"Bayraktar said international initiatives would support ongoing work in the Gabar field in southeastern Türkiye and in the Black Sea, while also contributing to TPAO's goal of becoming a global company with production capacity of 1 million barrels." www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/ge...

In this respect, Iran's request to have the planned meeting with the US in Oman, instead of Turkey, and the UAE hosting the latest round of talks between Russia, Ukraine and the US are noteworthy developments.

Final post of the day: There is much attention paid to Turkey's mediation and peace-making efforts in different places. Actual developments justify the interest, for sure. What the debate misses, however, is a comparative glance at when and where Ankara is present, and when not.

The recent MoU btw Syria's transition government's recent MoU with Chevron and the Qatar-based Power International Holding signals the limits to the US-Turkey cooperation in Syria. In December, Turkish Energy Minister signalled intention to sign a similar deal with Damascus.

Barzani's inclusive&accommodationist approach for the moment mostly converges with Ankara's efforts to disarm&dissolve the PKK, and simultaneously, shift Kurdish representation away from the network of actors around the PKK. What comes after, should Turkey succeed in its efforts, remains open.

Final post of the day: There is much attention paid to Turkey's mediation and peace-making efforts in different places. Actual developments justify the interest, for sure. What the debate misses, however, is a comparative glance at when and where Ankara is present, and when not.

The recent MoU btw Syria's transition government's recent MoU with Chevron and the Qatar-based Power International Holding signals the limits to the US-Turkey cooperation in Syria. In December, Turkish Energy Minister signalled intention to sign a similar deal with Damascus.

Barzani's inclusive&accommodationist approach for the moment mostly converges with Ankara's efforts to disarm&dissolve the PKK, and simultaneously, shift Kurdish representation away from the network of actors around the PKK. What comes after, should Turkey succeed in its efforts, remains open.

Journalism has never been easy, but I think there are always opportunities for people who want to work in news media. Here are five tips that came from my conversations with journalism students in recent weeks. Feedback welcome.

Once again, Bahceli ruled out an early election. Not surprising. It would be good if Turkey has elections in 2028, as scheduled. Economy still needs breathing room. More importantly, power struggles within the regime are far from reaching a relatively stable equilibrium. All these require time.

I agree with Sinem's thread here. To which I would add: I still believe a referendum will precede the next scheduled elections, to give Erdogan an opportunity to run for another term of office.

Once again, Bahceli ruled out an early election. Not surprising. It would be good if Turkey has elections in 2028, as scheduled. Economy still needs breathing room. More importantly, power struggles within the regime are far from reaching a relatively stable equilibrium. All these require time.

Sevgili Semsa Özar hocayi kaybetmisiz. Cok cok üzüldüm. Onu, yürekleri isitan kocaman gülümsemesi&hayati otelenmisler ve unutulmuslar icin her daim daha anlamli bir yer haline getirme azmi ve adanmisligi ile hatirlayacagim. Anisi daim olsun, nurlar icinde uyusun!

The SDF-STG agreement appears to have strengthened the trend away from collective status. Today, the basis to effectively sustain autonomy, let alone decentralisation, is much weaker. Whether coercive assimilation will in time replace the seeming commitment to individual rights is yet to be seen.

The SDF-STG agreement appears to have strengthened the trend away from collective status. Today, the basis to effectively sustain autonomy, let alone decentralisation, is much weaker. Whether coercive assimilation will in time replace the seeming commitment to individual rights is yet to be seen.

I am not sure what the formation of brigades with SDF fighters would in practice mean when i) internal security forces under Damascus are agreed to enter the city centres of Hasakah and Qamisli, ii) integration of AANES institutions to the Syrian state is foreseen, and that

I keep hearing that the KDP is anxious for its own survival. Yet find it not convincing, given that the SDF's strategic decline (alongside Ankara's rapprochement with Ocalan) creates a vacuum for Kurdish leadership in the region. KDP could very well see this as an opportunity.

Turkey will repatriate all Turkish women and children under 12 from al Hol and Roj camps, in Syria. According to UN, there are 1300 Turkish nationals. Apparently men and boys above 12 have been transferred elsewhere kisadalga.net/haber/ozel-h...

I am not sure what the formation of brigades with SDF fighters would in practice mean when i) internal security forces under Damascus are agreed to enter the city centres of Hasakah and Qamisli, ii) integration of AANES institutions to the Syrian state is foreseen, and that

Bruce Springsteen - Streets Of Minneapolis www.youtube.com/watch?v=GDaP...

My standing position for a while is “free (are votes accurately counted) and fair (what are the structural conditions of elections)” is not a good rubric anymore for assessing electoral regimes

In his interview with NTV yesterday, Hakan Fidan made a curious move. When asked about the earlier criticism that his uncompromising stance on the SDF could jeopardise the so-called peace initiative, Fidan stated that as a politician, he must take public opinion seriously.

Turkish gains in Syria come with the mid-to-long-term risk of becoming hostage to the structures that are formed and the interests they shape. Managing path dependencies without being led by them is not easy.

UAE plans to pay for first of the Gaza concentration camps, um “planned communities”. Naturally. www.theguardian.com/world/2026/j...

In his interview with NTV yesterday, Hakan Fidan made a curious move. When asked about the earlier criticism that his uncompromising stance on the SDF could jeopardise the so-called peace initiative, Fidan stated that as a politician, he must take public opinion seriously.

If you have not done so already, follow the CATS Network's LinkedIn Account for updates on publications from CATS and its Network partners. 👇

Die Ära der Pax Americana geht zu Ende. Europa kann sich nicht länger auf die Partnerschaft mit den USA verlassen. Eine Studie von Barbara Lippert & Stefan Mair (Hg.) zeigt in 14 Beiträgen Wege aus der Abhängigkeit von Washington. (1/4) www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/...

"“So, I see the presence continuing, perhaps withdrawn to Iraq at some point, and then subordinating US interests to regional allies. In this case, there are synergies between Turkey and the Arab states. The outlier was always Israel.”, Stein said" www.turkeyrecap.com/p/syrian-dem...

Bahceli: "The DEM Party must make a decision: Will it stand with or against the founding leader of the PKK? Will it remain in the shadow of terrorism, or will it serve a future free of terrorism? [...]

After Erdogan visited Trump last year, the discussion was thst TR left the US with empty hands. There is clearly more to what the bare eye sees. The last couple of days underline this.

It is now confirmed, I think, that the Trump administration’s vision for Syria overlaps with that of the Turkish and the Saudi: centralized state under Arab leadership.

After Erdogan visited Trump last year, the discussion was thst TR left the US with empty hands. There is clearly more to what the bare eye sees. The last couple of days underline this.

It is now confirmed, I think, that the Trump administration’s vision for Syria overlaps with that of the Turkish and the Saudi: centralized state under Arab leadership.

Seeming like the Shammar Sanadid Forces have defected from the SDF to the govt, meaning the YPG has lost its earliest Arab ally (dating back to 2013)... also means DAANES loses a big chunk of Arab populated areas at the end of the M4 on Iraqi border (between Rmeilan and Ya'rubiyah)

Collapse of Yemen’s STC and Syria’s SDF in such close proximity seems to be more than coincidence, especially given how the Saudi-UAE fallout has been framed around state sovereignty vs armed secessionist movements. Obviously local context matters most but there’s a new regional dynamic in play.

Hamidreza Azizi: "Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah is existential. Turkey neither seeks nor can credibly assume that role. Ankara’s broader regional project remains [...] calibrated to preserve maneuverability vis-à-vis Israel, the west and Arab partners" amwaj.media/en/debate/de...

The agreement btw the STG and the SDF sets the stage for a new phase in the struggle over political representation in Syria. One of the key components of this new phase will be efforts (by Damascus and other actors) to "indigenize" the Kurdish representation.

For background and context for today’s major developments in Syria and the SDF, check out several of the pieces in this terrific collection released last month. Questions of centralization, fragmentation and federalism have been critical to the transition. pomeps.org/pomeps-studi...

Among other things, what strikes me most about the agreement between the STG and the SDF is that it records the SDF's commitment to remove PKK members who are not Syrian outside Syria. This is a written acknowledgement by the SDF of its connection to the PKK.

It should also be noted that this is a long-standing request from Ankara...

Among other things, what strikes me most about the agreement between the STG and the SDF is that it records the SDF's commitment to remove PKK members who are not Syrian outside Syria. This is a written acknowledgement by the SDF of its connection to the PKK.

It is inevitable that the SDF's weakened negotiating position will affect the rapprochement process between Ankara and Ocalan. My working assumption is that this will help push the Kurdish representation from Ocalan and the PKK, which Ankara aimed at since the beginning.

Ongoing fighting in Syria between the STG and the SDF is not about west and east of the Euphrates. Damascus wants full control over territory, means of violence and resources. Redefining the front lines is a means to force the SDF to the negotiation table in this direction.

It is inevitable that the SDF's weakened negotiating position will affect the rapprochement process between Ankara and Ocalan. My working assumption is that this will help push the Kurdish representation from Ocalan and the PKK, which Ankara aimed at since the beginning.

Much still remains to be seen but the SDF's entire to approach to many Arab communities - cooption of certain tribes, clans or individuals within tribes - was a built on quicksand. Loyalty based on disempowered personal gain not able to withstand the symbolic legitimacy of the new regime.

Ongoing fighting in Syria between the STG and the SDF is not about west and east of the Euphrates. Damascus wants full control over territory, means of violence and resources. Redefining the front lines is a means to force the SDF to the negotiation table in this direction.

The series of events surrounding the rapprochement (and alignment) between Ankara&Ocalan (since October 2024) stands at the intersection of the future of political systems in TR&SYR. In Turkey, it is about regime survival&stabilization. In Syria, it concerns state formation under Shara's leadership.

As violent clashes between the STG and the SDF continue, pressure on the DEM Party within Turkey mounts. Over the last couple of days, pro-government journalists (and others) have called on the party to completely align itself with Abdullah Ocalan.

The series of events surrounding the rapprochement (and alignment) between Ankara&Ocalan (since October 2024) stands at the intersection of the future of political systems in TR&SYR. In Turkey, it is about regime survival&stabilization. In Syria, it concerns state formation under Shara's leadership.