The shrinking levels of white ethnocentrism in the @electionstudies.bsky.social Cumulative Datafile conceal a pretty striking partisan effect: since around 2012 very low ethnocentrism among white Democrats, but the opposite effect among other Democrats.

With thanks to amengel.bsky.social, the decline is far more modest when I take proper account for the administrative codes in the feeling thermometers

Americans have become increasingly confident that their votes are counted as intended—aside from a sharp drop among Republicans in 2020. Data from the Survey of the Performance of American Elections.

When 'When Prophecy Fails' Fails: onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1... (h/t @ethanvporter.bsky.social )

In 2025, polarization on schools & the Supreme Court leaves only Banks + Big Business with moderate/high confidence across parties. Populism still cuts across partisan lines. Data: @gallup.com Social Series.

The recent reversal in Republicans' moral approval of Gay and Lesbian relations is even more striking in context -- it does *not* coincide with more restrictive moral licensing in other areas. Data from Gallup's Social Series.

The inversion between income and Whites' presidential vote is also found among the validated voters in the just released Cooperative Election Study.

Something undergrads after often surprised to find out--there's curiously little money in American politics.

The last time I posted the income relationship to presidential vote among White respondents to the @electionstudies.bsky.social ANES, people asked for additional estimates among all voters. Updated estimates here:

Rapid secularization of Democratic politics continues -- in the 2024 ANES, only 54% of Democrats reported religion an important part of their life.

Trump's presidency has coincided with a rapid decline in GOP partisan advantage -- a 5 percentage point decline since the end of Biden's presidency. Data from Gallup social series.

Might be of interest to those teaching American politics -- motivated reasoning in retrospective economic/personal/geostrategic evaluation has been a stable part of presidential elections for 40 years. Data from the @electionstudies.bsky.social CDF and 2024 timeseries.

By the end of 2024, Stimson's Policy Mood was near 20 year highs in liberal policy support. (Ht @mattgrossmann.bsky.social for tweeting the new data!)

As expected, the change in government sharply reduced Democrats’ trust in the CDC and FDA. But surprisingly, by 2025 Democrats now express higher trust in federal health authorities than Republicans do.

With initial data, it appears that Trump's 2nd term approval is weakly related to consumer confidence.

The rightward shift in young men's partisanship is recent -- since 2024. data from the @pewresearch.org 's NPORS study.

Even Republicans have not recovered their pre-pandemic levels of economic confidence. Data from the University of Michigan ISR's (bsky-less?) consumer sentiment survey

Presidential vote has only been correlated with life expectancy since 2008, and even then the effect is strongest among whites.

While liberals have moved almost a full scale point more supportive of free trade since the election (on a 7pt scale) conservatives are unmoved. A super interesting case for the role of elites in shaping mass attitudes. Data from the incredible @prl.bsky.social 's 'America's Political Pulse.'

Outside of a tiny number of super polarized issues (in this case, immigration and climate change), the American public basically agrees on the topics deserving of national attention. Data from AP-NORC.

Gun control attitudes continue to depolarize (on the margins!) in the 2024 General Social Survey. Data from @norc.org

It's only on questions of race where younger generations are less tolerant -- for the other speakers on the GSS, Gen Z/Millenials basically indistinguishable from other Americans.

National political spending preferences by partisanship, 1972-2024. Fascinating that numerous policy areas have seen negligble polarization over this period. Data from @norc.org's GSS

Confidence in national institutions, by partisanship, 1974-2024. The collapse in Democrats' Supreme Court confidence in 2022-2024 is the largest single year change seen in 50 years. Data from the GSS @norc.org

The newly released GSS shows Whites continue to liberalize in their perceived cause of racial economic inequality.

Stark class income * partisan effect also apparent in 119th Congress's congressional districts:

Abortion attidudes depolarized (on the margins!) in the newly released 2024 General Social Survey from @norc.org.

Presidential vote among whites shows continued income polarization (data from @electionstudies.bsky.social's 2024 timeseries), with income negatively correlated to GOP presidential vote.

It's not just the coastal universities -- a plurality of conservatives perceive even the flagship public university in their state to be liberal.

If the Papal pick leaked, no one made it to the bookmakers...

With the release of the 2024 ANES, further evidence that Trump's invovlement in US politics had the effect of *reducing* authoritarianism in the public (in a thermostatic style--of course!--with larger changes among Democratic voters) Data from @electionstudies.bsky.social CDF and 2024ts

The Australian Federal election swing in historical context (1943-2025). The shift in two-party preference is more modest than I expected, given the swing in seats. #auspol

In April, Republicans in the UofM Consumer Sentiment adjudged national business conditions the best they'd been since the pandemic.

The 2024 election saw a modest *depolarization* in whites' answers to the racial resentment battery among @electionstudies.bsky.social respondents.

In the newly released 2024 ANES (@electionstudies.bsky.social), racial groups see modest partisan differences in affect. Other groups (Big Business, Labor Unions, the FBI) less polarized than recent cycles.

Partisanship swamps other factors in determining support for recent policies, even when they seemingly implicate traditional support for free expression. Data from @thefireorg.bsky.social's April 2025 National Speech Index, part of @prl.bsky.social's fantastic national panel.

Bookies' odds for Papal conclave

Might be taste, but I find it far easier to grasp experimental results in a figure of contrasts rather than a regression table. Simple setup-4 experimental conditions (control and 3 dosage levels) interacted with pid, 5pt dv (a typical design). From this table-how does pid interact with dose?

More partisan atttitudinal asymmetries -- since the presidential election, Democrats' national pride/trust in government has collapsed, while Republicans' values have only edged upwards. Data from @prl.bsky.social

Excited to share that my new book is now available for pre-order! This book has been a labor of love for the past decade & I am grateful to a whole community of people who supported this project. Get 30% off your purchase using code UCPNEW at UChicago Press! Link: press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/bo...

Much of the talk about new media (especially podcasts) being a hub for GOP-aligned news misses a broader point: under a Democratic president, Republicans appear to distrust all sources of government information. Data from @apnorc.bsky.social State of the Facts 2024.

Partisanship of people 18-25, by gender, 1999-2025. Data from @gallup.com 's Social Series. It's remarkable how many attitudinal factors demonstrate thermostatic response.

While liberals have grown far more supportive of free trade during Trump's presidnecy, conservatives are unmoved. Data from @prl.bsky.social

MPSA: because who*really* needs to read your slides? #mpsa2025

The new CES 2024 election study shows stability among whites' racial attitudes during the Biden presidency (following rapid liberalization under Trump)

Most aspects of American life are subject to ideological consensus on their poor state (gun laws, organized religion, immigration, inequality the exceptions...) Data from the Gallup social series

The @today.yougov.com version of this figure failed (I think) to adequately communicate the overwhelming operational liberalism of the American public -- ie, if you name a government program, Americans tend to want more of it

The newly released @electionstudies.bsky.social 2024 time series has polarization basically static, with Democratic respondents moderating on race and healthcare (consistent with the thermostatic response to a Democratic president).

It's not just economic perceptions -- partisans' generalized trust in government has swung since November. The share of Democrats who feel national pride has been cut in half! Data from @prl.bsky.social

Even for institutions where there's been no polarization in confidence, the typical institution has seen secular declines.