It’s live! The U.S. Navy Fighting Instructions are ADM Caudle’s thesis on how the Navy adapts to dynamic adversaries. They are how the Navy builds a repeatable process to organize, train, and equip a force that is capable of deterring a fight and ending one.

"Latvia finds no link between ship and Baltic cable breach, probe goes on." This is a helpful reminder of two defining features of the critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) challenge.

What does it mean when an attack is designed to be intercepted?

April 13, 2024. Iran launches hundreds of drones and missiles against Israel. Almost none hits. No one is killed. No critical infrastructure is destroyed. It was not a failure. As I argue, this is performative aggression, a game of bumper cars in a world long defined by games of chicken.

My latest in War on the Rocks

In 2019 I published a book on maritime insecurity, and in particular the challenge of aligning constabulary ways with military means. I argued at the time that, as maritime security threats rose in sophistication, it would be increasingly appealing to apply military resources to counter them.

This @warontherocks.bsky.social article offers a valuable, skeptical assessment of how transformative first-person view (FPV) drones have been on the Ukrainian battlefield—and is a great illustration of why it matters to collect data on the ground.

As the kinetic nature of the Israeli strikes on Iran capture attention, there are also other impacts across the maritime space, particularly looking at energy and commercial SLOCs, worth tracking.

It was a pleasure to rejoin the Sailor Pulse podcast to talk about the good, bad, and indifferent in Navy’s “fight from the MOC” journey. This was an interesting and fun discussion that reflects the underlying aspirations and frustrations in how fleet commanders envision the role of MOCs in war.

Who could have seen that coming…

I’ve rarely seen a command execute thoughtful in-stride campaign analysis. This should be a five alarm concern for CCDRs, the inability to monitor and self-assess operational level progress turns a four star into chief tactician instead of the strategic leader they’ve been selected to be.

Rhymes with my own analysis from prior to Operation Rough Rider as well. warontherocks.com/2025/04/how-...

CIMSEC IS RECRUITING! CIMSEC is now welcoming applications for a volunteer Deputy Editor-in-Chief. This person will be responsible for helping lead CIMSEC’s editorial operation. Please reach out to [email protected] to apply and for further details. www.linkedin.com/posts/dmitry...

It was a pleasure to join @thecipherbrief.bsky.social to talk about the importance of the Arctic to the U.S.. In addition to the usual talking points on national security, I tried to also emphasize economics, trade, and climate here, without which we cannot understand global interest in the region.

This piece on the EU contribution to Red Sea defense is a nice pairing to the War on the Rocks piece I wrote on Operation Prosperity Guardian earlier this month. The author takes the EU perspective well and notes (with fairness) that many analyses (including mine, I'd add) are quite US-focused.

From me in Defense News: The recent maritime EO mandated 90-day assessment of how allies and trade policy relate to domestic shipbuilding. I have some ideas, and they start with weighing our strengths (innovation, software, tech) against our allies (huge preexisting maritime capital expenditures).

Trying real hard to reach that one guy in N97!

Want to write for War on the Rocks?

You can find my full article on the subject here: warontherocks.com/2025/04/how-...

Why has shipping in the Red Sea failed to return to pre-conflict levels? The answer has little to do with bombs and drones, but rather insurance, demand, and geopolitics. warontherocks.com/episode/the-...

Some professional news! www.cna.org/our-media/pr...

Thank you to Kerry Anderson and War on the Rocks for having me on The Insider podcast to discuss my recent article on the Red Sea. You can read that article here: warontherocks.com/2025/04/how-...

I’ve always admired @csis.org’s innovation in visual storytelling. This article on Chinese shipbuilding is worth a read on the merits, but the thoughtful depiction makes it really stand out. Think tankers take note of interesting ideas on the intersection of analysis and research communication.

#Houthis Great piece by @doctallis.bsky.social @warontherocks.bsky.social warontherocks.com/2025/04/how-...

The Red Sea crisis exposed a hard truth: strategy needs more than firepower.

Tactical victories don’t always equal strategic success — just look at the Red Sea crisis. https://warontherocks.com/2025/04/how-the-biden-administration-won-tactically-but-failed-strategically-in-the-red-sea/

Operation Prosperity Guardian was directionally right. Protecting maritime commerce is the kind of global public good that I would expect a superpower to provision in defense of the global trading system. The U.S. Navy provided nearly flawless tactical acumen in its execution.

It has been such an honor to be a part of Team 33.

David is spot on. The lack of process, leadership, and guidance will be a boon for the services. To which I would add, there is consequently a big risk to coordinated capability development. If everyone is rushing to their corners and no one is in charge, that’s not a good recipe for “Joint.”

The Proceedings shipbuilding edition is a real contribution to the debate on DIB and force design—congratulations to @navalinstitute.bsky.social for orchestrating an important group of commentators. There is a great balance of perspective particularly on industry incentives versus constraints.

I’m struck by the number of articles from former senior Defense officials that don’t deliver on their central value proposition—deep knowledge of how internal systems and processes work. I’m begging publishers to encourage big names to say more than what anyone else could have written…

This is an important article given the zeitgeist lately around shipbuilding and the defense industrial base. Navy (like all of DoD) tends to overestimates its throw weight in the economy and often misunderstands the fundamental business incentives that govern shipbuilder performance.

If DOGE wants to increase government efficiency it should get Congress to buy some snow plows for this city. Schools closed because of 3 inches of snow…

Another shot across the bow for everyone working in federal research and analysis.

Interesting details in @economist.com on the state of the Global South’s view of Chinese claims to Taiwan, and some significant diplomatic wins that China has accrued over the last year-and-a-half. www.economist.com/internationa...

This is one of my go-to’s in the face of the “just buy drones” crowd. A TLAM is, warhead-pound-per-dollar, already more cost effective than a Shahed, not even counting the guidance system, survivability, and modular deployability advantages. Drones are good but not perfect.

I’ve made this argument before but it bears repeating based on the latest ceasefire new: if CENTCOM’s strategic objectives in the Red Sea include the restoration of white shipping, you have to understand that corporate incentives are not neatly aligned towards a quick return to the Suez route.

The latest details on Navy munitions expenditures in the Red Sea underscore a thesis I explored in @warontherocks.bsky.social this summer—that the rise of unmanned systems in war at sea must still be understood in the context of an attritional, missile-dominated kind of warfare.

31 copies of The War for Muddy Waters sold between June and November alone. Not bad for a book that just passed its five year publish-versary! Thank you for the support. Paperback options are now available for low prices at the Naval Institute Press. www.usni.org/press/books/...

“We will have to outthink… the think tank.”

If you know the history of the Navy and Marine Corps since WWII, you know the history of CNA--you just might not realize it yet. I was excited to join the War on the Rocks Sailor Pulse podcast with Andrew Tenbusch to talk about what your Navy and Marine Corps FFRDC does and why it matters.

Steve Wills has a great piece in Proceedings on the Navy’s goal to achieve 80% combat surge readiness. This may sound like a fully process-optimization kind of problem, but as Steve lays out, Navy force generation always reverse engineers to the strategic environment.

Curious about how these arguments reflect at sea. All the examples here are fundamentally land-centric, and many are COIN in nature. At sea, your kit really does matter, I don’t know how much one can substitute in resolve for technical superiority.

Notable for its potential implications for the US to funnel maritime security assistance in the Horn of Africa. www.semafor.com/article/12/1...

During COVID, thousands of seafarers became stranded at sea. The close of the pandemic has not, however, brought an end to the exploitation of perhaps the world's most essential and invisible class of workers. The war in Ukraine trapped mariners in Black Sea ports, Houthi strikes endangered more.

This year has underscored how important it is to understand the relationship between non-state actors and maritime security. More to the point, we’ve seen how an inability to address threats from such groups can confound the world’s most competent Navy. The COIN trap is not unique to land forces.

This is my annual Thanksgiving post: 2018 on USS Harry S. Truman. The CSs and supply officers work their hardest on the days the rest of the crew is trying to have some fun. The scale of the effort is made clear in the menu below. Have a happy holiday and keep in mind those far from home.

New SECNAV announcement. www.navytimes.com/news/pentago...

“We should also respect the law of physics. That is, the Pacific is a contested space of about 8,000 miles of ocean by 8,000 miles of ocean. So, a pocket drone that can stay airborne for an hour ain’t going to do it.” ADM Paparo at @brookingsinst.bsky.social. www.youtube.com/watch?v=USX6...