Für die Zeit haben wir mit @lucasguttenberg.bsky.social und @sandertordoir.bsky.social aufgeschrieben, was das Problem der europäischen Autoindustrie ist, warum Denkmalschutz für Verbrenner die schlechtesten aller Antworten wäre - und was die EU stattdessen tun kann. www.zeit.de/mobilitaet/2...

Great thread by Nils on our new paper. Joint work - Germany, France and the other member-states can either do a coordinated demand push for EU built cars or descent into a chaos of regulatory roll-backs and bailouts. It really is hang together or separately for European cars.

The car crisis tops today’s EU summit but leaders keep staring at the wrong problem The issue isn’t the 2035 engine ban - it’s demand falling off a cliff today With @sandertordoir.bsky.social and @lucasguttenberg.bsky.social, we show why flipping regs won’t help - and what the EU can do instead.

I hope the Commission made it clear that the €600 billion figure of course refers to current prices - and that most of it will be mobilised through EIB loans, with a leverage ratio of approximately 1:19.

Just a few weeks to go before the EU dives into what will likely be a bruising battle over its next budget. @romyha.bsky.social, @eulaliarubio.bsky.social, @lindnerjs.bsky.social l and I took a closer look at the Commission’s proposal. We think successful negotiations now hinge on four things:

"A divided EU can still accept a bad deal that is better than no deal. But only a united EU with a clearly mandated Commission can engage in a sustained trade war and weather the short-term domestic costs."

This is good. You can't expect the Jeunesse d'Esch to play like Real Madrid.

15% tariffs, breaches of WTO rules, more tech dependency – the US deal is a far cry from what the EU wanted. This was not a one-off accident, but exposes longstanding structural weaknesses in EU trade policy that will affect any future negotiation. My analysis🧵 bst-europe.eu/economy-secu...

Many seem surprised about the EU-US trade deal. But this was not an accident and it would likely happen the same way if we did it all over again. Read my colleague Etienne Höra (@etiennehoera.d-64.social)'s latest on the structural drivers of EU trade policy that have led to a bad deal:

Well, « shadow of plausible deniability » is a much nicer way of saying the above. bsky.app/profile/luca...

Excellent and honestly shameful example of the shadow of plausible deniability: Member states (and of course France among them) gave the Commission clear directions and are now running away from the results, blaming the Commission instead. At least own it collectively, it makes us look less stupid.

Well, it is mainly France hitting out - Merz supports the deal but points out it hurts EU exporters. Be that as it may, this is very disingenous: the contours of the deal we were headed for was clear for weeks. The two most powerful EU member-states could've stopped it. www.ft.com/content/00ec...

I don't want to blow anyone's mind with insight behind the curtain of international relations here, but in multi-billion dollar deals between gigantic economies, it's pretty useful to have agreed clarity on what the fuck's actually been agreed.

Excellent and honestly shameful example of the shadow of plausible deniability: Member states (and of course France among them) gave the Commission clear directions and are now running away from the results, blaming the Commission instead. At least own it collectively, it makes us look less stupid.

EU trade policy has the Commission operating largely on its own with member states giving guidance but staying in the shadow of plausible deniability. That might be the right setup for day-to-day trade technocracy. It's definitely not the setup for a full-scale hyperpolitical trade war with the US.

Important takeaway for the next round of this: by itself, COM isn’t equipped to manage the domestic politics of this, it needs stronger backing from capitals. Convenient for member states to hide behind it and then blame it for the outcome (sometimes more than they blame the US I feel).

I agree, but COM was also caught between a rock and a hard place: I am not sure member state governments, and in particular the one in Berlin, would have had the polical stamina for a full-scale trade war. And of course they would have blamed the COM for all the collateral damage it would have had.

Stimmt. Ich glaube, manche sehen die Risiken durchaus – sind aber defaitistisch. Warum glauben so viele in Berlin, Deutschland könne Chinas Industriepolitik nichts entgegensetzen? Dabei haben wir riesige fiskalische Spielräume und eine starke industrielle Basis. 1/

Der Kollege Tordoir macht sich gerade sehr verdient damit, immer wieder auf die Gefahren des zweiten China-Schocks für Deutschland hinzuweisen. Mein Gefühl ist allerdings, dass er damit nicht ausreichend gehört wird...

Ahead of tomorrow’s EU-China summit, the EU faces a tough balancing act between economic interests and geopolitical concerns. What should Brussels do and what should it avoid? This new piece by @corajungbluth.bsky.social lays out the dos and don’ts: bst-europe.eu/economy-secu...

Muss Deutschland jetzt viel mehr in den EU-Haushalt zahlen und ist Deutschland gar der Angeschmierte beim Vorschlag der EU-Kommission zum neuen Mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen? Die Antwort darauf ist kompliziert - aber schlecht kommt Deutschland sicher nicht weg. Warum? Stay with me:

Exzellenter Servicethread - die Sache mit deutschen Beiträgen zum EU-Haushalt ist etwas komplizierter, als die grossen Überschriften der letzten Woche vermuten lassen.

Muss Deutschland jetzt viel mehr in den EU-Haushalt zahlen und ist Deutschland gar der Angeschmierte beim Vorschlag der EU-Kommission zum neuen Mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen? Die Antwort darauf ist kompliziert - aber schlecht kommt Deutschland sicher nicht weg. Warum? Stay with me:

Was der Kollege Redeker sagt👇

The Commission proposal for the next long-term EU budget aka MFF just dropped. Its overall volume increases very moderately, but the proposal contains sweeping changes to the way the EU spends money and to budget's priorities. Here is my first quick take:

We ran some initial estimates on what today’s EU budget proposal could mean. The numbers aren’t official yet, so details might still change - but the overall picture looks a lot more positive than I expected. Three quick takeaways:

The Commission proposal for the next long-term EU budget aka MFF just dropped. Its overall volume increases very moderately, but the proposal contains sweeping changes to the way the EU spends money and to budget's priorities. Here is my first quick take:

Zum Vorwurf der "Zentralisierung" im neuen EU-Haushalt und Äußerungen dazu: Die deutschen Bundesländer haben hier ein massives Eigeninteresse, weil sie bisher verlässlich Geld aus Brüssel bekommen, während der Bund die Beiträge an Brüssel zahlt. Das hilft vielleicht bei der Einordnung der Empörung.

Surprise, surprise: Die EU-Regeln stehen am Ende deutlich höheren deutschen Defiziten als Resultat der Schuldenbremsenreform nicht im Weg. Aber natürlich wäre es mittelfristig trotzdem besser, wenn man mit einer Änderung der Tatsache Rechnung trüge, dass sie für Länder wie D nicht so richtig passen.

It seems that the Commission will indeed propose one big fund to cover all existing structural funds and the CAP and to organise the payout from this fund via a single national plan That would mean a huge departure from how the EU budget and the MFF negotiations have worked so far. Here is why:

It seems that the Commission will indeed propose one big fund to cover all existing structural funds and the CAP and to organise the payout from this fund via a single national plan That would mean a huge departure from how the EU budget and the MFF negotiations have worked so far. Here is why:

Funny Swedish shuffle. Call for EU budget reform of ambition on par with the creation of the euro. “Back in the mid-1990s, Sweden decided to stay out of the euro, even as it has no official opt-out.” So the Swedish shuffle: pretend to be both in and out.

Plus very funny: „Europe needs a bold change of perspective, on par with the creation of the single market or the euro.“ Says the PM of…checks notes…Sweden. Change of perspective, as long as we don’t have to be part of it.

Very good example of EU budget-related cheap talk by the Swedish PM: First, here are all the things I want more money for. Second, I am not ready to pay more. Third, this means other things become less important - but I won’t tell you which ones and where I would cut.

Let’s be clear: the European Parliament has every reason to fight tooth and nail for real influence over national plans - and it can ensure cohesion funds continue to support social investment. All of that is possible without clinging to the EU budget’s clearly dysfunctional structure.

The Socialists in the EP have leveraged a no-confidence vote put up by the far right to effectively gut a major part of the reform of the EU budget. Stunning development that further imperils the prospect for a major MFF reform. I had hopes that this time would be different. But I was naive. Thread:

To tackle Europe's challenges, the EU budget needs root-and-branch reforms. If you think cementing the status quo is a progressive victory, you’re fundamentally misreading the moment. www.politico.eu/article/soci...

What do we know about the planned European Competitiveness Fund? Lucas has all the details and a first analysis:

Wir haben eine tolle neue Stelle in Berlin offen für alle EU-Budget-Wonks und insbesondere für alle, die es noch werden wollen. Bewerbung direkt im Link, bei Interesse gerne DM an mich und please spread the word!

Wir haben eine tolle neue Stelle in Berlin offen für alle EU-Budget-Wonks und insbesondere für alle, die es noch werden wollen. Bewerbung direkt im Link, bei Interesse gerne DM an mich und please spread the word!

The best way to torpedo the Commission's reform agenda for the MFF is to trigger a debate now on a new emergency debt instrument that makes all the old faultlines reemerge. Someone inside the Commission very consciously tries to do just that. And I doubt what they care most about is joint debt.

New piece by @aleichthammer.bsky.social and me in @ipq.bsky.social: EU‘s cautious approach in the 🇺🇸🇪🇺 trade war has been useful, but has run its course as the 9 July deadline approaches. EU should prepare for flexible retaliation. 🧵 ip-quarterly.com/en/red-lines...

„Neue Strategie“ heißt hier: wir versuchen, uns auf irgendwas in 5 Sektoren zu einigen, verabschieden uns auf dem Weg von den WTO-Regeln (die verbieten vereinzelte bilaterale Zollsenkungen) und tun so, als hätte das keine Nachteile. Selbst wenn man dafür ist: Wir müssen über trade-offs reden.

Spot-on take on Germany’s stance on the next EU budget. In the end, the Competitiveness Fund will carry lots of the modernization load - so Berlin will have to move either on cohesion cuts or overall size if it’s serious. But broad support & few red lines make for a decent starting line.

The pretty concise position paper of the new German government on the next long term EU budget aka MFF just dropped. It lends clear support to the Commission's bold reform ideas on the MFF architecture while unsurprisingly also remaining German in a few crucial areas. Here are the main elements:

Not a helpful debate. If the EU is serious about clean industrial strategy, all tools need to be on the table. Instead of clutching its pearls over production aid or Buy EU rules, the EU needs a sector-by-sector discussion on where and how they could be useful. on.ft.com/4k7mefL

New piece for Zeit Online. The deregulation fever gripping Berlin is fine if dosed. But it’s not going to save Germanys promising clean tech sector. For that, industrial policy is indispensable. A good place to start? Align France and Germanys subsidy schemes - as a blueprint for the whole EU

16 member states want to use the national escape clause to get more space for defense spending under the 🇪🇺 fiscal rules. Notably absent: the 3 largest economies after 🇩🇪, namely 🇫🇷🇮🇹🇪🇸. From a fiscal point of view, probably a good sign as these countries have very little fiscal space. 1/3

So the key question in Shahin's piece seems to be (I might be shortselling his argument): The Chinese took the escalatory road and are better off now than we are - and we could have had the same. Not an expert on trade policy, how would the trade folks assess this?

16 member states want to use the national escape clause to get more space for defense spending under the 🇪🇺 fiscal rules. Notably absent: the 3 largest economies after 🇩🇪, namely 🇫🇷🇮🇹🇪🇸. From a fiscal point of view, probably a good sign as these countries have very little fiscal space. 1/3