Guy Sechrist, PhD (@guysechrist.bsky.social)

Please register now for the Naval Dockyards Society 30th Annual Conference (Hybrid) - Global Maritime History Naval Dockyards Society 30th Annual Conference (Hybrid) National Maritime Museum Greenwich Saturday 28 March 2026 Sponsored by the Society for Nautical Research Aftermath of the 1956 Suez Crisis: Global Ramifications and Reflections for Dockyards and Shipyards Conference registration is now open. Attendance is available In Person or Online. The Booking Deadline for the Conference is March 23rd 2026. To complete your booking form please click HERE Everything you need to know about our conference speakers and presentations along with the conference programme is presented below. We are really looking forward to seeing you at Greenwich on March 23rd so please complete your booking early. Conference Abstracts and Biographies Dr Samantha Middleton, From Convoys to Crisis: How the WWII Maritime Infrastructure shaped Britain’s Strategic Failure in Suez and its Aftermath for Dockyards and Shipyards The 1956 Suez Crisis has often been portrayed as the symbolic end of Britain’s imperial era, yet its roots and repercussions cannot be fully understood without reference to the vast maritime infrastructure constructed during the Second World War. This paper examines how Britain’s wartime shipyards, dockyards, and global base network— originally built to sustain Atlantic convoys and far-flung naval operations—shaped both the ambitions that drove the Suez intervention and the strategic failures that followed. During the Battle of the Atlantic, Britain created an unparalleled logistical system: expanded home dockyards, high-output shipbuilding centres, repair facilities across the empire, and a global chain of fuelling and support bases. This infrastructure underpinned postwar assumptions that Britain could continue to act as a world naval power. By 1956, however, the geopolitical landscape had changed even as Britain attempted to employ an essentially WWII-era maritime model to execute a Cold War operation. The Suez crisis exposed the obsolescence and vulnerability of this system. Britain’s dependence on overseas bases—many located in newly independent or politically unstable regions—was abruptly revealed. The crisis also underscored limits in fleet readiness, supply-line security, and the ability of domestic dockyards to support sustained global operations without American backing. As a result, Suez became a decisive trigger for a far-reaching reassessment of naval infrastructure. In the aftermath, successive defence reviews accelerated the contraction of wartime shipbuilding capacity, the closure or downgrading of imperial dockyards, and the restructuring of labour forces in historic maritime communities. This paper argues that Suez marked not merely a diplomatic defeat but the moment when Britain’s WWII maritime system definitively ceased to be viable. By linking wartime mobilisation to post-imperial retrenchment, the study offers new insight into how the legacies of the Battle of the Atlantic cast a long shadow over Britain’s naval policy, industrial landscape, and global identity. Biography Dr Middleton is an early career naval historian whose doctoral research examined the professionalisation of the Royal Navy between 1660 and 1688. Her thesis adopted a multidisciplinary approach, integrating naval history with accounting history, and demonstrated that principles of management control were consciously developed and implemented by James, Duke of York, Samuel Pepys and William Coventry. She is currently finalising a co-authored article on this research and has presented her findings at a range of international conferences in both accounting and naval history. Dr Middleton’s recent publications focus on the Battle of the Atlantic and the role of intelligence during the Second World War. David F. Winkler, Filling the Void: The Reluctant Superpower East of Suez During the first decades of the Cold War, the Middle East/Indian Ocean region remained a backwater for the U.S. Navy as a commitment to build NATO in Europe as a counterweight to the Soviet Union and Pacific theater proxy wars – first in Korea and then in Vietnam – took priority. This paper will overview the U.S. Navy’s Middle East Force which was based out of HMS Juffair in the British protectorate of Bahrain through a transitional period that includes the Suez Crisis, the signing of the Baghdad Pact and the formation of CENTO, the decision of the UK in 1968 to withdraw “East of Suez” in the early 1970s, and the reaction of the Nixon administration. The paper will detail the American decision to only occupy a portion of the former British naval base as the U.S. – instead of replacing the British as guardians of the Gulf – will resort to a “Twin Pillars” strategy that assigns Saudi Arabia and Iran the role of regional policemen. The strategy will falter in 1979 with the fall of the Shah of Iran and the United States will be forced to increase its regional footprint, establishing a maritime prepositioned force at British-controlled Diego Garcia. Also covered will be the decision by a newly independent Bahrain to “Evict” the Americans in the wake of the October 1973 Middle East War. – but were the Americans shown the door? Of note the paper will highlight the symbiotic relationship between the ruling Khalifa family in Bahrain with an out of region power – first Great Britain and then the United States – as the emirate faced regional threats with the first and foremost being Iran. It’s a dynamic that continues today. Biography Dr. David Winkler was the Naval Historical Foundation historian, taught at the US Naval Academy, and is an U.S. Naval War College adjunct professor. A retired U.S. Navy commander, he holds a PhD from American University, an MA from Washington University, and a BA from Penn State. His notable publications include: Incidents at Sea: American Confrontation and Cooperation with Russia and China; Amirs, Admirals, and Desert Sailors: The US Navy, Bahrain, and the Gulf; Witness to Neptune’s Inferno: The Pacific War Diary of Lloyd M. Mustin, and America’s First Aircraft Carrier: USS Langley and the Dawn of US Naval Aviation. Richard Holme, Sheerness Dockyards 1956–2026: Bad and good news. Sheerness naval dockyard closed in March 1960, just four years after Suez. The announcement of this, made in February 1958, also saw news of other closures and reductions. The Nore command, responsible inter alia for the Thames and Medway estuaries as well as the Humber and Harwich, was to be abolished in 1961. The […] https://globalmaritimehistory.com/navaldockyardssociety30thannualconference/