Here is a short and accessible post on the contrast between #posttruth and #posttrust diagnoses of #sciencedenial for the blog of the American Philosophical Association. blog.apaonline.org/2026/02/03/s...

My Element on science denial is free to download until December 1st! Get it for free while you can! doi.org/10.1017/9781...

Excited to share that this is forthcoming as part of the Cambridge Elements in Philosophy of Science series! (Preprint downloadable through the link) philpapers.org/rec/CONSDP-2

I’m super excited to announce I'm part of an amazing team (<3 @williambrady.bsky.social @killianmcloughlin.bsky.social @mjcrockett.bsky.social) that just published a paper in @science.org on the role of outrage in spread of misinformation Link here: science.org/doi/10.1126/... Summary in🧵🔽 1/

How long before higher-ed admins finally realize that, if they eliminate instructors completely, they can cut costs and turn their university/college into an all-inclusive resort for those who want the “college experience” without the burden of getting an education in the process?

Nice idea, Gabriele. In this article, Michel Croce and I argue against the view that the norms of good friendship require epistemic partiality by appealing to the idea that friendship requires understanding.

This is the most recent one and thus my favorite. The title is descriptive: it's about how to apply norms of testimony / assertion to the presentation of graphs (and other depictions). Plus what (some) philosophers of science get wrong about honesty. onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/...

Here, I try to ground epistemic normativity in the internal rules of epistemic social practices. The view also vindicates the idea that reasons concerning social inquiry - what I call inquisitive reasons - can be counted as epistemic reasons in good standing. philpapers.org/rec/FLEEPA

What kind of beliefs should policymakers form when experts disagree? (probably not my favorite, but want to get it out there)

This is a service paper, trying to put the conceptual (and very basic formal) tools together to think about what collective inquiry is link.springer.com/article/10.1...

Knowledgeable voters are perhaps more dangerous to democracy than ignorant ones because they use their knowledge and intelligence to twist the facts and reason their way to whatever they want. philpapers.org/rec/HANASV

In this chapter on political deference, I argue that we can be required to defer to others on the ground of their epistemic authority. The account also explains why political deference to experts is not normally required, however. academic.oup.com/book/46053/c...

When you discredit knowers because of their identity, that's epistemic injustice. But when you limit their knowledge claims to their identity - by reducing it to 'experience' or to a fixed domain of knowledge (like gender studies) - that's epistemic positioning. journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/...

This is a paper where I argue that game theory is a critical tool for even the most "pure" of social epidemiologists. link.springer.com/article/10.1...

Upcoming handbook chapter offering an overview of the philosophical debate about epistemic injustice kicked up by Miranda Fricker's work, with an eye towards more sharply delineating the target phenomena from her particular theoretical and terminological choices:

Group belief ascriptions are highly ambiguous. What’s more, in many cases, neither the available contextual factors nor known pragmatic considerations are sufficient to allow the audience to identify which of the many possible meanings is intended. I argue we shouldn’t make such ascriptions.

"Bald-Faced Bullshit and Authoritarian Political Speech: Making Sense of Johnson and Trump. (Co-authored with Tim Kenyon). Defends a new definition of bullshit, which allows for audience variation. Discusses the role of Power Bullshit in authoritarianism. www.researchgate.net/publication/...

philpapers.org/rec/WORSCB The fact that a belief of yours is suspiciously convenient to you is a reason for you to become less confident that it's true. A kind of ideal epistemological theory can be used to resist this conclusion, but that only brings out the pathologies of such ideal theory.

Social Epistemologists: I was trying to populate a starter pack for us manually but got lazy and thought it would be much more fun to turn this into a game! Post a link to your favourite paper you wrote on the topic below with a post-length abstract and I’ll add you to it! #PhilSky #SocEpis

One project: arguing that information and its negations and perversions (mis/disinformation) are too epistemologically thin to bear the weight the current trust in science literature places on them.

Acknowledging the diversity of human experience should push us toward a recognition of vijñaptimātratā. But that doesn’t yield a form of idealism, or even a form of phenomenology; it opens up a pathway for the cultivation of a deeply embodied awareness of an ecological form of non-duality.

Not a trained philosopher, but hoping I'm allowed to play :) AI has the potential to "re-enchant" the world.. that might be a good thing, but it's probably a very bad thing.

I'm developing a logic of worldviews. What are world-views? How do they function as sign-systems? How do world-views, frameworks, Gestalts, ethical orientations, rules for arguments, etc. hang together? How can one compare world-views rationally? #philosophy #worldview #logic

When is attention good and when bad? What makes it good or bad?

People are not primarily attracted to conspiracy theories because of pathology, personality traits, or political commitments. Instead, people are drawn to CTs for aesthetic reasons: they have a taste for a particular type of story.

Courage has been neglected among the virtues (yes, I have receipts). Fear is underestimated and understudied by philosophers (esp. moral). Empirical and philosophical literatures on both attitudes tend to not talk much with other. My new book project will be an attempt at remedying these issues.

Knowingly killing people with haemophilia is bad and traumatised their kids and families. Then they don't trust you anymore or any healthcare. You need to do trauma informed care. Be better.

I prefer total, act, scalar utilitarianism, but with groups as well as individuals recognised as moral agents (which gets some of the benefits of rule utilitarianism and some of the politics of socialism). An objective account of welfare incorporating Marx's values as well as Bentham's.

Currently working on a couple of papers slightly nuancing this, by discounting the welfare of the far future, non-humans, and highly improbable outcomes

the disease debate in philosophy of medicine needs to attend more to the historical, social, and institutional factors that inform pathologization and depathologization. I'm applying this through work with a gender affirming healthcare service to explore implications of a depathologization model.

Workers should have a labor right to protected in-group communication and information sharing as a means of securing more foundational labor rights such as the rights to strike and unionization.

Many social epistemologists argue that distrusting experts is rational. I am looking at biomedical cases where it is not just rational, but the "patient experts" make a contribution to biomedical knowledge. The aim is to identify the structural features of these groups that allow them to do that.

I created a Social Philosophy Starter Pack. Please tell me who I should add (including you)! #philsky

Reminder that you can still submit an abstract; deadline is Nov 26. Nancy Cartwright, Hasok Chang, and Eran Tal keynoting - this discussion will be high energy ☄️🔥 #philsky #philsci

Paper on public engagement with science, showing that there are different kinds of publics that can be engaged, with normative differences and important implications for democratizing science #philsci #philsky #science #sts www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....

Preparing my remarks on this important new book by Leah McClimans. She is visiting Cambridge HPS today and the reading group on the book expertly organised and chaired by @miguelohn.bsky.social and @cristianlarph.bsky.social is finally meeting the author! #philsky #medsky

I’ve created a new feed for #philosophy job listings. It includes posts with the hashtags #PhilJob, #PhilJobs or #PhilosophyJobs, as well as links to philjobs.org. Save/pin and like the feed if you find it useful! 🙏 #PhilSky #academia bsky.app/profile/did:...

So as a philosopher primarily interested in social epistemology and science & value stuff what feeds should I follow (and how do I even follow them)? #noobquestions #philsky

Its only philosophy if it comes from the oxford region otherwise its just sparkling proletariat rabblerousing

Thanks for being such a good example of how *not* to collectively trust science, Florida!

PSA for BlueSky noobs like me!

There is no algorithm here on Bsky except the chronological posts of people you follow. Means it's easy to miss people's posts unless you/they use tags & feeds. You make your own algorithm here using topic feeds for whatever you are interested in & making use of their tags.

Lots of great papers are now out from PSA 2022. Here is where I disagree with what I said in 2021, and argue that not every responsibility in science should have an accountability mechanism! #philsci #sciencepolicy #philsky www.cambridge.org/core/journal...

Don't get me wrong: I love to have almost 500 followers here, but does anyone actually see my posts?!? Hello, hello hello, is there anybody out there?

Mark your calendars for the main conference on philosophy and methodology of economics! Sept 17-19 2025 in Bayreuth w great keynotes by @richardpettigrew.bsky.social @furmank.bsky.social, Wendy Carlin. The organisers and the Program Com are meticulous and inclusive #econsky #philsci #philsky

It's often assumed that #publictrustinscience is individualistic (ie it is primarily people who (mis)trust science) but it is actually social (ie it is primarily communities that (mis)trust science). This should lead us to rethink the ways in which we collectively use science to serve our purposes.

Okay I’m giving BlueSky another try. Let’s try this again!

As philosophers we are always at risk of reinventing the wheel, but the risk is especially serious if you have been trained to ignore feminist philosophy, as many analytic philosophers were (and, I bet, still are).

Sometimes I wish that middle-of-the-term me could have a word with syllabus-writing me!

As colleges and universities are increasingly focused on selling an experience (instead of imparting an education), people will become increasingly reluctant to pay that kind of money for a four-year-long vacation that leaves you only with a piece of paper to commemorate it.