Russian oil and gas revenues in October 2025 were 888.6 billion rubles ($10.9 billion), or 27% below October 2024.

Russia's budget deficit will be even larger this year and could reach 3.5% of GDP. The recent budget correction assumes 42.8 trillion RUB expenditure, but Q4 would have to be historically frugal to achieve that target. After Q3, already 72% of the plan was spent. 66% is normal.

I don't understand why Bluesky still won't allow me to create my own private feeds or lists. It just doesn't make sense, and is maybe the most important weakness that keeps me from coming here more often. I don't want to have economics, Ukraine frontline and US politics in the same feed. It's chaos.

"Die Funktion der Diplomatie ist das Fixieren von Ergebnissen, die im Theater des Krieges erreicht wurden." So der russische Regime-Denker Dmitri Trenin. Das sollten sich die deutschen Putin-Versteher mal zu Gemüte führen. Auch sonst ein interessanter Text: www.kommersant.ru/doc/8158919

Die Sanktionen von Trump und der EU wirken - aber sie werden kaum die russische Wirtschaft kurzfristig in den Crash treiben oder Putin dazu bringen, seinen Angriffskrieg zu beenden. So meine Kurz-Version des Deep-Dives mit @jakluge.de 👇 www.ardaudiothek.de/episode/urn:...

Another explanation for the stronger ruble: Some of Russia's oil taxes are paid quarterly, with the next round due at the end of the month. Russian oil exporters are exchanging export revenues into rubles to pay for these taxes.

The ruble is strengthening at the moment. It also strengthened after the US sanctioned Surgutneftegaz and Gazprom Neft in January. One explanation is that Rosneft and Lukoil are transferring cash into Russia to protect it from being frozen.

Estimating Russian military spending as of 31.8.2025: Step 1/2 Federal budget totals (bn RUB) 27,920 total spending - 20,160 open spending ------------------------- 7,760 classified spending ====================

»Die russische Wirtschaft war berauscht von den Militärausgaben, und jetzt kommt der Kater«, sagt @jakluge.de im Interview mit @faznet.bsky.social (Paywall). 👇 www.faz.net/aktuell/wirt...

"The new sanctions will not have a dramatic impact on the economy, says Russia expert @jakluge.de . But the situation in the country has changed: Reserves are exhausted, there is a threat of recession. People are facing tougher times." 🎁 link

Maxim Kireev @zeit.de zu den Ölsanktionen der USA - u.a. mit Einschätzungen von @jakluge.de (Geschenklink ohne Paywall) www.zeit.de/politik/ausl...

Russian gasoline prices: Still rising, but not as fast anymore. Gasoline prices are heavily regulated, so it's not clear if this means that the crisis is over.

Good morning Bulgaria and Romania!

I was never so happy to say that I was wrong: Trump actually did it. He imposed new sanctions on Russia. home.treasury.gov/news/press-r...

Wie wirken Krieg und Sanktionen auf Russlands Wirtschaft, und welche Effekte haben die ukrainischen Angriffe auf Öl-Raffinerien und -depots? Ein Gespräch mit @jakluge.de www.zdf.de/nachrichten/...

Russia's retail gasoline prices are rising at the highest pace since the start of the fullscale war. The accumulated price increase is also the highest. The 2023 price increase was not a scarcity like 2025, but a reduction in subsidies (you can see when the policy was reversed).

How many Russian soldiers have died in the war against Ukraine? I made my own estimate based on regional budget data. The results are very close to those of Mediazona's "200" project, even though they use an entirely different data source.

Glitch in der ARD-Wettervorhersage?

I've updated my Russian budget browser with the latest data for 2026. In comparison to previous years, Russian military spending is supposed to fall by almost 1% of GDP next year... (unclear what the underlying assumptions are regarding the war against Ukraine)

The Russian Finance Ministry now expects a deficit of 2.6% of GDP in 2025. Original plan was 0.5%, revised in June to 1.7%. The extra deficit will be financed with additional borrowing ~1% of GDP, leaving the National Wealth Fund intact (~2% of GDP liquid assets). www.interfax.ru/business/104...

Russian budget figures for 2026: Revenue: 40.283 trillion rubles (of that: 8.9 trillion from oil+gas) Expenditure: 44.869 trillion rubles Planned deficit: 4.6 trillion rubles (~2% of GDP) Source: government.ru/news/56304/

As rumored in recent weeks, Russia is increasing its VAT rate from 20% to 22% in 2026. This increase is explicitly linked to rising military expenditure by MinFin. It will generate ~0.5% of GDP in additional revenue (Russian mil. spending is ~8.5% so far in 2025). www.kommersant.ru/doc/8060398?...

I updated the data for Russia's GDP in H1/2025 (99.7 trillion). Russian military spending was firmly above 8% of GDP in the first half of 2025 (my estimates don't include a couple of smaller components and are slightly below what SIPRI methodology would suggest). budget.jakluge.de?view=0&id=52...

Russian recruitment continues at a high pace. Regional budget data suggests 35,000 new contracts in August. Federal budget data for Q2 indicated a much lower number, but the reason is probably technical (delayed spending at the federal level).

You may have noticed that Russian tax income from gas extraction fell significantly this year (while Gazprom's profits held up surprisingly well). The reason: Gazprom got a massive tax cut this year worth $7.5 billion.

Russian oil and gas revenues remained very low in August, amounting to just 505 billion rubles or 2.8% of GDP. Oil taxes recovered slightly since June, but fuel subsidies increased as well. Chart in % of GDP:

In the first half of 2025, Russia spent more on its military than in all of 2022, and a little less than in all of 2023.

In the first half of 2025, Russian military spending was close to $300 billion (purchasing power parity). Usually, there is more military spending in the second half of the year, so Russian military spending of $600 billion PPP in 2025 is realistic. Link to source below.

Russian military spending is almost 50% (!) of budget revenues in the first half of 2025. This is the result of low revenues and the ever increasing costs of the war. Revenues in H1 were 17.6 trillion RUB, estimated military spending 8.5 trillion. budget.jakluge.de?view=0&id=52...

Spending on sign-on bonuses from the federal budget was surprisingly low in Q2. Regional data suggests that the pace of recruitment has not slowed, so I assume that it is a data issue or related to timing of spending (next quarters my be bigger). budget.jakluge.de?view=1&id=52...

Russia's highly unpopular pension reform of 2018 really helps the budget. Subsidies to the pension system have come down (> 1 million Covid deaths in Russia played a role, too). PS: in late 2022, Russia "prepaid" some pension subsidies to shift funds into 2023. See: budget.jakluge.de?view=2&id=52...

Russia's public debt is low, but because of very high interest rates, servicing that debt is still expensive. In the first two quarters, debt servicing amounted to 1.5% of GDP (year-to-date). Direct link to chart: budget.jakluge.de?view=0&id=52...

Fighting the war against Ukraine is becoming more expensive every year for Moscow. Russia is not on a sustainable path, but Putin assumes that Ukraine / Europe will falter before his economy does. Here is a link to the chart: budget.jakluge.de?view=0&id=52...

In the first two quarters of this year, Russian military spending was close to 40% of total federal budget spending. You can analyze the data yourself with the latest version of my budget browser: budget.jakluge.de

As expected, the Kremlin said NYET to a Zelenskyy-Putin meeting: "Putin and Trump supported the idea of continuing the direct talks between the DELEGATIONS of Russia and Ukraine. It was agreed to explore the possibility of raising the level of the representatives of the Russian and Ukrainian side.."

Russian federal military spending was already 8.5 trillion RUB (4% of GDP) in the first half of 2025, almost as much as after three quarters last year and in the full year of 2023. Full year 2025 could be over 8% of GDP... (PS: The charts were made with budget.jakluge.de -> Timeseries).

One crucial fact to always keep in mind: 👉Putin will never accept any outcome of the war that leaves Ukraine free and functioning.👈 It is out of the question. The reddest of red lines. No shades of grey, no exceptions. If it seems like Putin is agreeing to this, it's a trap.

Ich habe die Sorge, dass in Deutschland viele wirklich glauben, wir wären nach Alaska auf einem diplomatischen Weg zum Frieden. Trump will jetzt die Kapitulation der Ukraine, natürlich verkleidet als "Friedensdeal". Das hätte für uns in Europa dramatische Konsequenzen. Es gibt nichts Gutes daran.

The sustainability of Russia's war effort is relative... (Wall Street Journal, www.wsj.com/world/how-wi...).

Großer Erfolg für Putin in Alaska: Trump hat das Narrativ "besser großer Friedensdeal als schneller Waffenstillstand" komplett übernommen. Also kein Druck mehr auf Putin, stattdessen möglicherweise mehr Druck von Trump auf Europa und Ukraine.

Putin sieht sich im Krieg gegen die Ukraine auf der Siegerstraße, er sieht auch, wie der Westen schwächelt. Deshalb wäre es naiv, gerade jetzt auf ein Entgegenkommen Putins zu hoffen. www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/s...

»Ich glaube, dass die Diskussionen über Gebietsabtretungen in die Irre führen. Denn Putin hat deutlich höher und weiter gesteckte Ziele, und es gibt keine Anzeichen dafür, dass sich an diesen Zielen etwas geändert hat«, sagt @jakluge.de: www.ardmediathek.de/video/Y3JpZD...

Es ist bei uns leider normal geworden, darüber zu diskutieren, welche "Gebietsabtretungen" die Ukraine leisten soll. Das ist und bleibt eine zutiefst imperialistische Perspektive, es ist die Sprache von Putin und Trump und wir sollten sie nicht gedankenlos übernehmen. www.daserste.de/information/...

To achieve the 2.5% full year growth for 2025 that Russia uses in its budget forecasts, Russian GDP would have to grow by almost 5% between now and the end of the year. A continuation of the current trend would lead to 0.7% full year GDP growth in 2025.

It looks like Russia narrowly avoided falling into a technical recession. According to Rosstat, growth (year over year) in the second quarter was 1.1%, implying a slight increase in output in the second quarter (+0.2% quarter over quarter). This is very early data, of course.

I recently updated the Russian budget browser: The latest version allows you to analyze federal budget laws and execution data from 2018 to 2025, as well as filter by military spending. A slightly more detailed description: janiskluge.substack.com/p/new-and-im... and the link: budget.jakluge.de

Einschätzungen zu Putin/Trump: Wenn der Gipfel stattfindet wäre es ein großer Erfolg für Russlands Präsident Putin. Die Europäer sollten im Vorfeld des Gipfels klarmachen, dass sie nicht von ihrer Ukraine-Unterstützung abweichen werden. www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/v...

Russia's budget deficit after 7 months is 2.2% of GDP. Last year, it was 0.5% of GDP after 7 months and 1.7% of GDP after 12 months. Because of the slowing economy and low oil prices, Russia's deficit could realistically reach 3% of GDP this year. Source: minfin.gov.ru/ru/press-cen...

Falls es wirklich zu einem Trump-Putin Gipfel kommt, ist das alleine schon für Putin großer Erfolg. Es ist das erste Treffen eines US-Präsidenten seit Beginn der Vollinvasion. Und das aus einer Situation heraus, in der der US-Präsident Russland immer schärfer kritisiert und Sanktionen angedroht hat.

Trump setzt Zölle als Allzweckwaffe ein - aktuell gegen Indien wegen der Ölgeschäfte mit Russland. Er sucht nach Möglichkeiten, Staaten wie Indien unter Druck zu setzen und Konzessionen zu erpressen, so @jakluge.de in der @wirtschaftswoche.bsky.social : www.wiwo.de/politik/ausl...