Muss Deutschland jetzt viel mehr in den EU-Haushalt zahlen und ist Deutschland gar der Angeschmierte beim Vorschlag der EU-Kommission zum neuen Mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen? Die Antwort darauf ist kompliziert - aber schlecht kommt Deutschland sicher nicht weg. Warum? Stay with me:

Because it fears a change of the EU fiscal rules, the Commission is resorting to a very far-reaching interpretation of the rules to make room for much more defense spending. This is a shortsighted mistake because it risks accidentally killing the rules altogether at the worst moment. Here is why:

I published a short note on the implications of a proposed constitutional amendment in Germany, which includes an 11% of GDP fund for infrastructure and permission to fund most military spending outside the debt brake’s maximum deficit of 0.35% of GDP (Thread, 1/9): www.bruegel.org/analysis/can...

Good outcome at the #EuCo on EU fiscal rules: National escape clause is branded as „immediate measure“ but the Commission is asked to explore further options (read: opening the rules). The insight seems to have kicked in that a prolonged use of the escape clause is probably not a good idea.

Do EU fiscal rules prevent a reform of the German constitutional debt brake? In a new paper @nilsredeker.bsky.social and @lucasguttenberg.bsky.social show that EU rules should leave more fiscal space. I calculated how much more and find that the difference is substantial. Short thread 1/5

Consumption-based diff. btw inflation faced by low- and high-income HHs reduced over recent months due to disinflation in energy and food prices. I built a data app presenting joint work with Bruegel colleagues: inflation-inequality.onrender.com (feedback welcome, original article: t.co/mi5hbR8dqU)

Our assessment of yesterday's Council compromise on on the reform of the EU fiscal rules: A reasonable outcome overall, in some respects better, in others worse than the Commission’s April proposal: