With some interesting nuggets: Germany pursues multi-pronged quest for long-range missiles www.defensenews.com/global/europ...

The US presence at #Zapad in Belarus is not unexpected, given the mini-rapprochement between both states in recent months. In 2021, the US, along a couple of more states were also invited by #Belarus, though #Russia did not invite #NATO states. 1/5 www.reuters.com/world/europe...

"Exercises are also instruments of strategic communication, intended to shape perceptions, signal resolve, and strengthen deterrence. The real challenge is reading them correctly. This is where confidence- and security-building measures may help" 1/2 europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/n...

Habe mit dem @derstandard.at über die strategische Lage in der Ukraine gesprochen: 'Der möglich, zukünftige Einsatz von Systemen wie Flamingo setzt Moskau unter Druck, aber es ist auch klar, dass RU alles versuchen wird, diese Entwicklung präemptiv zu verhindern' www.derstandard.de/story/300000...

Presenting an early draft of a paper by @alxgraef.bsky.social and myself at EISA PEC.

Arms control has a bad image mainly because people conflate it with unilateral disarmament or frame it as the opposite of deterrence. The less they understand it, the more they fall for these fallacies.

Excited to join the European Leadership Network as Senior Policy Fellow for Russia–West relations in tense times, working to address escalation risks.

Der Inspekteur des Heeres General Alfons Mais sagt bei maybritillner, Russland ziehe jährlich 200.000 Wehrpflichtige ein. Außerdem sei die Wehrpflicht kürzlich von 1 auf 2 Jahre erhöht worden. Das Problem: Beides stimmt nicht. youtu.be/ioG_cGQI4qI?... 1/10

🧵 1/4 Heeresinspekteur Alfons Mais zur #Rüstung u. künftigen Kampfweise der Landstreitkräfte im Behördenspiegel. Darstellung sehr diffus. Vlt. hat der eine oder andere sinnvolle Hinweise zur Einordnung. „Im dt. Heer 2035 plus wird Abstandsfähigkeit konsequent höher priorisiert als Duellfähigkeit.“

Looking forward to presenting on my academic hobby horse next week at @ceri-sciencespo.bsky.social: "The Changing Field of Foreign Policy Expertise in Russia", as part of a seminar series organized by the "Beyond post-Sovietism" research group www.sciencespo.fr/ceri-eveneme...

These are the escalation scenarios that should keep us up at night- not some sudden land grabs to dismantle NATO: Shadow fleet showdown in the Gulf of Finland. War is about politics, not simply the balance of power. Recall the Obama doctrine: Don’t do stupid shit! www.lloydslist.com/LL1153505/Es...

Habe mit dem Standard über die Gespräche in Istanbul zwischen #Russland und der #Ukraine gesprochen. 1/3 www.derstandard.de/story/300000...

Zum Satz des Bundeskanzlers über die "Konventionell stärkste Armee Europas" habe ich mit @br24.de gesprochen: "Was Merz hier macht, ist ein politisches Signal." Der Kanzler bestätige in ähnlicher Form Aussagen, die auch sein Vorgänger Olaf Scholz getroffen hatte. www.br.de/nachrichten/...

Talked to Jyllands-Posten about the war and negotiations: "This is a fundamental point: Russia's interest is not to end the war - Russia's interest is to achieve its goals. And if it is necessary to continue the war to achieve that, then Russia will continue it." jyllands-posten.dk/internationa...

Where does the idea come from that everyone wants #peace? War is a tool of politics. #Putin doesn’t seek peace for its own sake - he wants to reach his objectives. Even #Zelensky isn’t after just any "unjust" peace. That’s why he keeps repeating the phrase "good faith negotiations".

Die Episode der G4 in Kyjiw zeigt das Problem einer medial getriebenen Politik: Schöne Bilder reichen nicht. Keine Sanktionen vorbereitet. Trumps Zusage über Nacht einkassiert. Ultimatum ohne Folgen verstrichen. Von Putins Vorschlag eines Treffens in Istanbul überrumpelt. 1/3

"Das Szenario eines direkten Angriffs auf die Nato beruht somit auf zumindest zweifelhaften Annahmen über die Rationalität politischer Entscheidungsträger im Kreml." www.stern.de/politik/ausl...

Russia might want to "change the European security architecture", as they say, but it simply doesn't have the means. A phantom menace. All it can do and certainly wants to do, is to stop further NATO enlargement, and limit Western/EU/NATO/US influence in its neighborhood. 1/5

Dass die #Taurus-debatte gerade jetzt wieder hochkocht, ist auch ein Zeichen für die politische Ratlosigkeit hierzulande angesichts der US-RU Dynamik. Eine Ersatzhandlung der Symbolpolitik. Strategisch wird es wenig nutzen, ggf sogar schaden. Deshalb wird Merz nicht liefern.

Großbritannien, das sich als ein Leader einer potenziellen #Ukraine-Friedenstruppe inszeniert, schafft es nicht, wie angekündigt, seine Präsenz an der #NATO-Ostflanke zu verstärken; im Gegenteil. Der in Estland stationierte Brigadekern wird abgeschmolzen, der Aufwuchs für Übungen wird zum Problem.

#EU to exclude US, UK and Turkey from €150bn rearmament fund, a central demand of France. on.ft.com/3Ridozy

The US and Russian readouts of the Trump-Putin call differ, but a key twist is on the scope of the "ceasefire", which is effectively only a limit on targeting. The US reads "energy and infrastructure" but Russia says "energy infrastructure". Those are not necessarily the same 1/2

@alxgraef.bsky.social calls for political leadership & multi-level diplomacy. He argues that growing military activities highlight the need for military-to-military contacts to manage risks; the OSCE can facilitate these dialogues and provide support. europeanleadershipnetwork.org/policy-brief...

"From Crisis to Strategy: The OSCE and #ArmsControl in a Divided #Europe" for @theeln.bsky.social. The #OSCE remains a crucial platform for dialogue but it needs sufficient capacity for engagement and the ability to address evolving security concerns 1/8 europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/u...

📢Don't miss it: As ceasefire in Ukraine is discussed, @theeln.bsky.social briefing with Katia Glod @alxgraef.bsky.social @janekinninmont.bsky.social and former #OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut at 15:00 CET this Friday afternoon will provide crucial background and analysis‼️ 👇

Join us this Friday at 14:00 UTC, for the launch of 2 publications on the OSCE by Katia Glod & Alexander Graef. Speakers also include ELN Policy & Impact Director @janekinninmont.bsky.social & former Secretary General of the OSCE Marc Perrin de Brichambaut. Register below ⤵️ zoom.us/meeting/regi...

Trump doesn't aim to end the war for the benefit of either Ukraine or Russia, but for the advantage of the United States. Relative gains between them are mostly irrelevant to him, but in the global balance sheet, U.S.-Russia relations take precedence over U.S.-Ukraine relations.

Many now talk about European decoupling from the U.S. but underestimate its role in European security. The U.S. is not just a force multiplier but a force integrator. Developing these capabilities and gaining the necessary experience and trust among allies takes years 1/2

"Die Ukraine steht heute strategisch noch schlechter da als vor einem Jahr", sagt Alexander Graef. [...] Und: "Der unerwartete direkte Kontakt zwischen Trump und Putin ohne vorherige internationale Abstimmung hat die Ukraine politisch enorm geschwächt." www.derstandard.de/story/300000...

Three years into this war, Ukraine is in a bad position but that doesn't mean Russia is about to overun the country. That is why Trumps initiative is so valuable to Moscow: it promises to achieve diplomatically what otherwise would require continuing a hard & costly mil campaign.

Under Trump European allies might get the chance to understand better how US power can look like from the perspective of non-allies and strategic competitors. A useful lesson in geopolitics and realism.

Three years into this war, Ukraine is in a bad position but that doesn't mean Russia is about to overun the country. That is why Trumps initiative is so valuable to Moscow: it promises to achieve diplomatically what otherwise would require continuing a hard & costly mil campaign.

The problem with the US approach isn’t the bilateral meeting with Russia w/o Ukraine or the EU. It was always clear that the extent of the crisis required great power dialogue and multilevel diplomacy. The issue is the lack of any parallel tracks and total disinterest in creating them.

The never ending debate on European strategic autonomy has always been misguided, fixating on military capabilities while real weakness and dependency lie in strategic thinking. Spending resources on tanks and aircraft is easy; building leadership and geopolitical vision takes a generation.

Russian MFA and State Dept press releases about today's meeting. A little bit more detail in the former. www.state.gov/secretary-ru... mid.ru/en/foreign_p...

As an EASLG member, glad to support this statement. "Three Essential Steps to Prevent Nuclear War": (1) Prevent nuclear testing, (2) Advance nuclear fail-safe, (3) Affirm and strengthen the fundamental principles governing the use of outer space. europeanleadershipnetwork.org/group-statem...

Leseempfehlung: Neuer @ifshhamburg.bsky.social Policy Brief von @alxgraef.bsky.social zu "US-Mittelstreckenraketen in Deutschland: Abschreckung und Rüstungskontrolle zusammen denken". is.gd/xl7IoR

Final 2024 publication (in German): Policy-brief on US intermediate-range #missiles in Germany. I argue that the focus should be on military doctrine and comprehensive effects, including risks when deterrence fails. To enhance #stability, Germany can take three steps. 1/5 ifsh.de/file/publica...

This debate is becoming increasingly confused. There are two very different things: European spending on defence and EU spending on defence. They are *not* the same and I have many questions from an EU budget person perspective on why we focus on the latter. Thread: www.reuters.com/world/europe...

The outrage over Lavrov's trip to Malta for the OSCE Ministerial Meeting shows a lack of understanding of political trade-offs. Without Lavrov, reaching an agreement on the leadership positions vacant since September would have been impossible. Diplomacy is more than a megaphone.

Talked to WaPo: “We are in an arms race, and it’s going to develop over the next 20 years,” Graef said. “... — Russia, states in Europe, the United States — are growing their arsenals because they don’t have the numbers yet to use these weapons effectively...” www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/1...