🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨 Wu (2025) shows that European populist radical right governments diverge in their China policies due to differences in transnational business ties and executive centralization, despite sharing similar ideological foundations. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

The FPA Editorial Team will take a break from December 22 to January 5 to recharge. Please allow for extended response times for our communications during this period.

1/3: Starting January 1, 2026, the new FPA editorial team will start its 5-year term. Co-Editor-in-Chiefs: Leslie Wehner, Sibel Oktay, Baris Kesgin

Urtuzuastigui, Bsisu, and Vernallis show that military sanctions tend to reduce refugee flows by constraining violence against civilians, while economic sanctions increase displacement by intensifying civilian exploitation. academic.oup.com/fpa/article-...

Lee (2025) shows that leadership approval in Japan rises when leaders take tougher stances toward more salient and threatening rivals, while policies toward lesser rivals have limited domestic political effects. academic.oup.com/fpa/article-...

🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨 Bias (2026) shows how states deploy “traditional values” as an anti-feminist foreign policy tool, urging closer dialogue between anti-gender research and foreign policy analysis. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Risse (2025) shows that democracies consistently back conventional arms control but support nuclear arms control only when the initiatives are led by fellow democracies. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Yang (2025) argues that U.S. political and military influence has a Janus-faced effect on protégés’ latent nuclear capabilities—first bolstering them for deterrence, then constraining further development as their programs advance. academic.oup.com/fpa/article-...

Girard and Wilhelm (2025) show that Americans turn against data localization policies when economic costs are emphasized, while sovereignty-based frames have little effect and ethnocentrism—not geopolitics—drives evaluations of related trade agreements. academic.oup.com/fpa/article-...

The Conversation features a new piece by an FPA Editorial team member @ahmed-b.bsky.social on how the UN is reinventing peacekeeping, with Haiti as the testing ground. Please read it here: theconversation.com/the-un-is-re...

Asadzade (2025) shows that the April 2024 Iran–Israel confrontation heightened Iranians’ support for nuclear weapons, chiefly through intensified security and deterrence concerns rather than status-related motives. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Lee (2025) shows that IO membership strengthens leader survival, with summit-holding IOs offering the greatest political protection. academic.oup.com/fpa/article-...

Pipoyan and Meibauer (2025) show that Armenia’s limited hedging toward Russia stemmed from systemic constraints and pragmatic elite ideas, producing selective bandwagoning and partial balancing. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Imanishi (2025) shows that both the volume and diversity of media coverage shape U.S. bureaucratic responsiveness in complex emergency aid between 2000 and 2019. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Visoka and Brajshori (2025) show that aspirant states like Kosovo use protean power—adaptability, innovation, and improvisation—to navigate barriers to recognition and gain partial legitimacy in international organizations. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Wang and Xiang (2025) find that bilateral investment treaties boost foreign aid flows by compensating or enforcing compliance, with democracies favoring compensation and autocracies enforcement. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨 Abu-Haltam (2025) shows that Jordan practices “indirect bandwagoning,” subtly aligning with U.S. interests by limiting China’s influence without open confrontation, illustrating how aid-dependent states navigate great power rivalry. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Dörfler (2025) explains Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by showing how groupthink amplified loss-framed risk perceptions among Putin’s inner circle, making high-risk behavior more likely and frame reversal improbable. academic.oup.com/fpa/article-...

Choi (2025) finds that security alliances significantly reduce the likelihood of war, providing strong support for deterrence theory over the Steps-to-War perspective. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Heimann and Kampf (2025) show that interpersonal diplomatic offenses such as degradation, unfriendliness, and marginalization disrupt relations between state representatives and call for their systematic study in IR. academic.oup.com/fpa/article-...

🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨 Girard and Wilhelm (2025) find Americans oppose data localization when framed as costly, with attitudes shaped more by ethnocentrism than geopolitics. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/... @alex-wilhelm.bsky.social @tylergirard.bsky.social

Asadzade (2025) shows, survey data from Iran before and during the 2024 Iran–Israel confrontation reveal a sharp rise in support for nuclear weapons, driven mainly by security concerns and deterrence needs. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Do small states under hegemonic pressure always choose between balancing or bandwagoning? Pipoyan and Meibauer (2025) show that Armenia instead pursued a form of limited hedging shaped by Russian assertiveness and domestic ideas. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Does leadership turnover in recipient states reduce arms orders from previous suppliers? Mehrl (2025) finds no empirical evidence that it does. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨 Risse (2025) shows that democracies consistently support conventional arms control but back nuclear arms control only when resolutions are co-sponsored by other democracies. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Choi (2025) finds strong empirical support for deterrence theory over Steps-to-War theory by showing that alliances significantly reduce the likelihood of war, the most destructive form of conflict. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Heimann and Kampf (2025) examine how interpersonal diplomatic offenses, such as degradation and marginalization, disrupt state relations and call for integrating these micro-level interactions into International Relations theory. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Imanishi (2025) shows that U.S. emergency aid increases not just with media volume, but especially when coverage is diverse in framing—revealing that “attention diversity” significantly shapes bureaucratic responsiveness. academic.oup.com/fpa/article-...

Jenichen and Deka (2025) show that focusing solely on religion—without accounting for class and gender—limits the effectiveness of FoRB advocacy, as illustrated by the Asia Bibi case in Pakistan. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Flowers (2025) introduces the HEX dataset to analyze global espionage exposures, revealing that most accused spies were state personnel motivated by money across 483 cases from 1946 to 2010. academic.oup.com/fpa/article-...

Fracalossi de Moraes (2025) shows that perceived adjustment costs were key, APMs were seen as low-cost to abandon, while cluster munitions posed significant material burdens. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

LaSpisa and Mitchell (2025) find that democratic dyads are more prone to maritime conflict due to stronger domestic interests, executive constraints, and weaker territorial norms at sea. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨 Zvobgo and Simmons (2025) show that most Americans still support ICC war crimes investigations, even when U.S. personnel are targeted, though national interest arguments can dampen this support. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨 Attia (2025) shows that U.S. presidents with strong party support and high approval are more likely to lift sanctions, while congressional oversight makes termination less likely and slower. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Cadier (2024) shows that populist governments politicize foreign policy by opposing predecessors and using external affairs to advance domestic battles, as illustrated by Poland’s case. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Thiers (2024) shows that Evo Morales’s shifting emotions toward Chile help explain why Bolivia’s foreign policy oscillated between cooperation and escalation in their long-standing rivalry. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Gloria (2025) shows that Duterte's foreign policy pivot toward China and away from the U.S. was shaped by a populist discourse of national victimhood, framing the Philippines as historically wronged and insecure in a shifting global order. academic.oup.com/fpa/article-...

Abbasov and Thies (2023) show that in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, individuals with stronger pro-democracy attitudes are more likely to support a pro-Western foreign policy over alignment with Russia. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

How does the lack of intersectionality limit international religious freedom policies? academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Cadier (2024) argues that populist governments politicize foreign policy by opposing predecessors, instrumentalizing diplomacy for domestic battles, and prioritizing internal political incentives over external strategic logic. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Oestman and Passmore (2024) show that while leadership change often disrupts peacekeeping contributions, democracies maintain more consistent commitments due to institutional constraints and overlapping domestic preferences. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

How do publics respond to coercive vs. persuasive foreign messaging? Davies, Edney, and Williams (2025) find that even mild persuasive messages from China on UK nuclear investment backfired—security threat perceptions consistently fueled public resistance. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Dörfler (2025) argues that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was driven by groupthink and loss-framed risk amplification among Putin’s inner circle, consistent with prospect theory. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

🚨 New article🚨 Fracalossi de Moraes (2025) shows Brazil banned anti-personnel mines but not cluster munitions due to lower perceived military and economic adjustment costs. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

🚨 New article🚨 When do firms stay in sanctioned states during wartime? Phạm (2025) shows that firms with high economic vulnerability, especially in extractive sectors or with major assets, are less likely to exit Russia after sanctions. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

🚨 New article 🚨 Fritzler, Grøn, and Wivel (2025) show that these states shape international norms through processual leadership, especially by enabling deliberative spaces around the Responsibility to Protect. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

🚨 New article 🚨 Why do some U.S. protégés develop higher nuclear latency than others? Yang (2025) finds that initial U.S. backing helps build capacity, but becomes a constraint once a protégé nears weapons-ready status. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

What drives parliamentary support for military interventions in democracies? Vignoli and Baraldi (2024) show that left-wing governments secure higher parliamentary backing, and that inclusive, humanitarian missions face less opposition than strategic ones. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

What drives elected officials to engage with foreign security policy in democracies? Walter C. Ladwig III shows that in India’s Lok Sabha, electoral security, party affiliation, and social identity shape parliamentary attention—not just public salience. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

How can role theory help us understand the U.S.–Russia confrontation over Ukraine? Walker and Malici apply binary role theory to model how each superpower constructed its foreign policy identity from NATO expansion in 1994 to Russia’s 2022 invasion. academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...