loading . . . The coming years will be even more dangerous than 2025 **_By Alexander With_**
The war in Ukraine is escalating. While the front line is mostly static, both sides have ramped up their ability to conduct strategic bombing with drones and missiles. The cost of war is therefore increasing at a time when both sides are already feeling the burden of four years of war.
Russian inflation is high, there are fuel shortages, and Russian administrative regions are finding it increasingly difficult to reach their recruitment quotas. Worse yet, the Ukrainian campaign against Russia’s oil and gas industry is taking a hard toll on the Russian economy, and recently Ukraine escalated this effort by also targeting oil tankers in the Black Sea.
Russia is also hurt by the sanctions imposed by the European Union. Although EU seems unable to agree to fund Ukraine’s war effort with frozen Russian money, the EU does fund a lot of Ukraine’s war effort, nevertheless.
In a somewhat clumsy and inconsistent attempt to end the war, Donald Trump is applying pressure on both sides. This has so far not amounted to many results, but US economic sanctions on countries buying Russia’s oil are hurting Russian exports, which are already under strain from European sanctions and Ukrainian attacks. It is yet too soon to judge whether this effect will be permanent. As with many of Donalds Trumps policies, it can be difficult to judge whether they are in fact policies or just negotiating tactics. Should the sanctions continue however, it is likely to hurt the Russian economy.
For his part, Vladimir Putin is not a man likely to sit back and watch the West help Ukraine win the war. Russia has increased both the number and the severity of its hybrid attacks. This is a dangerous escalation that is bound to cause damage at some point—damage that its victims can no longer tolerate. Russian hybrid warfare is also likely to intensify if the EU goes ahead and transfers frozen Russian assets.
Perhaps more worrying, Russia has shifted its entire society to a war footing. Nuclear sabre-rattling is now a common phenomenon from the Kremlin, and propaganda portraying the West as decadent, weak, and hostile is everywhere. The Russian state and economy now have one purpose above all others: war. The official Russian war goals are maximalist and unlikely to be accepted by either Ukraine or the EU.
The problem is that Putin cannot accept a peace deal that does not portray him as the victor. His entire prestige and legitimacy are bound to a peace in which Russia can dominate Ukraine and keep it without Western security guarantees.
Thus, the war in Ukraine is escalating, and Europe is becoming increasingly involved due to the Russian hybrid campaign, the struggling Russian economy, and the prospect of more sanctions. This mutual escalation cannot continue indefinitely. Something will happen.
Should a peace be made—or merely a lull in the fighting—Russia would be left with a booming war industry that would be difficult to revert to normal economic activity. Peace might be as hard on the Russian economy as the war has been, especially if sanctions are not lifted. This would naturally create an incentive to use the surplus combat power being produced in Russian factories: to maintain a war footing in pursuit of other goals, such as humbling the West, lifting sanctions, and creating a new European order shaped by Putin.
Whether the Russians would be inclined to act on this incentive depends on several factors. Would NATO appear strong and united? How far would European rearmament have progressed? Would the Russian economy be able to sustain such an effort, or would it collapse after years of strain? And what would China do? China has the means to fund the Russian war machine almost indefinitely but has so far kept a balancing act between supporting Russia diplomatically and with trade but not alienating the EU by supporting Russia too directly. Unfortunately, it does seem like China has quietly shifted the balance towards Russia during the course of the war. As a Chinese diplomat told the EU; China cannot afford Russia to lose the war, as this would allow the US to turn its whole attention towards China.
A particularly worrying prospect is that time is not on Europe’s side. The US has stated that European states should be able to do most of the heavy lifting in Europe’s defence by 2027—something that is not realistic within such a short time frame. While Europe has made a dramatic increase in defence budgets, it will take years before this translates into combat power, as the weapons will first have to be produced and the soldiers recruited and trained.
The US, however, is under pressure from another direction. 2027 is also the year when China according to some US officials could win a war over Taiwan, and the year which Taiwan itself simulates fighting to repel a Chinese invasion. It is not clear whether China also operates according to this timeline, but it is true that China is preparing for such a war and will probably be capable of initiating it at some point. Being capable does not mean intending to act, but America will nevertheless have to take the possibility seriously—especially since the Pentagon itself is already questioning whether the US could defeat China in a war.
Even if America were willing to help Europe, it might not be able to do so if tied down in the Pacific. Europe could quickly find itself standing alone against a dangerous, risk-willing, and economically desperate Russia.
### About the author:
Alexander With is commander (OF-3) in the Royal Danish Navy and military analyst at the Royal Danish Defence College. His website is https://www.alexanderwith.dk https://www.logicofwar.com/the-coming-years-will-be-even-more-dangerous-than-2025/
