We @fpri.bsky.social published insights from @salisbot.bsky.social @michaelbpetersen.bsky.social and Frank Hoffman about the challenges ahead for the US Navy as it considers how to take control of the Strait of Hormuz www.fpri.org/article/2026...

In 1991, it took a multi-national mine clearing task force of 40+ ships (plus aircraft) four months to clear Iraqi mines *after the war ended* and they knew where the mines were because they had the charts. Today, unmanned systems help, but the process is still extremely slow and dangerous. 1/

What intelligence is Russia giving Iran? It’s possible to speculate. Much will be space based imagery of various kinds. This is good for knowing what bases are being used when, and where aircraft may be parked. It can allow Iran to temporarily slow or halt airfield ops, or harass base personnel. 1/

Russia passing intelligence to Iran is challenging, but not game changing. Their ability to produce over the horizon dynamic targeting is limited. They can help with fixed targets, but moving targets are another thing entirely. And there’s the challenge of passing perishable intelligence to Iran.

I have no idea who Thomas Keith is but a lot of his tweets have been blowing up on both here and Twitter. All of his claims about things I know more than a little about have been false. This tweet is an example, he claims the classification date of a component to be the production date.

The Iranian Navy was never really a threat. But IRGCN FAC/FIACs and unmanned surface vessels are going to be a problem if/when Navy ships head back into the Gulf. Hopefully, the IRGCN has taken the same beating as the actual Iranian Navy.

Lots of good stuff here. And where I explain why the submarine CO who sank Dena could not have done otherwise. It’s worth knowing facts, context, and feasibility in that conversation.

Folks, you know less than you think about how submarine warfare works. Take a knee on this one.

It is remarkable how little industry knows about the Navy and vice versa.

In an odd confluence of social media arguments over professional military education and the Iran War, my old colleagues at the Naval War College have years of research showing how difficult it is to defeat Shahed attacks, something they’ve warned of for quite a long time.

A very important and welcome piece. Drones are dangerous. Their use is necessary. But maneuver, mission command, flexibility, and air power can mitigate impacts like those we see in Ukraine.

Lots of people going a few rounds on the other site over the war game sponsored by Die Welt. Won’t rehash the criticisms, but it’s always useful to remember that it’s just one single-pass war game. Its results aren’t dispositive and only reflect one possible outcome. That’s getting forgotten.

I’m thrilled join the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s (@fpri.bsky.social) Eurasia Program as a senior non-resident fellow, where I will be writing about Russian and European military and maritime power. Super stoked to rejoin my bud @emilyholland.bsky.social for critical work in a crucial time.

If the Russian Navy is increasing presence in the Baltic, this is a good thing in the long run. Burning readiness in response to NATO naval activity is a net loss. Increased operational tempo is more “expensive” for Russia than it is for NATO navies.

This is precisely what the Russians have been concerned about for years, and why they put so much intellectual emphasis on long-range precision strike.

I was very happy to talk about this with the Washington Post. There's quite a bit of hype about the Poseidon, but I'm not buying it. Gift article: wapo.st/3LiPswj

This is a reminder that a single Russian SSBN packs way more firepower than a Poseidon whatever-it-is.

One reason Russia has struggled so badly in UKR is the moribund state of Russian military operational art, which ensures tactical outcomes are linked to strategic goals. New CNA research with me, Paul Schwartz and @gabrielairosa.bsky.social shows how this is true. 1/2 www.cna.org/analyses/202...

We first met when he was a 1-star at Naval Forces Europe and have crossed paths quite frequently since. It’s not my job to blindly cheer on the Navy, but he’s a great choice; smart, demanding, creative, take-no-prisoners. He’ll work his staff hard, but he’ll also get results.

Detailed article quoting 🇬🇧 UK defence sources on 🇷🇺 Russia's undersea warfare, surveillance and maritime sabotage activities near Britain. Some highlights: a 🧵 1) 🇷🇺 Russian ASW sensors suspected of attempting to spy on the UK’s nuclear submarines have been found hidden in the seas around Britain.

A thoughtful thread worth a read. I might quibble on Russian submarine missions, but the larger point holds. And there are theater-wide implications beyond Norway. The Barents can be a key staging area for long-range attacks into the UK and Iceland. Adds to importance of UK/Norway partnership.

I’ve known ADM Franchetti since she took command of Sixth Fleet. We worked some hard warfighting problems together and it was a huge honor to be a part of her team when she became CNO.

This is one of my go-to’s in the face of the “just buy drones” crowd. A TLAM is, warhead-pound-per-dollar, already more cost effective than a Shahed, not even counting the guidance system, survivability, and modular deployability advantages. Drones are good but not perfect.

Asked if Russia would be allowed to maintain its naval port at Tartus and the Hmeimim air base in Latakia, Abu Qasra said: “If we get benefits for Syria out of this, yes.” www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/0...

I won’t take sides in this argument, but the bottom line is that no matter what the reason for this latest incident, Russia’s dark fleet is a significant danger in the maritime environment and requires more thoroughgoing and permanent policy solutions beyond stationing naval vessels in the Baltic.

I’ve made this argument before but it bears repeating based on the latest ceasefire new: if CENTCOM’s strategic objectives in the Red Sea include the restoration of white shipping, you have to understand that corporate incentives are not neatly aligned towards a quick return to the Suez route.

I was Halsey Alfa faculty for a year before setting up a similar program for Russia. Hands down, Halsey Alfa is *the* premier US/China warfighting analytic and educational program in the US Navy. It goes far, far beyond any other China warfighting analysis in the world. There’s nothing like it.

I’m not a skeptic of China’s military power, but a common theme of Chinese military equipment in Russian hands is that it is highly unreliable. Why would this be different if it was in Chinese hands? Either Russia analysts are overstating it or China analysts are ignoring it. What gives?

One outcome of the Ukraine War is that U.S leadership has begun planning for the possibility of protraction while Russian strategy writers continue to rely on the idea of a short, sharp war with NATO.

Hegseth thinks ADM Franchetti is an example of "the perils of promoting diversity and inclusion?" If true, he is wrong. I've known her since 2018 & worked for her in 2023/24 as CNO. She's successfully commanded fleets, strike groups, & destroyer squadrons. She's for real. www.wsj.com/articles/joh...

Looks like folks may have counted Russia out of Syria too soon. (Probably the same people who refuse to capitalize Russia’s name, I’d wager.) www.bloomberg.com/news/article...

One possible outcome among many here is a renegotiated basing agreement that has more balanced terms than the one currently in effect.

An exceptional thread as always. To this, I'd add a point about sealift. Unless Russia has to leave immediately (they don't right now), you will see more ships at Tartus, not fewer.

The Kremlin claims to be in contact with "representatives of the armed Syrian opposition" and supposedly got guarantees on "the security of Russian military bases and diplomatic institutions in Syria." tass.ru/mezhdunarodn...

I’ve said it elsewhere, but unless they leave a lot of equipment behind, perhaps a better indication of imminent evacuation of Tartus is more Russian sealift appearing there, not less.

Everyone seems focused on Russia fleeing Tartus/Humeimim, but it seems an equal possibility that Moscow may try to cut a deal with HTS to maintain presence at both. This is of course speculation, but seems plausible.

A thousand times, this.

Reading a Russian account of the 2022 Battle of Gostomel and came across this tidbit I didn't know: Russian paratroops were supposedly supplied with two days of lethal ammunition and a day's supply of rubber bullets. So they were expecting maybe a day of light resistance and some civil pacification.

Russian warships are back in Tartus. So they are not "fleeing." This is a plea for putting a little sobriety back into analysis.

“Russia had recently switched to a Chinese motor after Western countries imposed sanctions to block Moscow’s access to Western technology.” Chinese equipment on Russian platforms often fails, begging the question of how often it fails on Chinese platforms. www.washingtonpost.com/national-sec...

An important read that gets to the heart of a critical question that “All in on Ukraine” Biden Admin critics haven’t faced: that the admin has to balance considerations that its critics do not. Criticize Biden for sure (I do), but be fair and recognize that his constraints are greater than yours.

Who knows if they are loaded and/or what they are loaded with, but this photo depicts 40 Kalibr-capable vertical launch tubes plus 4-6 more Kalibrs loaded into torpedo tubes. They are probably not fully loaded, if at all, but this is still nothing to sneeze at.

What motivates Russian soldiers in Ukraine? There's an interesting survey on combat motivation in Ukraine published in, oddly, the August 2024 edition of Morskoi Sbornik. The survey period was through January 2024 and points to soldiers' evolving motivations. Some highlights: 1/9

This is my annual Thanksgiving post: 2018 on USS Harry S. Truman. The CSs and supply officers work their hardest on the days the rest of the crew is trying to have some fun. The scale of the effort is made clear in the menu below. Have a happy holiday and keep in mind those far from home.

My old institute published a translation of Russia’s latest nuclear doctrine. Very useful for non-Russian readers. digital-commons.usnwc.edu/rmsi_researc...

Great thread. Olya’s who I always look to for these smart observations on Russian nukes.

Beware monocausal explanations of the Dnipro strikes. At the moment, 3 non-competing explanations appear to be true: assured target destruction (maybe), battlefield testing, and yes, signaling. Military decision making to use a weapon of this type usually has many motivations.

Interesting. Is Russia reviving operational art? Maybe, but details matter, & the picture described here requires the Russian military to fix basic problems first, like creating a universal common operating picture, improving joint C2 at the operational level, & well, not shooting down its own jets.

A peek into some current research: How do the Russian Aerospace Forces understand the air war in Ukraine? Deputy Commander of the Aerospace Forces Colonel General Sergei Dronov wrote on this in early 2024. Air combat in Ukraine, he writes, 1...