I was an exhibit a few weeks back on atomic age posters — some pro, some anti — at Poster House in NYC... some thoughts on nuclear posters that work: doomsdaymachines.net/p/critical-m...

Right now. Washington, DC. Oh well...

Note this at the end of the letter: "Thank you for your attention to this highly important matter." :-)

If you think about it, one can, in fact, imagine 'Art. 5-style' guarantees plus no foreign troops in Ukraine plus a small(ish) Ukrainian army. One can even imagine that Moscow would be okay with it. But this would go very much against the conventional wisdom.

oof

Am I the only one who gets annoyed by this kind of stuff ChatGPT 5 adds to its answers? (I asked for an image of an ICBM silo)

We've launched our first-ever short fiction contest! Entries can be of any genre, as long as they have some connection to (avoiding) the apocalypse. The first-place wins $3,000, with $500 each to four runners-up. The deadline for submissions is September 30, 2025. thebulletin.org/write-before...

A very useful take on how we got here: compactmag.com/article/how-... I'd say it's rather biased, but you can imagine that from the Kremlin things looked like orders of magnitude darker. This is not to excuse Moscow, but it's useful to see this perspective.

Come work with me, @russianforces.org, and other great people at @unidir.org's WMD Programme as a Graduate Professional in Geneva or remotely unidir.org/job/graduate...

Hello! I have written a short article about the atomic bombings, and the anniversary that I think gets overlooked — when Truman *stopped* further atomic bombing, and why he did so. thebulletin.org/2025/08/trum...

No Constant Phoenix visiting Novaya Zemlya today - but an aircraft is visible off Pankovo in this morning's Sentinel 2 pass. As it is within restricted & sovereign airspace, it is likely one of the Russian monitoring aircraft operating from Rogachevo Airbase in support of the Burevestnik test.

Fair enough to say that it's hard to trust Russia after it did this or violated that. But it's puzzling to see this turned into "one cannot ever have an agreement with Russia" (on INF in particular, but not only). It doesn't work like that. 1/

PhD level

In case you missed it, here is "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988" history.state.gov/historicaldo...

Guess who got a 🚨FOIA release🚨! After 6 years. Will have upload link momentarily. #NukeSky #OpenSky Nuclear Weapon Safety from Production to Retirement, Stan Spray. You can enable my work: paypal.me/nuclearanthro patreon.com/nuclearanthro Afaik, I am 1st to put record into public: 1/2

К 80ой годовщине ядерной бомбардировки Хиросимы попал в сюжет Ильи Варламова о ядерном оружии в компании Димы Ковчегина и @russianforces.org www.youtube.com/watch?v=ENJs...

There are a lot of horrifying photographs of the damage and human toll at Hiroshima. But it's still this one that sticks in my mind the most. Noboricho Elementary School, about 1 km from ground zero. School children were an important source of data about the bomb's mortality. 98% fatalities.

I said it before and will say it again - had the US seriously engaged with Russia's October 2020 INF+9M729 moratorium proposal (like, by forming negotiating teams at the July 2021 summit), the war in Ukraine would have been averted. 1/

The idea of moving US ballistic missile submarines around for signaling purposes is not exactly new. Just a year ago, in July 2024, a perfectly Nuclear Submarine USS Tennessee made a very visible visit to the Norwegian Sea (link below) 1/

Russia is preparing to renounce the US-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA). The cabinet will consider the issue on 31 July. The agreement, is inactive since 2016 - Russia suspended it in response to the US unilaterally changing its disposition method. 1/

Knyaz Pozharsky, a submarine of the Borey-A/Project 955A class transferred to Russian navy russianforces.org/blog/2025/07... There was a delay, presumably to conduct a Bulava launch, which is normally part of the state acceptance trials. But it appears that the launch didn't happen.

“Containerized Mobile Vaults would give U.S. military commanders globally more flexibility to forward-deploy nuclear weapons, any other highly sensitive assets, if required.”

I'm pretty certain nobody (who reads this) knows the answer, but I'll try. Last July Jill Hruby said that Norway "will be the 49th country" to have all HEU removed energy.gov/nnsa/article.... The problem is that in 2018 Nigeria was the 33rd such country energy.gov/nnsa/article... 1/

New: Iran will receive IAEA technical team, considering new talks with US open.substack.com/pub/diplomat...

A serious question: How exactly does counterforce targeting strengthen extended deterrence? The answers I've found so far are largely "because it does." Examples below 1/

Why do all nuclear war scenarios start with someone firing missiles at the US and the US president having to make that decision in so many minutes? I think it's totally unrealistic - the US will strike first if it ever comes to it.

I need help with a question. I have an empty ICBM silo that I hope to use again some day. Can I open the silo cover and keep it open for a few days? The hot launch silos should be sturdy enough to take this. Are they? Examples (photos, sat images) are appreciated. Thanks!

Ankit @nktpnd.bsky.social is right to criticize the Europeans. I would add that Europe has a valuable lever in this situation - it could promise (in some form) not to invoke snapback if Iran stays in NPT and (of course) cooperates with the IAEA. on.ft.com/4eupG2z

It's a bit more complicated. Grossi did mention "decades" but definitely not in a way of agreeing with the estimate. I'd say "Si peut-être des décennies par rapport à quoi ?" is more like "If it's decades then relative to what?"

Amid speculations about the effects of attacks on Iran - did they set back the program years or mere months? - NYT quotes Grossi as saying that it's "perhaps decades." The problem is, Grossi didn't say that. Like, at all. 1/ www.nytimes.com/2025/06/26/w...

I guess my point is that in the US discussion you seem to be better off emphasizing "ineffective" rather than "counterproductive" (not to mention "illegal"). That tells you something about US discussion and that is what's frustrating.

It's rather disturbing that in US those who oppose strikes on Iran feel they have to argue that the strikes were too feeble to really destroy the program. I know that people want to say that a JCPOA-style agreement would have been (still is) a better choice, but that's not quite how it comes out

It is reasonable to assume that Iran had moved its stock of 60% HEU before the US strike. But was it "stored in special casks small enough to fit in the trunks of about 10 cars"? That's not clear. Actual cylinders may not be that small and moving them wouldn't be easy 1/

Interesting results from @ecfr.eu polling of European public on defense: Poland most pro nuclear proliferation with Portugal (?) not far behind. UK public more pro a European nuke force than expanding the UK's arsenal. French more pro expanding own nuclear force than UK. ecfr.eu/publication/...

Today in 1961, the Antarctic Treaty entered into force, affirming that Antarctica is exclusively for peaceful, scientific uses by demilitarizing the entire continent, creating the first nuclear-weapon-free zone (covering testing and deployment), and banning the disposal of radioactive wastes.

It's worth keeping in mind that 60% HEU is already a reasonable weapon material. See the critical mass graph (from an IPFM report 2010). The only true threshold is 6% or so. Even 20% LEU can be used in an explosive device (albeit a very big one).

True also for all nuclear weapon states 👇

You know what would have offered Iran much better protection than nuclear weapons? Having a reasonable (non-aggressive) policy toward its neighbors.

Pre-empting the inevitable "See, nobody is bombing North Korea because it has nuclear weapons" takes, I'd note that NK didn't have weapons at some point. US was preparing to attack in 1994, but went with the Agreed Framework instead (which worked despite later unrelated problems). 1/2

Putin on Bushehr yesterday - "We have agreed with the Israeli leadership that their [Russians in Bushehr] safety will be ensured." en.kremlin.ru/events/presi... Rosatom's Likhachev today: "We've evacuated some people and are about to evacuate everybody." www.interfax.ru/forumspb/103... (RU)

What I am hearing is that Israeli officials are hedging - yes, "it was a mistake to say," but wouldn't say directly that the Busher was not hit (I certainly hope it wasn't).

The story was updated - "Israel says 'it was a mistake' to say Iran's Bushehr was hit" www.reuters.com/world/middle... Some mistake... Deleting the earlier post (below)

As many people noted, it wasn't that bad in the original German... The problem, of course, nobody listens to interviews (in German) these days. It's the soundbite that goes around (see attached). And, of course, people see what's being and not being done by governments

Merz's 'dirty work' remark is appalling (as is the apparent quiet approval by other Europeans). It's like people openly admit that this whole 'rules-based thing' is just a pretense.

When I wrote about this back in December, my conclusion was that from a non-proliferation perspective, attacking Osirak was not a success www.chathamhouse.org/publications...

Someone asked me about the Osirak bombing in 1981 - wasn't it a good thing? I'm not quite sure. Imagine if Israel and allies would mobilize states to impose strong IAEA controls, push for early development of AP, that kind of thing. Everybody would have gained from stronger institution.

This should be interesting - as I understand it, the commission was able to get the Pentagon to tell them something about targeting. It won't be in the public report, I guess, but the results should reflect it. It will be webcast at www.nationalacademies.org/event/45265_...

Not many people will mourn Iran's nuclear program (or Iran's military for that matter). But unless it's dismantled or constrained lawfully (difficult but not impossible), the dismantlement will create problems down the road.

The "nuclear weapons prevent an invasion/regime change" idea is based on cases that don't really prove it. With Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine one can only say they were invaded while they didn't have weapons. Note that it's while, not because of. 1/