This is true but also a very problematic framing that has been adopted by too many. The issue isn’t simply a lack of strategy, it is a lack of justification for launching the war in the first place.

Gets at something important, namely, the shared colonial legacies that link Irish history with that of much of the non-Western world.

With escalation risks only increasing, the immediate priority for all parties has to be finding a route to a ceasefire. www.crisisgroup.org/stm/middle-e...

Trump doesn’t quite understand his predicament: “The US president told the FT in an interview on Sunday that he could also delay his summit with China’s President Xi Jinping later this month as he presses Beijing to help unblock the crucial waterway.” www.ft.com/content/1ca6...

This should be seen as what it is, a messaging exercise aimed at calming markets and managing public opinion. But since it’s unlikely to make any difference to the current conflict it’s not worth much.

The legal, moral and strategic costs of the U.S. decision to go to war with Iran go far beyond the price of gas. It’s frankly damning that the political class has decided that this is the primary thing that can garner sustained public attention and generate backlash.

Little efficacy in further dialing up the air war and the costs of deploying ground troops would be very high and success very uncertain. That being said, the attempts to create a narrative of success will sound even more ridiculous the longer this campaign goes on. Will create pressure to escalate.

Good thing we have plenty of those sitting around!

Further escalation of the air war is unlikely to prove decisive in terms of Iran’s capacity to continue retaliating. It will do untold damage to Iran, but in the process will further magnify the strategic bankruptcy of the current course.

Soleimani strike in Trump 1, the strikes on Iran at the end of the 12 day war, and the Maduro operation have all served to warp Trump’s risk calculus.

“Inside the administration, some officials are growing pessimistic about the lack of a clear strategy to finish the war. But they have been careful not to express that directly to the president, who has repeatedly declared that the military operation is a complete success.” Profiles in courage.

One particular outcome of this war is that U.S. allies, partners and enemies will have a much more concrete picture of U.S. vulnerabilities. Obviously the U.S. hasn’t mobilized forces for major sustained combat, but even this snapshot will be consequential.

Even if they projected a quick, decisive military campaign of days, it’s pretty alarming that military planners are only now considering their options. Disruptions in the strait can’t be a surprise if there was any contingency planning done.

The mistrust generated by the trajectory of events over the course of the last year plus the erratic U.S. messaging on war aims and the seeming lack of full U.S.-Israel alignment all make it more difficult for Iran to simply stand down if Trump decides to declare victory.

Worth noting that the Houthis remain on the sidelines and could further escalate, complicate dynamics if they enter the war, particularly as their impact would be felt most acutely with respect to global shipping.

Dan Yergin: “We are looking at what is by far the biggest disruption in world history in terms of daily oil production.”

A rebooted global version of the neoconservative fervor of March 2003.

From @crisisgroup.org’s Iraq expert:

I spoke with Scott Simon about the course of the war, and I mentioned possibility of catastrophic success in which the U.S.-Israel war effort results in regime destabilization. While Israel may be comfortable with that outcome, the U.S. has yet to grasp that it cannot be www.npr.org/2026/03/07/n...

“Yet in the rubble of war, the IRGC, the very institution most isolated from the international order may prove the most capable of inheriting the state”. My essay for ⁦‪@nytimes‬⁩ www.nytimes.com/interactive/...

Trump’s appetite for military adventurism and risk-taking seems undiminished and at this point I’m guessing will only be curbed by disaster.

I joined Richard Atwood along with @alivaez.bsky.social, @mairavz.bsky.social and Yasmine Farouk on this week’s episode of Hold Your Fire to discuss developments in the U.S.-Israel war with Iran. www.crisisgroup.org/pod/middle-e...

Widespread inability to understand the way global energy markets work is a genuine risk factor right now. The kicker is the way the policies that flow from these misunderstandings have been joined up with a concerted effort to demolish alternatives and the ability to hedge against price shocks.

A situation in which Gulf partners are made keenly aware of their second-class status while the U.S.’s other security partner undertakes actions that further undermine their security. The contradictions at the heart of the U.S. agenda of integration and normalization have been laid bare.

If the war drags on this is going to be a growing source of friction with the Gulf: “There has also been resentment in the region at the perception that the US has prioritised Israel’s security over their own.” www.ft.com/content/9353... Gulf states in race to secure more US interceptors

Administrations contort themselves to avoid any suggestion that U.S. is contemplating ground forces, often even when special operations forces are already deployed, so it’s striking to see them say this. But the administration’s political judgments about the war have been off from the start.

A really great piece from my colleague @stevepomper.bsky.social - the story told here is one of accumulated failure by both parties. If you work to undermine any checks or guardrails on yourself when you are in office, then those expanded powers end up with others. And here we are.

This is not even close to the worst-case scenario: “I guess the worst case would be we do this and somebody takes over who’s as bad as the previous person” Trump Lays Out His ‘Worst Case’ Scenario in Iran www.nytimes.com/2026/03/03/u...

Happy to talk with @zackbeauchamp.bsky.social for this piece. We discussed the pathways and contours of a worst-case outcome. Not particularly likely, of course, but a scenario you have to at least contemplate.

In recent decades, state failure in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen, has been damaging to U.S. interests and helped undermine efforts to shift attention and resources elsewhere. So it’s astonishing to see a U.S. administration actively contemplating state failure in Iran as a potential policy goal.

NEW The White House has submitted its War Powers report to Congress for the attack on Iran. The justification for military action rests on 1) Iran's supposed continued quest for nuclear weapons and 2) the threat Iran's missiles pose to US forces, vessels, civilians and those of partners. 1/n

"Power has gravitated to two individuals in Iran. Both are former commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps." @alivaez.bsky.social explains who is making decisions in the Islamic Republic to @cnn.com as the war between the U.S., Israel and Iran intensifies. x.com/BeckyCNN/sta...

If you believe the U.S. has the influence and leverage to block Israel from going to war with Iran, which it does, then it’s much harder to then argue the U.S. has been dragged into war by Israel. Trump wanted this war.

This is an amazing bar to set. So if this war lasts less than two years, under this framing, it will be all good.

From two drones according to the Saudi MOD. It doesn’t sound like major damage but highlights how vulnerable US assets and interests are at the moment.

Netanyahu has been pushing Trump to strike Iran, but the decision to go to war is 100% Trump’s. He wanted this conflict, buoyed by the Maduro operation and limited fall out from Midnight Hammer. But growing perception that Netanyahu duped Trump into war, even if mistaken, is a huge risk for Israel.

Should be alarming to see such low approval numbers at this stage of a war. Suggests the political dangers of this war are quite big (not to even mention the national security implications).

Immediate effects on readiness elsewhere and these dilemmas will only deepen for the Trump administration the longer the war goes on. Critically, it’s not just the U.S. now that has a say in how long this war goes on.

U.S. policy on Cuba after the Maduro capture has created a humanitarian crisis and the Trump administration had seemed intent on undermining the political status quo. Signs now that the U.S. may be calibrating its approach, but the situation remains fragile. www.crisisgroup.org/qna/latin-am...

ONLINE EVENT | Crisis Briefing on the U.S., Israel and Iran 3 March | 11am Washington, DC | 6pm Tel Aviv | 7.30pm Tehran w/ Ali Vaez, Mairav Zonszein, Michael Hanna, Yasmine Farouk, Max Rodenbeck, and Lahib Higel us06web.zoom.us/webinar/regi...

A key issue for the U.S. going forward will be managing its relations with the Gulf. As frontline states to the conflict and now direct targets in Iran's retaliation, they have more to lose than either the U.S. or Israel and much less say in how the war proceeds. That is a recipe for friction.

Lots of worrisome signals about what next, but the idea that the U.S. can just destabilize Iran and then wash its hands and walk away unscathed is particularly so.

That we have managed to avoid full-on regional war in recent years has been taken by some as a demonstration that such risks are overblown, but speed with which war is escalating on multiple fronts belies the idea of another quick, contained military operation for Trump, whatever his initial intent.

I’m frankly a little surprised they’ve entered the war in light of their degraded state. Attention will now turn to the Houthis to see if they follow suit.

This. Whoever it is.

“But the days in which the Middle East dominated American foreign policy in both long-term planning and day-to-day execution are thankfully over—” www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/u...

3 takeaways from this interview. There is a possibility of coming Trump-Israel divergence regarding desired end states via talks w/regime; an emboldened Trump hardly considers how things could go wrong; and he doesn’t have a fixed idea about what this war is for. www.theatlantic.com/national-sec...

Bringing clarity to the proceedings: “That process should soon be starting in that, not only the death of Khamenei but the Country has been, in only one day, very much destroyed and, even, obliterated.”

The lack of clarity and the inconsistency on display could help de-escalation despite a lack of strategic gains, but there will also be real pressure from some quarters to keep going, with all the risks that entails. Trump’s own words effectively endorsing regime change will be used as a prod.