The vivid partisan sorting of US house districts by income and party -- 2005 -2024

Given declining US confidence in institutions overall, striking that low election confidence is *not* a secular trend--instead 2020 is the disjuncture. Plot shows the winner/loser effect demonstrated by Charles Stewart and others. Data from @mitelectionlab.bsky.social

In the April @apsa.bsky.social ejobs release, we're still tracking a 30% decline in political science tenure track jobs since 2023-24.

Striking partisan stability in Israel/Gaza attitudes in the 2025 CES study

Political Science's academic job market having its worst post-Covid year -- almost 20% fewer jobs than at the same point in the previous cycle (which itself was bad!) Data scraped from APSA ejobs pdfs.

Bookmakers have shifted Democratic chances of winning the White House in 2028 by 2pp since the start of the Iran war

Pedagogical opportunity to remind undergraduates that the Democratic party used to dominate the presidential vote in the Mahoning Valley.

APSA authored papers by subfield and department, 2018-2025. A coarse but interesting look at the areas of research activity in the discipline.

To show prospective students our discipline's research priorities, I scraped the last 6 @apsa-preprints.bsky.social annual meeting programs to count papers by section, then assigned sections to subfields. Polisci remains fascinated with the American case!

Things undergrads are surprised to learn -- there are only modest amounts spent on American politics. data from @opensecrets.org and US Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Trump's first year in office saw a rapid decline in GOP affiliation, erasing the advantage in net partisanship that had endured during the Biden term. data from @gallup.com

Views of American industrial sectors remain strikingly non-ideological (save for the publishing, the movie industry, and fossil fuels).

The consequences of low media trust and Republican partisanship--only 1 news media source enjoys over 30% use among those partisans. Data from @pewresearch.org's American Trends Panel, March 2025.

Among the most vivid declines in the American people's trust -- their diminished trust in other people. Data from @gallup.com's Social Series.

The shrinking levels of white ethnocentrism in the @electionstudies.bsky.social Cumulative Datafile conceal a pretty striking partisan effect: since around 2012 very low ethnocentrism among white Democrats, but the opposite effect among other Democrats.

With thanks to amengel.bsky.social, the decline is far more modest when I take proper account for the administrative codes in the feeling thermometers

Americans have become increasingly confident that their votes are counted as intended—aside from a sharp drop among Republicans in 2020. Data from the Survey of the Performance of American Elections.

When 'When Prophecy Fails' Fails: onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1... (h/t @ethanvporter.bsky.social )

In 2025, polarization on schools & the Supreme Court leaves only Banks + Big Business with moderate/high confidence across parties. Populism still cuts across partisan lines. Data: @gallup.com Social Series.

The recent reversal in Republicans' moral approval of Gay and Lesbian relations is even more striking in context -- it does *not* coincide with more restrictive moral licensing in other areas. Data from Gallup's Social Series.

The inversion between income and Whites' presidential vote is also found among the validated voters in the just released Cooperative Election Study.

Something undergrads after often surprised to find out--there's curiously little money in American politics.

The last time I posted the income relationship to presidential vote among White respondents to the @electionstudies.bsky.social ANES, people asked for additional estimates among all voters. Updated estimates here:

Rapid secularization of Democratic politics continues -- in the 2024 ANES, only 54% of Democrats reported religion an important part of their life.

Trump's presidency has coincided with a rapid decline in GOP partisan advantage -- a 5 percentage point decline since the end of Biden's presidency. Data from Gallup social series.

Might be of interest to those teaching American politics -- motivated reasoning in retrospective economic/personal/geostrategic evaluation has been a stable part of presidential elections for 40 years. Data from the @electionstudies.bsky.social CDF and 2024 timeseries.

By the end of 2024, Stimson's Policy Mood was near 20 year highs in liberal policy support. (Ht @mattgrossmann.bsky.social for tweeting the new data!)

As expected, the change in government sharply reduced Democrats’ trust in the CDC and FDA. But surprisingly, by 2025 Democrats now express higher trust in federal health authorities than Republicans do.

With initial data, it appears that Trump's 2nd term approval is weakly related to consumer confidence.

The rightward shift in young men's partisanship is recent -- since 2024. data from the @pewresearch.org 's NPORS study.

Even Republicans have not recovered their pre-pandemic levels of economic confidence. Data from the University of Michigan ISR's (bsky-less?) consumer sentiment survey

Presidential vote has only been correlated with life expectancy since 2008, and even then the effect is strongest among whites.

While liberals have moved almost a full scale point more supportive of free trade since the election (on a 7pt scale) conservatives are unmoved. A super interesting case for the role of elites in shaping mass attitudes. Data from the incredible @prl.bsky.social 's 'America's Political Pulse.'

Outside of a tiny number of super polarized issues (in this case, immigration and climate change), the American public basically agrees on the topics deserving of national attention. Data from AP-NORC.

Gun control attitudes continue to depolarize (on the margins!) in the 2024 General Social Survey. Data from @norc.org

It's only on questions of race where younger generations are less tolerant -- for the other speakers on the GSS, Gen Z/Millenials basically indistinguishable from other Americans.

National political spending preferences by partisanship, 1972-2024. Fascinating that numerous policy areas have seen negligble polarization over this period. Data from @norc.org's GSS

Confidence in national institutions, by partisanship, 1974-2024. The collapse in Democrats' Supreme Court confidence in 2022-2024 is the largest single year change seen in 50 years. Data from the GSS @norc.org

The newly released GSS shows Whites continue to liberalize in their perceived cause of racial economic inequality.

Stark class income * partisan effect also apparent in 119th Congress's congressional districts:

Abortion attidudes depolarized (on the margins!) in the newly released 2024 General Social Survey from @norc.org.

Presidential vote among whites shows continued income polarization (data from @electionstudies.bsky.social's 2024 timeseries), with income negatively correlated to GOP presidential vote.

It's not just the coastal universities -- a plurality of conservatives perceive even the flagship public university in their state to be liberal.

If the Papal pick leaked, no one made it to the bookmakers...

With the release of the 2024 ANES, further evidence that Trump's invovlement in US politics had the effect of *reducing* authoritarianism in the public (in a thermostatic style--of course!--with larger changes among Democratic voters) Data from @electionstudies.bsky.social CDF and 2024ts

The Australian Federal election swing in historical context (1943-2025). The shift in two-party preference is more modest than I expected, given the swing in seats. #auspol

In April, Republicans in the UofM Consumer Sentiment adjudged national business conditions the best they'd been since the pandemic.

The 2024 election saw a modest *depolarization* in whites' answers to the racial resentment battery among @electionstudies.bsky.social respondents.

In the newly released 2024 ANES (@electionstudies.bsky.social), racial groups see modest partisan differences in affect. Other groups (Big Business, Labor Unions, the FBI) less polarized than recent cycles.

Partisanship swamps other factors in determining support for recent policies, even when they seemingly implicate traditional support for free expression. Data from @thefireorg.bsky.social's April 2025 National Speech Index, part of @prl.bsky.social's fantastic national panel.