If you care about any EU policy, chances are that money is involved. Great primer on the long-term budget and what to expect in the negotiations.

You have heard a lot about the EU‘s next long-term budget a.k.a. The MFF but were never quite sure what it is and how it works? @annaheckhausen.bsky.social and I have just the right thing for you: a comprehensive guide to the MFF and the upcoming negotiations on it 👇 bst-europe.eu/investitione...

Ordnungspolitik, aber nur einmal täglich.

The Industrial Accelerator Act is out. On public procurement in strategic sectors, it tries to square the circle: keep trusted partners in and China out. A few thoughts on the Commission’s approach in the proposal and the problem of China's transnational footprint:

After months of wrangling and an epic list of delays, the Commission has finally released its Industrial Accelerator Act. This could turn into one of the EU’s most consequential industrial policy files in years - and the proposal is honestly not a bad place to start. Some quick thoughts:

What is the European Competitiveness Fund and how can it be improved so that it actually works? If you've had these questions on your mind for a long time but never dared to ask: Lucas and Anna have you covered with their new paper 👇

Unabhängig von den klimapolitischen Konsequenzen ist die Entkernung des Gebäudeenergiegesetzes industriepolitisch ein großer Fehler. Etienne erklärt, warum 👇

That was always the risk in going for the solution based on EU debt rather than using the Russian assets. The assets would have required QMV, the debt needs unanimity regardless of the fact that it would be carried out by enhanced cooperation. France et al knew that risk and went for it anyway.

New piece with former fellow ECB hand @thinicemacro.bsky.social. At the Munich Security Conference, the ECB made its geopolitical move, opening repo lines to central banks globally. It was probably the most consequential policy announcement at the conference. 1/ www.cer.eu/insights/ecb...

Nothing stops the European Council from appointing Lagarde‘s successor at the March 2027 European Council even of she serves out her term. So I find this line of thinking a bit weird.

Another middle power moment, but not groundbreaking: EU-CPTPP have a lot in common and there's scope for closer cooperation. Fundamental limitations are still there, and it certainly won't be an 'anti-Trump trade alliance'. Why and what still can be done 🧵

Good points by @lucasguttenberg.bsky.social: The Council can take single market decisions by qualified majority. If such a majority exists, why give the minority an opt-out? And if it doesn't, is it really worth deepening the "single" market when so many member states are not on board?

In the discussion on using Enhanced Cooperation for single market deepening seem to forget that the EU treaties put a clear limit on Enhanced Cooperation - that it shall not undermine the single market or the economic cohesion of the EU:

Exactly. Momentum is good, but Enhanced Cooperation and “One Market” don’t go together. QMV remains the way forward. Breaking deadlock in single market files requires everyone – leaders to officials – to abandon national regimes and commit to true European harmonisation. Still a way to go.

Spot on - good that there's political momentum now, but there just isn't a ton of issues where smaller states drag their feet (and many where Germany would need to move).

The idea to unblock the Single Market deepening agenda with a multi-speed approach a.k.a. Enhanced Cooperation seems extremely weird to me both in principle and politically especially if the goal is "One Market". Here is why:

Simplification will continue until morale improves

When EU leaders meet tomorrow to discuss the EU’s competitiveness agenda, they should stop chasing ghosts and confront the real problem Europe‘s economy is facing. Our latest for @politico.eu with @nilsredeker.bsky.social and @sandertordoir.bsky.social 👇

Worth reading. We want long lasting competitiveness and wealth creation. We can get both, being truth to our goals and principles.

OPINION: As the current consensus goes, Europe has smothered itself in unnecessary regulation, and growth will return once red tape is cut. This agenda is bound to disappoint.

Very good. I think the word for this is punchy. Also trenchant.

Bang on op-ed.

Tomorrow’s summit is a chance for EU leaders to stop chasing the wrong fixes — and finally sketch a response that matches the scale of Europe’s economic challenge. Here, lucasguttenberg.bsky.social, @sandertordoir.bsky.social and I lay out what that could look like. www.politico.eu/article/euro...

When EU leaders meet tomorrow to discuss the EU’s competitiveness agenda, they should stop chasing ghosts and confront the real problem Europe‘s economy is facing. Our latest for @politico.eu with @nilsredeker.bsky.social and @sandertordoir.bsky.social 👇

Brutal chart from @noahbarkin.bsky.social and Gregor Williams. German exports to China grew for nearly two decades - and are now in free fall.

Das spannende an diesem Interview gerade für Deutschland ist nicht die Position zu europäischen Schulden - das sagt Macron seit Jahren so. Viel wichtiger ist die große Klarheit, mit der Macron die Bedrohung der europäischen Wirtschaft und insbesondere der Industrie durch China anspricht.

EU ambassadors have reached a deal on the legal texts to provide Ukraine with a €90 billion loan funded by joint debt. €30 billion will be allocated for financial support, and €60 billion for military aid. Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic will be exempt from the loan.

I don't fully understand why we are discussing the merger of Commission and EuCo president now. It was unbearable with Charles Michel, but that seems to have been an idiosyncratic issue. It works well with Costa. VDL is Europe's number to call. Costa keeps EuCo working. What problem are we solving?

Big weeks for EU trade – MERCOSUR signed but in a limbo, India concluded, deepening with Mexico waiting to be signed, more in the pipeline. It’s also a good moment to look at the bigger picture: More trade agreements are worth doing in a power-based world, but they’re no game changer for EU growth.🧵

“Coalitions of the willing” are back in vogue. Internationally, that makes sense. But in the EU context, I don’t buy the hype. In fact, it leads to the wrong conclusions and risks weakening the one institutional framework that actually gives Europe collective power in a world without rules. Thread:

Good news, but the tariffs were never the main problem. We still live in the world where the US is willing to threaten allies like it‘s a normal thing, just not the one where it followed through for now. This gives EU breathing space - should be used for serious de-risking, not for complacency.

Of and I should not forget of course: the threat of pulling out of the football world cup @lucasguttenberg.bsky.social!

This time, Europe’s leaders played the EU-US trade game well. From the Franco-German tough line to Meloni’s off-ramps, backed by a credible €93bn retaliation threat, they made escalation for Trump costly, and de-escalation easy. Markets and US politics did the rest — Rutte scoring on the assist.

European Parliament really seizing the moment. What a disaster. #Mercosur

That this isn't a trade conflict also means that the appropriate response isn't defined by trade impact. 10% extra tariffs would cost less than 0.1% of EU GDP (calculations by @julianhi.nz @kiel.institute). A dissuasive EU response would need to escalate beyond that bc the overall stakes are higher.

This is of course correct, but just to add: The Council will most likely not hand the Commission the keys to the ACI armory without exactly knowing in advance what guns it wants to take out and use and how. So the comitology most likely won’t matter a ton.

The Greenland conflict is *not* a trade conflict. It is about preserving the sovereignty of a European country. The goal should thus *not* be to avoid tariffs but to make the US drop its aggression. That is why tools beyond trade policy such as threatening to boycott the world cup could make sense.

What Mona says. We weaken ourselves if we continue this weird dichotomy of ACI=strong response and no ACI=weak response. That is bogus. The ACI is a process, not a measure in itself. What matters is what the EU is willing to do in terms of substance to threaten/hurt the US to make it back down.

The 'bazooka' thing really hurts the debate. By all means, use the ACI against coercion - but talking it up in this way also means that there's no plan for when the magic weapon doesn't work, and people think less about other strong options. Or even which measures should take place under the ACI.

What's in the leaked Commission draft for the Industrial Accelerator Act? Lucas has got you covered 👇

How should the EU react to Trump’s tariff threats over Greenland? Get out of self-deterrence, launch the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) and focus on concrete levers instead of the next abstract tools debate. This is an explainer how this could work: 1/ 🧵

Don't forget that Latin America may feel the same way. Quiz: which 2 countries since 1950 have been in the World Cup semi-final that are not European or Latin American?

Europe should hold a competing football competition in Denmark at exactly the same time - and call it the Viking Freedom Supercup.

Great idea

It might sound silly, but I mean it: The easiest and most potent way for Europe to hurt Trump this year is to once again use its cultural soft power and to threaten a boycott of the World Cup. It would become a completely meaningless event and would hurt him where he is most vulnerable - his vanity.

This is a good point. As is the whole thread.

One additional point on politics: Without the very strong push especially from Berlin for the use of the Russian assets, Orbán would most likely not have agreed to this lesser-evil solution from his (and Putin‘s) perspective. The threat was real, and he caved.

Good thread. Orban, Fico and Babis didn't veto the loan. But the loan is backed using enhanced cooperation (A20 TEU) which means they don't underwrite it/pay for it either.

Very helpful overview of what happened last night and where it leaves us by @lucasguttenberg.bsky.social!

So what the hell just happened? Two things: Ukraine will get 90 billion euros. And Orbán did not veto that even though he could have. How so? Short thread: