I updated the data for Russia's GDP in H1/2025 (99.7 trillion). Russian military spending was firmly above 8% of GDP in the first half of 2025 (my estimates don't include a couple of smaller components and are slightly below what SIPRI methodology would suggest). budget.jakluge.de?view=0&id=52...

Russian recruitment continues at a high pace. Regional budget data suggests 35,000 new contracts in August. Federal budget data for Q2 indicated a much lower number, but the reason is probably technical (delayed spending at the federal level).

You may have noticed that Russian tax income from gas extraction fell significantly this year (while Gazprom's profits held up surprisingly well). The reason: Gazprom got a massive tax cut this year worth $7.5 billion.

Russian oil and gas revenues remained very low in August, amounting to just 505 billion rubles or 2.8% of GDP. Oil taxes recovered slightly since June, but fuel subsidies increased as well. Chart in % of GDP:

In the first half of 2025, Russia spent more on its military than in all of 2022, and a little less than in all of 2023.

In the first half of 2025, Russian military spending was close to $300 billion (purchasing power parity). Usually, there is more military spending in the second half of the year, so Russian military spending of $600 billion PPP in 2025 is realistic. Link to source below.

Russian military spending is almost 50% (!) of budget revenues in the first half of 2025. This is the result of low revenues and the ever increasing costs of the war. Revenues in H1 were 17.6 trillion RUB, estimated military spending 8.5 trillion. budget.jakluge.de?view=0&id=52...

Spending on sign-on bonuses from the federal budget was surprisingly low in Q2. Regional data suggests that the pace of recruitment has not slowed, so I assume that it is a data issue or related to timing of spending (next quarters my be bigger). budget.jakluge.de?view=1&id=52...

Russia's highly unpopular pension reform of 2018 really helps the budget. Subsidies to the pension system have come down (> 1 million Covid deaths in Russia played a role, too). PS: in late 2022, Russia "prepaid" some pension subsidies to shift funds into 2023. See: budget.jakluge.de?view=2&id=52...

Russia's public debt is low, but because of very high interest rates, servicing that debt is still expensive. In the first two quarters, debt servicing amounted to 1.5% of GDP (year-to-date). Direct link to chart: budget.jakluge.de?view=0&id=52...

Fighting the war against Ukraine is becoming more expensive every year for Moscow. Russia is not on a sustainable path, but Putin assumes that Ukraine / Europe will falter before his economy does. Here is a link to the chart: budget.jakluge.de?view=0&id=52...

In the first two quarters of this year, Russian military spending was close to 40% of total federal budget spending. You can analyze the data yourself with the latest version of my budget browser: budget.jakluge.de

As expected, the Kremlin said NYET to a Zelenskyy-Putin meeting: "Putin and Trump supported the idea of continuing the direct talks between the DELEGATIONS of Russia and Ukraine. It was agreed to explore the possibility of raising the level of the representatives of the Russian and Ukrainian side.."

Russian federal military spending was already 8.5 trillion RUB (4% of GDP) in the first half of 2025, almost as much as after three quarters last year and in the full year of 2023. Full year 2025 could be over 8% of GDP... (PS: The charts were made with budget.jakluge.de -> Timeseries).

One crucial fact to always keep in mind: 👉Putin will never accept any outcome of the war that leaves Ukraine free and functioning.👈 It is out of the question. The reddest of red lines. No shades of grey, no exceptions. If it seems like Putin is agreeing to this, it's a trap.

Ich habe die Sorge, dass in Deutschland viele wirklich glauben, wir wären nach Alaska auf einem diplomatischen Weg zum Frieden. Trump will jetzt die Kapitulation der Ukraine, natürlich verkleidet als "Friedensdeal". Das hätte für uns in Europa dramatische Konsequenzen. Es gibt nichts Gutes daran.

The sustainability of Russia's war effort is relative... (Wall Street Journal, www.wsj.com/world/how-wi...).

Großer Erfolg für Putin in Alaska: Trump hat das Narrativ "besser großer Friedensdeal als schneller Waffenstillstand" komplett übernommen. Also kein Druck mehr auf Putin, stattdessen möglicherweise mehr Druck von Trump auf Europa und Ukraine.

Putin sieht sich im Krieg gegen die Ukraine auf der Siegerstraße, er sieht auch, wie der Westen schwächelt. Deshalb wäre es naiv, gerade jetzt auf ein Entgegenkommen Putins zu hoffen. www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/s...

»Ich glaube, dass die Diskussionen über Gebietsabtretungen in die Irre führen. Denn Putin hat deutlich höher und weiter gesteckte Ziele, und es gibt keine Anzeichen dafür, dass sich an diesen Zielen etwas geändert hat«, sagt @jakluge.de: www.ardmediathek.de/video/Y3JpZD...

Es ist bei uns leider normal geworden, darüber zu diskutieren, welche "Gebietsabtretungen" die Ukraine leisten soll. Das ist und bleibt eine zutiefst imperialistische Perspektive, es ist die Sprache von Putin und Trump und wir sollten sie nicht gedankenlos übernehmen. www.daserste.de/information/...

To achieve the 2.5% full year growth for 2025 that Russia uses in its budget forecasts, Russian GDP would have to grow by almost 5% between now and the end of the year. A continuation of the current trend would lead to 0.7% full year GDP growth in 2025.

It looks like Russia narrowly avoided falling into a technical recession. According to Rosstat, growth (year over year) in the second quarter was 1.1%, implying a slight increase in output in the second quarter (+0.2% quarter over quarter). This is very early data, of course.

I recently updated the Russian budget browser: The latest version allows you to analyze federal budget laws and execution data from 2018 to 2025, as well as filter by military spending. A slightly more detailed description: janiskluge.substack.com/p/new-and-im... and the link: budget.jakluge.de

Einschätzungen zu Putin/Trump: Wenn der Gipfel stattfindet wäre es ein großer Erfolg für Russlands Präsident Putin. Die Europäer sollten im Vorfeld des Gipfels klarmachen, dass sie nicht von ihrer Ukraine-Unterstützung abweichen werden. www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/v...

Russia's budget deficit after 7 months is 2.2% of GDP. Last year, it was 0.5% of GDP after 7 months and 1.7% of GDP after 12 months. Because of the slowing economy and low oil prices, Russia's deficit could realistically reach 3% of GDP this year. Source: minfin.gov.ru/ru/press-cen...

Falls es wirklich zu einem Trump-Putin Gipfel kommt, ist das alleine schon für Putin großer Erfolg. Es ist das erste Treffen eines US-Präsidenten seit Beginn der Vollinvasion. Und das aus einer Situation heraus, in der der US-Präsident Russland immer schärfer kritisiert und Sanktionen angedroht hat.

Trump setzt Zölle als Allzweckwaffe ein - aktuell gegen Indien wegen der Ölgeschäfte mit Russland. Er sucht nach Möglichkeiten, Staaten wie Indien unter Druck zu setzen und Konzessionen zu erpressen, so @jakluge.de in der @wirtschaftswoche.bsky.social : www.wiwo.de/politik/ausl...

Relative to GDP, Russian oil+gas revenue has reached its lowest point since the start of the full-scale invasion in the last 3 months. Revenue has remained close to 4% of GDP, down from a record 18.4% of GDP in April 2022.

Russian oil+gas revenues remained weak in July, falling 27% from July 2024, to 787.3 billion rubles (incl subsidies). All this is in nominal terms, with inflation at 10% the decline is more significant in real terms. (Chart based on Finance Ministry data, subsidies not included.)

How can poor, indebted Russian regions afford to spend billions of rubles on the war? The answer is: They don't. The federal government reimburses them through a debt write-off program. Officially, the program is meant to boost housing and infrastructure investment.

Russia is recruiting slightly more this year than last year, based on extrapolated regional data. This is mostly due to the effect of higher sign-on bonuses. Recruitment was particularly strong in late-2024 and early 2025. Since May this year, it is almost identical to 2024.

Trump is just politely asking for a settlement-bribe...

This is the end. The Nord Stream saga is finally over for good, 20 years after it was launched by Schröder and Putin.

Forging ahead: Russia sidesteps sanctions to import Austrian machinery for making howitzer barrels A Spanish company has supplied Russia with an Austrian radial forging machine.

„China ist ein entscheidender Unterstützer Russlands“, sagt @jakluge.de. Um Sanktionen durchzusetzen, müsse die EU mehr Druck aufbauen. Aber: „Wenn wir jetzt die Sanktionen deutlich verschärfen, wird das 2025 kaum einen Effekt haben. Da helfen letztlich nur Lieferungen von Waffen.“

Hier geht es zu unserem Brennpunkt. Moderiert von Ellen Ehni. Unter anderem mit Expertise von @inaruck.bsky.social, @jakluge.de und @nicolange.bsky.social.

Don't take the Graham sanctions bill at face value. The US will not impose a 500% tariff on China over imports of Russian oil. It is not a credible threat. And even if it worked, Russian oil cannot simply be removed from world oil supply, at least not at once. www.nytimes.com/2025/07/10/w...

New data on Russian recruitment: Around 200,000 men signed a contract in the first half of 2025. Dmitry Medvedev claims the number is 210,000 - my latest estimated based on regional budget data indicates 191,000. (Link to the full analysis below.)

In den letzten Tagen haben sich immer mehr russische Offizielle besorgt über die eigene Wirtschaft geäußert (Rezession... Bankenkrise...). Im neuesten SWP-Podcast diskutieren wir deshalb die Fragen: Wie steht's um Russlands Wirtschaft? Und wie um die Sanktionen? www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/...

Mein Kollege Janis Kluge @jakluge.de kennt sich mit der Wirtschaft #Russlands sehr gut aus. Hier erklärt er, wie und warum sie im dritten Kriegsjahr unter Druck steht, und was das für die Fortführung des #Angriffskriegs gegen die #Ukraine bedeutet. #Hörempfehlung www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/...

If you're interested in analyzing Russian federal budget spending, here's an interactive treemap you can use. Spending can be ordered by category, program or by ministry. The data is from Q1/2025. Direct links and explanation in my latest Substack: janiskluge.substack.com/p/visualizin...

So JD Vance is on Bluesky now? The (dark) MAGA infighting is really quite a show.

Wenn Journalisten zu faul sind, zu prüfen, was stimmt.

Kleiner Flashback: Vor 6 Jahren trat Peter Altmaier in Russland beim St. Petersburg International Economic Forum auf: "Ich war einer der ersten in Deutschland, der sich für Nordstream 2 ausgesprochen hat!" (Video von der dt-ru. Außenhandelskammer auf Facebook). www.facebook.com/watch?v=6850...

New data on Russian recruitment: Based on federal spending on sign-on bonuses, Russia recruited 89,601 men from January-March 2025. This represents a 22% increase over the same period last year. Here's the link to my analysis: open.substack.com/pub/janisklu...

Excess mortality among Russian males can also be calculated for the regional level. The regions with the highest share of excess male deaths (a proxy for KIA) in the 20-59 age brackets in 2022/2023 are listed below:

The same data can be used to estimate KIA as a cause of death among Russian men who died in 2022 and 2023.

Russian casualites in official death statistics: This is the number of excess male deaths in 2022 and 2023 by age bracket, based on changing proportions of male/female deaths in Rosstat data. 2019 is the baseline, missing persons are not included.

In Russia, the number of working-age men who die is usually three times greater than the number of working-age women who die. Russia's war has changed this. Among those aged 20 to 35, the ratio is now 1:4-1:5.