mexico waiting to be signed, more in the pipeline. It’s also a good moment to look at the bigger picture: More trade agreements are worth doing in a power-based world, but they’re no game changer for EU growth.🧵

Big weeks for EU trade – MERCOSUR signed but in a limbo, India concluded, deepening with Mexico waiting to be signed, more in the pipeline. It’s also a good moment to look at the bigger picture: More trade agreements are worth doing in a power-based world, but they’re no game changer for EU growth.🧵

“Coalitions of the willing” are back in vogue. Internationally, that makes sense. But in the EU context, I don’t buy the hype. In fact, it leads to the wrong conclusions and risks weakening the one institutional framework that actually gives Europe collective power in a world without rules. Thread:

Good trade news! There's not a whole lot of detail out now besides some flashy tariff lines (cars, pharma, agri et al). The two sides had to move quite a bit to make this happen, both on substance and negotiating styles. No economic game-changer, but an important step geoeconomically.

This is still true after the EP vote for an ECJ opinion on Mercosur: strong external momentum, extremely fragile internal base. Stuff like this makes the whole 'reliable partner in a world of chaos' rhetoric ring hollow. EU can't get geoeconomics right if people keep playing political games with it.

Important point: Even if EU goes for full-on derisiking (which it should), this will take a while. There needs to be a strategy for dealing with tech coercion in the meantime, including resilience against outages as well as options for retaliation. None of this is far-fetched.

This is still true after the EP vote for an ECJ opinion on Mercosur: strong external momentum, extremely fragile internal base. Stuff like this makes the whole 'reliable partner in a world of chaos' rhetoric ring hollow. EU can't get geoeconomics right if people keep playing political games with it.

Good news, but the tariffs were never the main problem. We still live in the world where the US is willing to threaten allies like it‘s a normal thing, just not the one where it followed through for now. This gives EU breathing space - should be used for serious de-risking, not for complacency.

Broader point about economic statecraft - it‘s very hard to get someone to do something they really don‘t want by economic incentives alone, unless they literally become unable to continue (see discussions on sanctions effectiveness). EU/DK was always going to be the side that cared more.

Good news, but the tariffs were never the main problem. We still live in the world where the US is willing to threaten allies like it‘s a normal thing, just not the one where it followed through for now. This gives EU breathing space - should be used for serious de-risking, not for complacency.

That this isn't a trade conflict also means that the appropriate response isn't defined by trade impact. 10% extra tariffs would cost less than 0.1% of EU GDP (calculations by @julianhi.nz @kiel.institute). A dissuasive EU response would need to escalate beyond that bc the overall stakes are higher.

'the first step as ultima ratio' - DE position is getting things backwards here. Using the ACI is the start of a process, not the end of it. It doesn't mean anything in itself. Still need to define measures. The first step is the first step, and talking it up like this ('bazooka') doesn't help.