loading . . . Estonian intelligence says Russia’s shell production rose 17-fold to 7 million a year as the Kremlin rebuilds reserves for future wars Russia has increased production of artillery ammunition more than 17-fold in recent years and is now turning out about 7 million shells annually. The Kremlin is channeling part of that output not only to the front lines in Ukraine but also to rebuilding strategic reserves, according to Estonia’s 2026 intelligence report . The document says Russia’s defense-industrial base sharply ramped up production of large-caliber munitions after 2021.
The first growth phase in 2022–2023 came from activating previously idle production lines. The next phase was driven by massive funding and expansion of plants involved in shell manufacturing.
This surge has enabled Russia’s military to sustain heavy bombardments. While daily expenditures reached 60,000 rounds during the spring 2022 offensives, they later fell and stabilized at 10,000–15,000 per day.
“The key factor affecting consumption is Russia’s strategic ammunition reserves, which before the 2022 invasion were estimated at 20 million shells, rockets and mortar rounds. Since Russian forces expended much of these reserves during the first two years of the war, they were subsequently forced to ration ammunition use,” the report notes.
Estonian intelligence estimates that in 2025 Russia produced about 7 million shells, mortar rounds and rocket munitions, including:
- 3.4 million shells for howitzers of 122 mm, 152 mm and 203 mm;
- 2.3 million mortar rounds of 120 mm and 240 mm;
- roughly 800,000 rounds for tanks and IFVs;
- about half a million for multiple launch rocket systems.
Funding for these purchases cost the Russian budget roughly 1 trillion rubles—more than €10 billion. At the same time, unit prices for some items remain low compared with Western equivalents. In particular, a legacy 152 mm shell costs the state less than 100,000 rubles.
“Such low prices are achieved through the profitability of state-owned enterprises in the supply chain, all of which depend on regular subsidies and other government support,” the analysts write.
Moscow is also leaning on foreign suppliers: since 2023, Russia has received between 5 million and 7 million shells from Iran and North Korea. According to Ukrainian estimates, in the second half of 2025 North Korean munitions may have covered up to half of Russia’s daily artillery needs at the front.
“Given this production growth and significant imports, Russia will likely be able to replenish part of its strategic artillery ammunition reserves even during the war against Ukraine. For the Kremlin, maintaining such reserves is almost certainly a critical element in planning potential future conflicts,” the report states.
A separate section focuses on explosives. The central player is Speсkhimiya, part of Rostec, which coordinates about a dozen facilities. Until 2022, Russia’s propellant sector was almost entirely dependent on imported cotton cellulose from Central Asia.
Starting in 2023, Russia launched production of nitrocellulose using domestically sourced wood- and flax-based feedstock. Intelligence assesses that these steps partially replaced imports and reduced sanctions exposure, but did not eliminate foreign dependence.
The most vulnerable choke points in Russia’s munitions production are concentrated nitric acid and “melange,” produced at only a few plants in Berezniki and Novomoskovsk. Any disruptions there could seriously slow the entire ammunition supply chain.
Those plants are not subject to EU sanctions because they also produce nitrogen fertilizers. Restricting them could threaten global food supplies, especially given that Europe’s fertilizer output fell 14% from 2021 to 2024.
Earlier, Focus reported that despite international sanctions, Russia continues to significantly expand production of artillery shells and tube artillery. Upgrades and retooling of strategic defense enterprises rely on foreign-made equipment, including from European countries and Taiwan.
Meanwhile, the Czech initiative to procure ammunition for Ukraine faces a funding shortfall and cannot be fully implemented yet. Of the planned €5 billion, partners have raised only €1.4 billion, significantly limiting the scale of deliveries. https://www.uawire.org/estonian-intelligence-says-russia-s-shell-production-rose-17-fold-to-7-million-a-year-as-the-kremlin-rebuilds-reserves-for-future-wars
