Spotted in Eskisehir, Turkey

Spotted in Eskisehir, Turkey

Questions mounting in Turkey over lack of progress in Chinese electric vehicle giant BYD’s investment, despite a $1bn deal to build a factory signed in 2024. www.ntv.com.tr/galeri/otomo...

Bahceli has mastered the art of divide-and-rule. t24.com.tr/haber/bahcel...

Bahceli has mastered the art of divide-and-rule. t24.com.tr/haber/bahcel...

Direnişin 1️⃣8️⃣0️⃣9️⃣. günü #5Yıl 17 Aralık 2025 Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Akademisyenleri Nöbeti no. 1218 #KabulEtmiyoruzVazgeçmiyoruz December 17, 2025 Bogazici University Faculty Vigil #1218/5th year/1809th day of the resistance #WeDoNotAcceptWeDoNotGiveUp

Turkey’s S-400 missile defense system is back in the news. Again. With David Banks, we offered a symbolic politics explanation of why the Russian-made purchase would repeatedly pop up as a foreign policy stumbling block. AND not cover Turkey’s air defense gap. www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1...

In the immediate aftermath of Assad's fall, there was a discussion in Turkey about a possible maritime deal between Ankara and Damascus. Yet, this debate was rather short-lived and did not really come back. www.al-monitor.com/originals/20...

Perhaps one last point: Let's say Ankara is determined, no matter what, to push for a maritime agreement with Syria. I doubt that Shara'a is in a position to play along. It takes two to tango.

The measured MoF statement about the recent delimitation agreement between Lebanon and the Rep.of Cyprus is quite telling, I think. The statement focusses solely on the rights of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Still, I would be surprised if a maritime agreement with Syria is a priority for Ankara, at a time when most of its energy is focussed on the SDF and keeping relations with the Trump Administration in tact.

It is true that tension(s) in the EastMed have been bubbling up and Ankara is quite nervous about what it perceives to be an emerging strategic triad btw Greece, Israel and Republic of Cyprus (perhaps add here also the UAE).

Tensions with Israel in and over Syria, Ankara's reluctance to act unilaterally in Syria, and last but not least, also the lessons learned from maritime deal signed with the then Government of National Accord of Libya have certainly played a role here.

Mali bought six Akıncı combat drones for $210m, but the contracting party (the state security agency ANSE) doesn't have the budget to pay for them. A "bienfaiteur étranger" likely committed to pay for at least part of the transaction.

In the immediate aftermath of Assad's fall, there was a discussion in Turkey about a possible maritime deal between Ankara and Damascus. Yet, this debate was rather short-lived and did not really come back. www.al-monitor.com/originals/20...

M.Ucum's reflections today describing the perceived nature of left politics and why such politics should embrace the so-called "Terror Free Turkey" project is an attribute to the hegemonic nature - since its first public manifestation - of Ankara's rapprochement with Ocalan.

M.Ucum's reflections today describing the perceived nature of left politics and why such politics should embrace the so-called "Terror Free Turkey" project is an attribute to the hegemonic nature - since its first public manifestation - of Ankara's rapprochement with Ocalan.

The second one is the following: while the regime attempts to render political competition meaningless in a real sense, friction and tensions within the regime are increasing. In other words, the circle is tightening.

The second one is the following: while the regime attempts to render political competition meaningless in a real sense, friction and tensions within the regime are increasing. In other words, the circle is tightening.

My first take away from the imprisonment of Mehmet Akif Ersoy: Being a loyalist or having close ties to the Palace does not provide absolute immunity. Perhaps one reason why the regime is unable to stabilise itself.

Pro-government journalists in Turkey rejoice at Brad Cooper's remarks about the SDF's integration with the STG as a manifestation of an (long-awaited) alignment between CENTCOM and the White House on the SDF's future under the March 10 agreement.

Pro-government journalists in Turkey rejoice at Brad Cooper's remarks about the SDF's integration with the STG as a manifestation of an (long-awaited) alignment between CENTCOM and the White House on the SDF's future under the March 10 agreement.

This resembles in many ways the agreement between the SDF&the STG in Aleppo's Kurdish neighborhouds. Yet, the negotiation isn't only about the the armed groups. Central to all of this are the questions of control over resources as well as over territory in majority Arab areas under SDF rule.

The aim is to push the SDF's integration into the planned and desired national command under Shara's rule. To me, what is noteworthy are the similar statements lately from Fidan, Ocalan and a couple of months ago also from James Jeffrey about local security forces as a point for compromise.

Fidan's remarks in Doha signalling flexibility to local security forces under SDF command, reports of TR military reinforcements to Syria and the Chief of Turkish General Staff's recent visit to Dam. are complementary developments, offering carrots while at the same time threatening with sticks.

5 Aralık 2025 Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Akademisyenleri Nöbeti no. 1210. Direnişin 5. yılı/1797. günü Boğaziçi Üniversitesi'nde #KabulEtmiyoruzVazgeçmiyoruz December 5, 2025 Boğaziçi University Faculty Vigil #1210/5th year/1797th day of the resistance. At Boğaziçi Univ. #WeDoNotAcceptWeDoNotGiveUp!

Fidan's remarks in Doha signalling flexibility to local security forces under SDF command, reports of TR military reinforcements to Syria and the Chief of Turkish General Staff's recent visit to Dam. are complementary developments, offering carrots while at the same time threatening with sticks.

I am probably naive, but it reads like there is logic behind the NSD document. It might not be a coherent and well-thought-out one. Yet, it is simple and accessible: i) the US has the privilege to use force (of different sorts) to protect its interests,

DAANES prohibits public gatherings throughout the northeast tomorrow and on Dec 8 (year anniversary of the fall of the regime), citing security concerns

"I can tell you, being a user of the system, that President Erdoğan is doing a very good job of managing a very difficult situation. And our belief, the US belief, is he's not interested in extending the Ottoman Empire. Taking care of Istanbul and Ankara is enough."

The thing that gets me is how they expect tribute from allies as a matter of right, in return for...???? Nothing. If you run a mafia protection racket then you actually have to offer protection from the other rival mafia racketeers. Otherwise your entire protection racket model collapses.

Thread in relation to the new US National Security Strategy. 👇 Basically European allies are subordinate to Trumpian interests and should become far-right racist societies that pay tribute to the US in return for very, very vague and noncommittal mutterings about security (not promises).

I don‘t see the document as a declaration of intent to retreat as much as to redefine priorities, challenges and instruments to tackle these so that the US remains on top of the pyramid. The section on Europe is revealing in this respect.

Very interesting take by @sinemadar.bsky.social ! The new US NSS miscalculation, however, to me lies in the implied retreat from Europe. It would mean that the US no longer is a European/Eurasian power & strategically much diminished as a consequence. A move to assure the loss of global superiority.

Great short thread on the National Security Strategy.

I am probably naive, but it reads like there is logic behind the NSD document. It might not be a coherent and well-thought-out one. Yet, it is simple and accessible: i) the US has the privilege to use force (of different sorts) to protect its interests,

Lurking underneath the differences btw Ankara&Ocalan regarding the scope and extent of disarmament are also the issues such as i) control of resources in Syria (and the SDF's withdrawal from Arab-majority areas), and ii) control of the border between TR and the Autonomous Administration.

This may surprise some, but for Yeğen, even the Kurdish movement in Turkey (admittedly a vague term) is not fully prepared for this new Kurdish question, as evidenced by the ambiguity of the concept of democratic integration.

Lurking underneath the differences btw Ankara&Ocalan regarding the scope and extent of disarmament are also the issues such as i) control of resources in Syria (and the SDF's withdrawal from Arab-majority areas), and ii) control of the border between TR and the Autonomous Administration.

This week's issue covers the re-closing of the Deir Hafir and Tabqah crossings, comments to the media on talks from PYD and Govt officials, al-Houl's Iraqi pop continues to drop, 1 year anniverary demos, latest in Coalition + gov't relations akmckeever.substack.com/p/this-week-...

Some great stuff from this year's @foreignpolicy.com Holiday Gift guide foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/26/h...

Both might be possible at the same time: The distance btw the CHP and DEM elites will increase, while the CHP's efforts to save what is left of competitive elections (in Ozel's words, "to establish the democracy front") might bring the two parties' respective electorate close to one another.

Both might be possible at the same time: The distance btw the CHP and DEM elites will increase, while the CHP's efforts to save what is left of competitive elections (in Ozel's words, "to establish the democracy front") might bring the two parties' respective electorate close to one another.

Turkey recap is out with comments by @sinemadar.bsky.social and more: 1. Peace process hinges on secrecy and Syria 2. CHP prepares 4th congress in 2 years 3. Domestic and diplomatic wraps 4. Serbs dunk on sultan, lose anyway 5. Holiday. Celebrate. A 25% discount!

Thread!

I wanted to write about this, but Sinem has said it all (and said it well, too). The Imrali affair is now over, and that's a good thing, because it was exhausting (a lot of noise for what was ultimately a very symbolic meeting...).

Really interesting conversation! Can't wait to read the book!

I find the argument that the Imrali visit has given Ocalan political legitimacy to be misleading for three reasons. First, the regime's intent to confer the PKK's founder legitimacy was already put on the table when Bahceli called Ocalan to declare the PKK's dissolution at the Turkish parliament.

I find the argument that the Imrali visit has given Ocalan political legitimacy to be misleading for three reasons. First, the regime's intent to confer the PKK's founder legitimacy was already put on the table when Bahceli called Ocalan to declare the PKK's dissolution at the Turkish parliament.

First sign reads "We have been, we are, we will be"