As accurate as this observation may be, I believe it overlooks how individuals adapt to an increasingly repressive system; yet this adaptation helps - both intentionally and unintentionally - to consolidate power and facilitates repression.

Society, meanwhile, is included in this analysis as a factor contributing to dissatisfaction with the political system.

Turkey's autocratisation saga is still often analysed within the framework of party politics, with an emphasis on understanding the goals and limitations of the ruling coalition and the opposition parties.

This is about Turkey under Erdogan, but it's also largely applicable to many other societies under similar circumstances. If most people go along to get along, then it only encourages the authorities to push further and further.

Turkey's autocratisation saga is still often analysed within the framework of party politics, with an emphasis on understanding the goals and limitations of the ruling coalition and the opposition parties.

If anything, hypocrisy around Ankara fits into the general trend of turning a blind eye to human rights violations (and violations of other sorts). Post-Oct 7 dynamics drove the last nail in the coffin of norms. It is now sadly another world.

Western countries' prioritisation of interests over values in the case of TR is indeed disheartening at a time when the country's opposition is facing severe repression. Yet, Turkey is far from an isolated case.

Western countries' prioritisation of interests over values in the case of TR is indeed disheartening at a time when the country's opposition is facing severe repression. Yet, Turkey is far from an isolated case.

NATO Summit seems to bring otherwise critical actors to the pro-govt orbit of decision-makers, experts and analysts. Quite amazing how centralisation of power and resources acts like an octopus.

Why have Turkey and Hungary become close political partners despite limited trade and little public demand for closer ties? My article argues that the answer lies in a common pushback against EU criticism and both regimes' regional ambitions beyond the EU. 1/4 www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....

Noteworthy is the emphasis on the need for "constructive engagement" with Turkey on matters "beyond the accession process" given Turkey is a member of NATO and "key partner for the stability" in the EastMed and in a variety of areas including migration and econmy.

I read the European Parliament's most recent report on Turkey as the strongest attempt so far to disentangle the accession process from the remaining and at times contradictory frameworks: transactionalism and confrontationalism.

I read the European Parliament's most recent report on Turkey as the strongest attempt so far to disentangle the accession process from the remaining and at times contradictory frameworks: transactionalism and confrontationalism.

My understanding is that, having failed to dominate Iran, the Trump adm is trying to co-opt the country. If it works, a more assertive Iran would further the region's arms race, heighten regional actors' threat perceptions regarding Iran&help balance Israel's aspirations for regional domination.

My understanding is that, having failed to dominate Iran, the Trump adm is trying to co-opt the country. If it works, a more assertive Iran would further the region's arms race, heighten regional actors' threat perceptions regarding Iran&help balance Israel's aspirations for regional domination.

As the potential role TR could play in the changing Eur. security landscape resurfaces in public debate, and the think-tank community seems to lack an adherence to cumulative knowledge production, I'd like to draw attention to a project we carried out on this subject last year👇

Turkey was not thrilled watching Trump empowering Putin. Turkey is not thrilled watching Washington empowering Iran, while at the same time highly likely watches the increasing tension between the US and Israel with curiosity and interest.

The system of international conflict management is in deep crisis. This is particularly evident in the Horn of Africa. In an SWP Research Paper @gerritkurtz.bsky.social @swp-mea.bsky.social explains why the international community must find new ways to build peace: www.swp-berlin.org/en/publicati...

One challenge for the policy and think tank world is the lack of established guidelines ensuring cumulative knowledge production. Without proper citation, building on and expanding what is already being found and argued, debates at times feel like a cat chasing its own tail.

About Ucum‘s piece advocating for another Erdogan term through an election only shortly before the official date: Why now is a more important question than what he is saying, which at this point has no news value to any seasoned Turkey observer.

In this respect, KK's rhetorical alignment should also be read as a message to political and economic actors who see their interests embedded in the continuation of such a policy.

The problem with an expansionist foreign policy is more than a moral one. It risks becoming a hostage to structures and interests (at home and abroad) that were created, and being unable to shift course when necessary or simply having to pay an expansive bill to do so.

What is more concerning about these remarks is that they normalise an expansionist approach to foreign policy.

Kılıçdaroğlu’s remarks yesterday, which presented Turkey’s so-called foreign policy activism as a necessity, align with the ruling party’s rhetoric. Yet, this is hardly surprising given that KK is back in the party exactly on this mission.

The problem with an expansionist foreign policy is more than a moral one. It risks becoming a hostage to structures and interests (at home and abroad) that were created, and being unable to shift course when necessary or simply having to pay an expansive bill to do so.

Kılıçdaroğlu’s remarks yesterday, which presented Turkey’s so-called foreign policy activism as a necessity, align with the ruling party’s rhetoric. Yet, this is hardly surprising given that KK is back in the party exactly on this mission.

Very important points: what is happening to Turkey's main opposition party is a final, tectonic shift to embed the "opposition" into the regime.

The irony here is that the more KK loses its legitimacy in the public eye, the more dependent he becomes on Ankara for political survival. The emerging elite pact is one of unequal interdependency. For the elite pact argument, see here: www.ipg-journal.de/regionen/eur...

In other words, it is assumed that in an environment where the cost of resistance is high, give-and-take, interest-driven relationships have long since become the norm.

The working assumption is that the financial resources under Kılıçdaroğlu’s control will be effective in winning over delegates and MPs in the medium term.

However, as long as this reaction remains manageable and can be contained, it does not pose a major obstacle for Ankara and Kılıçdaroğlu. Their priority is control over the party and its MPs. This is precisely where the time factor comes into play.

Just as was the case during İmamoğlu’s arrest, Ankara is acting on the assumption that time is on Kılıçdaroğlu’s and its own side. Yes, the public is reacting negatively. Yes, support for Kılıçdaroğlu’s leadership among CHP voters is low.

Slides for my presentation “Interventions in History Online” at the 6th INTH conference in Tallinn are available on Zenodo. The presentation was part of a series of panels on Attacks on History. #history #digitalhistory #dhist #censorship. doi.org/10.5281/zeno...

Just as was the case during İmamoğlu’s arrest, Ankara is acting on the assumption that time is on Kılıçdaroğlu’s and its own side. Yes, the public is reacting negatively. Yes, support for Kılıçdaroğlu’s leadership among CHP voters is low.

The irony here is that the more KK loses its legitimacy in the public eye, the more dependent he becomes on Ankara for political survival. The emerging elite pact is one of unequal interdependency. For the elite pact argument, see here: www.ipg-journal.de/regionen/eur...

Some thoughts based on the respective speeches by Özel and Kılıçdaroğlu today: 1) Özel's priority is to force a caucus as soon as possible. To this end, he i) rhetorically doubles down on the "appointed" versus "elected" leadership binary to delegitimise KK,

The UN Secretary General's report listing the Israeli and Russian armies, along with Hamas, Sudan's RSF, a number of Libyan militias and others, as "parties credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape or other forms of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict":

Excellent piece that translates easily to English. I think the outlined internal dynamics with DEM Parti & KK are at least as important as international dynamics (Trump's zero fucks for democracy and EU's greater need for Turkish defense cooperation) at explaining Turkey's further democratic decline

Sinem Adar'ın yazısı, Türkiye'de olan biteni anlamak isteyen yabancı dostlarımız için yol gösterici olabilir.

Das Urteil gegen die türkische CHP ist kein Justizakt, sondern ein Elitenpakt. Präsident Erdoğan sichert sich eine Opposition, die das System stabilisiert statt herausfordert. @sinemadar.bsky.social analysiert das neue autoritäre Machtmodell der Türkei. www.ipg-journal.de/regionen/eur...

Sinem nails down the broader implications of the "mutlak butlan" moment in Turkey: a new attempt to form regime cohesion with a tacit agreement of oligarchic sharing

The text can be accessed at the link below: www.ipg-journal.de/regionen/eur...

It marks a shift in the political system: Turkey is moving away from institutionalised party competition toward an authoritarian elite arrangement in which the opposition is no longer defeated but controlled. Ankara's rapprochement with Ocalan&its cooperation with KK follows a similar logic.

I have written a short piece (in German) about the most recent developments in Turkey. It argues that the ruling against Ozel and his leadership is more than just another attack on the Turkish opposition.

Meine Kollegin @sinemadar.bsky.social ordnet das Gerichtsurteil gegen die Republikanische Volkspartei CHP und die darauf folgenden Ereignisse politikwissenschaftlich ein. Ich habe es mit Gewinn gelesen.

Extremely important insight... and one that I think Sinem is among the first to identify

I have written a short piece (in German) about the most recent developments in Turkey. It argues that the ruling against Ozel and his leadership is more than just another attack on the Turkish opposition.

Reposting this, in light of Bahceli’s recent remarks calling the CHP to hold a party congress in September 👇

Angespannte Situation in der türkischen Oppositionspartei CHP nach Absetzung von Parteichef Özel: Das ist mehr als ein interner Machtkampf. "Es ist berechtigt und legitim, von einem Justizputsch zu sprechen", so @aydin2025.bsky.social im ZDF-Interview: www.zdfheute.de/video/heute-...