It's been over 10 years since the last large-scale UN mission start-up. This week, I provide a refresher on start-up funding arrangements, explain the Secretary-General's request for the UN Support Office in #Haiti, and point out some issues with the request. casquebleu.substack.com/p/getting-th...

The #UN80 mandate review highlights the use of the phrase "within existing resources" by delegates wishing to handwave away pesky budgetary issues. But the way it's currently being used goes against the Charter and decisions of the General Assembly. casquebleu.substack.com/p/how-do-you...

The UN has been forced to repatriate 25% of troops and police in #peacekeeping missions to deal with cash shortages stemming primarily from U.S. non-payment. I explain why existing liquidity mechanisms were insufficient and what this means going forward. casquebleu.substack.com/p/the-contin...

U.S. arrears at the #UN are mounting, and it is at risk of losing its vote in the General Assembly. This week, I dive into when this might happen and what the consequences might be. casquebleu.substack.com/p/is-the-us-...

Talk of modular approaches in peace operations is in the air, but there are many different interpretations and uses of the concept. What are the different schools of thought and which should be the focus of #UN80 and the peace operations review? casquebleu.substack.com/p/what-do-we...

The Security Council never needed resolution 2719 to be able to provide assessed contributions to non-UN forces, and the likelihood of 2719 application seems more remote than ever. It's time to look beyond 2719 in designing effective partnership arrangements. casquebleu.substack.com/p/what-now-f...

In my latest piece, I examine the #UN80 revised estimates and explain how the initiative risks exacerbating the liquidity crisis, precipitating a loss of talent, and undermining the ability of the next Secretary-General to define a path forward for the #UN. casquebleu.substack.com/p/nobody-wan...

This is the one week of the year where I can say things like: Sorry I’m late to this meeting; I was stuck behind the Spanish and Swedish kings while waiting for the elevator.

Do we actually know if Waltz is a member of the Cabinet? The U.S. Representative to the UN is not automatically a Cabinet-rank position, and although Stefanik was nominated as a Cabinet-level official, I haven't yet seen anything to that effect for Waltz.

On UNGA's one-year deadline for Israel to comply with its legal obligations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Erica Gaston writes that Member States have ample options for responding to the situation in Gaza, drawing from 80 years of practice: www.justsecurity.org/120901/from-...

The #UN80 revised estimates were released this week. In this week's post, I look at the cuts and changes proposed for the peace and security pillar (DPPA and DPO), assessing the likely motivations behind the changes proposed and why these fall short. casquebleu.substack.com/p/restructur...

The U.S. wants a Gang Suppression Force in #Haiti with a UN support office. In this piece, I examine how the support office model went from being the option of last resort to the default option for UN peace and security engagement in complex settings. casquebleu.substack.com/p/un-support...

The simplistic narratives underpinning the #UN80 mandate review do not help us understand and address the problems underpinning ineffective and inefficient delivery. open.substack.com/pub/casquebl...

For an organization with so many plans and planners, the UN is surprisingly bad at planning. In my latest commentary, I argue that this is driven by several factors and has pernicious effects for relevance, effectiveness and adaptability of UN peace ops. casquebleu.substack.com/p/dont-feed-...

What are the prospects and potential for various day-after options for #Gaza, including #UN #peacekeeping? I gave ABC Radio National some of my thoughts earlier this week. www.abc.net.au/listen/progr...

Ten years ago, the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations argued for using the full spectrum of peace operations, but today the divisions between #peacekeeping and political missions are further entrenched. Why does this matter and what can be done? casquebleu.substack.com/p/towards-a-...

In the most recent edition of my weekly musings, I explore what the recent USUN confirmation hearings and the withdrawal from UNESCO tell us about the emerging contours of U.S. policy towards the UN. casquebleu.substack.com/p/the-emergi...

Geopolitics are not the only reason why UN peace operations struggle today. My latest piece looks at what can be done to ensure that the peace ops review and #UN80 actually take a critical look at whether existing approaches and structures remain fit for purpose. open.substack.com/pub/casquebl...

In case you're hankering for more #UN content in your podcast queue, the latest episode of Future Tense includes commentary from @richardgowan1.bsky.social and me on #UN80 and the liquidity crisis. www.abc.net.au/listen/progr...

My latest piece: On the irony of allowing a culpable Member State to weaponize a measure originally intended to avert a liquidity crisis to block action in the #FifthCommittee to mitigate one, plus the likely impact and rationale behind the #UN80 budget cuts. casquebleu.substack.com/p/fiddling-w...

Last week, the General Assembly approved a level of nearly $5.4 billion for #peacekeeping operations for 2025/26. My latest piece has some thoughts about whether under-resourcing is what ails missions, and what this tells us about reform. #FifthCommittee #UN80 open.substack.com/pub/casquebl...

I'm giving Substack a try. In my first post, I argue that the #UN80 mandate review is a distraction that is unlikely to yield actionable insights on how to address duplication and redundancy within the UN. casquebleu.substack.com/p/thoughts-o...

Another sign of how different a world we're living in right now compared to two decades ago, the US president is deciding whether to launch a major war of choice against a country that has not attacked the US, and there is not even a mention of going to the UNSC to get an authorizing resolution. 1/

An nescis, mi fili, quantilla prudentia mundus regatur?

The rescission package, which affects funding already appropriated for FY2024 and 2025, includes $200 mil from CIO (inter alia, U.S. assessments for the UN regular budget) and $361 mil to CIPA (U.S. assessments for UN #peacekeeping budgets), along with $437 mil in voluntary contributions.

The Security Council has not been able to reach agreement on financing #AUSSOM using UN assessed funding (i.e., the “hybrid” implementation of UNSCR 2719). As such, UN support to the AU in #Somalia will continue under existing arrangements through #UNSOS. undocs.org/en/S/2025/322

It is entirely unclear what the SG is trying to accomplish here. Arbitrary staffing cuts not only won’t bring the fundamental reform needed at the UN. It also won’t address the liquidity crisis. If the U.S. withholds, it doesn’t matter how small the pie is. 22% will still be missing. #UN80

Germany did an excellent job at hosting the 2025 Peacekeeping Ministerial earlier this month. But 10 yrs on, has the ministerial process run its course? I argue that it reinforces the primacy of the military in #peacekeeping and an outdated approach to force generation. cic.nyu.edu/resources/re...

💭 #NYUCIC’s Senior Fellow Eugene Chen, @telegramwriter.bsky.social, speaks to the @economist.com#NYUCIC’son the growing trend of delayed UN payments by member states. With major contributors delaying or withholding payments, the UN is experiencing a liquidity crisis. Read the full article 🔻

The Secretary-General will be briefing Member States on the #UN80 initiative today at 11:00 AM (New York time). The webcast link is here: webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1n...

Today, not only did the White House FY2026 request no funds for the account from which UNSOS (and hypothetically #AUSSOM) contributions are usually paid, but Senate Republicans also reaffirmed their opposition to funding the mission. #Somalia www.foreign.senate.gov/press/rep/re...

It's official: the FY2026 budget does not provide funding for #UN and other #peacekeeping operations, and "pauses most assessed and all voluntary contributions" including for the UN regular budget, #UNESCO, and the #WHO. This presumably refers to the CIO, CIPA, IO&P, and PKO accounts in SFOPS.

I talk to about US aid cuts to the UN alongside @telegramwriter.bsky.social and @loucharb.bsky.social. genevasolutions.news/global-news/...

The effort to pay for 75% of #AUSSOM by cutting #UNSOS has run into challenges, w/a $40 mil shortfall. Apparently, further "savings" are being sought, but does it make sense to hamstring UNSOS further, and in doing so undermining operational capacity? #Somalia amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-...

Much has happened since I was interviewed for this piece, but my assessment still holds: whether the UN is able to make a deal with the U.S. on assessed contributions depends on whether UN policy under Trump 2.0 is transactional or ideological. [1/3] genevasolutions.news/global-news/...

Last April, I warned Security Council members that failure to raise the 25% for AU missions while giving access to liquidity measures would harm all current and future UN peacekeeping ops. Now w/U.S. assessments in doubt, it’s time to be realistic about the practicality of moving forward with 2719.

This article provides more detail; it seems as if the memo does not propose eliminating CIO entirely, as some funding to IAEA and ICAO would remain, but it does appear as if all U.S. assessments to the UN are on the chopping block. www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025...

Most likely, the memo proposed eliminating the CIO account (from which assessed contributions to the UN system other than peacekeeping are paid) and the CIPA account (from which assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping are paid). www.nytimes.com/2025/04/14/u...

💼 We’re hiring! Join us as a Program Officer (Researcher) for the Multilateral Reform Program and be a part of our dynamic team. Apply now ⬇️ cic.nyu.edu/about/career...

I wonder what the reaction from the White House and State Department will be tomorrow morning.

🚨New on Multilateralism in Action🚨 In 𝑼𝑵 𝑷𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒆𝒌𝒆𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝑬𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑯𝒐𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑨𝒖𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒔𝒎? Sarah von Billerbeck, @birtegippert.bsky.social, @kseniyaoksamytna.bsky.social & @oisintansey.bsky.social show that UN peacekeeping activities can enable authoritarian activities 🇺🇳🫡🪖 A short 🧵—🔗below

Still cannot believe it: the United Nations Security Council Resolution Authors (UNSCRA) dataset is out in the @jpeaceresearch.bsky.social 🥳

 Read here why the data is important and use it widely for your research: journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/...

Because IOM is so project-oriented, it’s among the UN system orgs which will find it the "easiest" to adapt to such massive cuts (at an organizational level). Yet, the degree to which the project-level overheads cuts affect IOM headquarters is a hint to the disruption Trump will cause to the UN.

Kinshasa weighs attending peace talks with M23 in Angola as Southern African leaders opt for phased withdrawal of SAMIDRC troops in eastern Congo www.reuters.com/world/africa...

The SG announced that the #UN80 initiative will develop proposals in three areas: - Efficiencies and improvements in the way the UN works - Implementation of mandates from Member States - Structural changes and programme realignment in the UN system

The Secretary-General is about to give a press conference on the launch of the UN80 initiative (09:00 AM New York time). webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1b...

The retrenchment of #UN #peacekeeping continues. The Secretary-General is requesting a total $5.5 billion for 2025/26, down from the approved level of $5.6 billion for the current 2024/25 period. 🔗 undocs.org/en/A/C.5/79/31

GCSP has published a concept for a #Ukraine ceasefire monitoring mission (UN and/or OSCE), incl C2, req’d capabilities, & mandated tasks. It suggests elements of ceasefire agreement & underlines need for linkage to broader political settlement & security guarantees. www.gcsp.ch/publications...

The retrenchment of #UN #peacekeeping continues. The Secretary-General is requesting a total $5.5 billion for 2025/26, down from the approved level of $5.6 billion for the current 2024/25 period. 🔗 undocs.org/en/A/C.5/79/31

This article dives into the organizational culture of the #UN peace and security pillar and is a must-read for anyone working on peace operations.