loading . . . Operation Budapest – Moscow’s men in Brussels Betrayal does not begin when someone formally switches sides, it begins when someone uses the trust of the system to undermine it from within, writes Orhan Dragaš.
Dr. Orhan Dragaš is the founder and director of the International Security Institute based in Belgrade.
There is a kind of betrayal that is overwhelming in its brazenness – one that takes place openly, is documented, and yet manages to persist in the space between diplomatic civility and an institutional unwillingness to call it what it is. Europe today faces a problem it can no longer describe otherwise: one of its members is working directly against it.
There is no need to speculate. There are recordings, transcripts, and undisputed statements. The question is no longer whether Viktor Orbán’s Hungary has a special policy toward Russia. The question is where that policy ends.
In conversations that have become public, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó reports to Sergey Lavrov on the progress of closed discussions in the European Union, promises to deliver documents, and asks for guidance on how Budapest should act regarding the issue of minorities in Ukraine. This is not diplomatic courtesy; it is an operational relationship.
The content of these conversations leaves no room for relativization. Szijjártó acts as a political channel through which Moscow gains insight into and influences processes within the EU. Lavrov does not ask what Hungary thinks; he suggests what it should do.
The line between national politics and external influence is no longer clear. For this reason, this case no longer fits the usual disputes between Brussels and a “problematic” member state. This concerns a member state participating in shaping European policy in coordination with a state under sanctions and waging war against a neighboring country. It changes the nature of the problem.
For years, Hungary has used the issue of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine as a reason to block European decisions. That is well known. The new development is that it is now clear how this instrument is used and with whom it is discussed. There is no concern for minority rights in the recordings. There is agreement on how to use the issue as leverage to pressure Kyiv and to slow down European decisions. In other words, the issue of minorities has been turned into a tool of Moscow’s foreign policy, and Budapest has become a channel through which that tool is used within the EU. This is not an interpretation; it is the content of the conversation.
One conversation in particular reveals the nature of this relationship. After his visit to Russia, Szijjártó receives a call from Sergey Lavrov. The conversation quickly turns to a specific request: the removal of Gulbakhor Ismailova, sister of oligarch Alisher Usmanov, from the list of EU sanctions. Szijjártó does not ask for further explanation or distance himself. He states that he will submit a proposal with Slovakia for her removal and that he will “do everything he can” to implement it. The conversation ends with a sentence from Szijjártó that removes any doubt about the nature of the relationship: “I am always at your disposal.” A few months later, Ismailova is indeed removed from the list of EU sanctions. In the same conversation, Szijjártó also conveys to Lavrov the course of discussion from the meeting of EU foreign affairs ministers, including the arguments presented by other member states. This is no longer diplomatic contact; it is a direct transfer of information and a readiness to fulfill the demands of a foreign power.
In parallel, Orbán maintains a direct line with Moscow. In his communication with Putin, he speaks of “friendship,” offers help, and expresses willingness to be useful – not as an intermediary between two parties, but as a political partner with a role within the European system.
That position is not symbolic; it has concrete consequences.
Hungary blocks financial aid to Ukraine, slows sanctions against Russia, and uses its veto power as a tool of political pressure. Each decision directly affects the course of the war. Every delayed aid package to Ukraine means fewer defense resources. Every blocked decision gives Russia more time for military operations. Here, political loyalty translates into operational impact.
Calling a spade a spade is no longer a matter of political courage but of basic seriousness. What Orbán’s Hungary is doing is neither a “special position,” a “sovereign policy,” nor an “internal disagreement.” It is a betrayal of common European policy at a time when war and peace on the continent are at stake.
Betrayal does not begin when someone formally switches sides. It begins when someone uses the trust of the system to undermine it from within – when he sits at the table as a partner but acts as a channel for the interests of the other side. In this respect, Hungary today does not function as a member state pursuing a different policy but as an instrument. Servants of the Kremlin do not have to sit in Moscow; it is enough for them to sit in Brussels and vote when necessary.
That is why this case goes beyond Orbán as a political figure. It is not about his style, rhetoric, or electoral interests. It is a model in which one EU member state assumes the role of an extended arm of Russian politics within the European system.
And this happens while Ukraine pays a high price for that system.
Every day, Ukraine fights a war while Brussels debates procedures. People there are not discussing the wording of resolutions but how to survive the night. Ukraine does not seek a perfect system; it wants the existing system to support it.
The European Union responds cautiously, almost bureaucratically. Officials speak of “internal disagreements,” “different views,” and the “need for dialogue.” Such language no longer reflects reality.
This is not a difference of opinion but a difference of goals.
While most European countries try to limit Russia’s capacity to wage war, Hungary uses its position to ease that pressure – not as a neutral mediator, but in direct communication with Moscow. There is no longer any balance in such a relationship.
This case raises a question the EU has long avoided: what happens when a member state uses the rules of the system to act against its basic purpose?
The institutional framework of the European Union is not designed for this kind of situation. The principle of unanimity gives each member a veto, intended to protect sovereignty. However, when that right is used in coordination with an external actor, it shifts from a protective measure to a vulnerability. Russia understands this weakness well and exploits it. It does not need to break European unity from the outside; it is enough to slow and sabotage it from within. Orbán’s Hungary plays a clear role in this process.
This is also evident in a broader context. The Kremlin openly supports Orbán’s political position in Hungary. Campaigns, media narratives, and political signals all aim to portray Orbán as a leader who protects the national interest from Brussels and the conflict with Russia. At the same time, Orbán uses this narrative to justify blockades within the EU. The cycle is complete.
External influence strengthens the internal position. The internal position produces a foreign policy effect that benefits Moscow. This is not a theory; it is a model. In this model, the European Union remains without an answer.
Not because it lacks the tools, but because it lacks the political will to use them. Any attempt to sanction or bypass Hungary meets resistance from other member states who fear setting a precedent.
That fear has a price. The price is visible in Ukraine. Every blockade of aid, every delay in decisions, and every dilution of sanctions prolongs the war – not abstractly, but concretely, in time, resources, destroyed cities, and lives.
In this respect, the issue of Hungary is no longer an internal EU matter. It is a question of the continent’s security.
The war against Ukraine is not just another conflict between two states. It is an attempt to forcibly erase a country that has chosen not to belong to the Russian sphere. One side defends the right to exist as a sovereign country; the other tries to show that this right does not exist unless approved by Moscow. Orbán’s policy demonstrates that this pattern has already entered the very institutions of the European Union. Once inside, it can no longer be ignored or easily removed. That is why this case cannot remain at the level of political criticism or diplomatic disagreement. An EU member state uses its position, at key moments, to work in favor of a state waging a war of aggression against its European neighbor. These actions reveal not only poor politics but also a deliberate shift in loyalty. It is betrayal and collaboration with the enemy. The question is no longer whether Europe sees it. The question is whether it will decide to act before it is too late.
There is a historical precedent that serves as a clear operational analogy. Kim Philby, a senior officer in Britain’s MI6, worked for the KGB for decades. He was not an agent hiding in the basement; he sat at the table with the Allies, participated in planning, and enjoyed the full confidence of the system he was destroying from within. Everything the Allies planned, Moscow knew in advance and managed to thwart countless Western actions. Clearly, every generation has its own Kim Philby. The only difference is that Philby was not the foreign minister of an EU and NATO ally.
Caption: Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) attends a meeting with Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto (C), as Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (L) sits nearby, at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, 4 February 2026. EPA/MIKHAIL METZEL / SPUTNIK / KREMLIN POOL https://eualive.net/operation-budapest-moscows-men-in-brussels/
