loading . . . With rivals faltering, Bhumjaithai eyes northeast and south With rivals faltering, Bhumjaithai eyes northeast and south
Amid speculation that Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul may dissolve parliament in mid-December, his Bhumjaithai Party arguably remains the most powerful and election-ready political force.
Experts say that by leveraging state power, the Bhumjaithai Party is using its abundant resources to attract local politicians and their political networks. Having gained little traction in previous elections, it is now securing electoral victories and aiming for further gains in the northeast and south.
Ubon Ratchathani
In northeast Thailand’s Ubon Ratchathani, the Bhumjaithai Party ran an unsuccessful campaign in 2019. In the 2023 election, it won three of eleven seats, finishing just behind Pheu Thai, which secured four.
This was a notable achievement, even though Bhumjaithai lagged in the party-list vote, where Pheu Thai led in every constituency except Constituency 1, which was won by the Move Forward Party (now the People’s Party).
Dr. Pratueng Moung-On of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, who has been researching elections in Ubon for more than ten years, said that the Bhumjaithai Party had adjusted its strategy.
“Last time the local people viewed drugs as a big problem. They had the belief that if they chose Pheu Thai, it would suppress [drugs].” But Bhumjaitai won three MPs because “the people did not buy the Bhumjaithai Party, but they did buy the individuals,” said Pratueng.
The Bhumjaithai Party’s strategy involved co-opting local MPs who had spent years in their constituencies building connections with voters. Having established strong networks, these MPs’ political bases remain intact despite changes in party affiliation.
“The people expect that MPs must come out to the area, so that the people see their faces now and then, whether by attending ordination ceremonies, funerals, various ceremonies in the community.” Local voters still expect this from their MPs, so that when grievances arise, they can communicate with them directly, Pratueng noted.
Thanks to their strong ties with voters, these local politicians wield significant bargaining power with political parties to secure resources that sustain their influence. At times, they band together to form local powerhouses, known in Thai as ban yai (big houses).
Whichever party offers more resources can secure their support as MP candidates. Notably, the three Bhumjaithai MPs who won in 2023 previously worked for other political parties. In the next election, the Bhumjaithai Party is likely to continue this strategy.
Just this month, two MPs from Pheu Thai defected to join Bhumjaithai including Sudarat ‘Kan’ Pitakpornpunlop, MP for Ubon Ratchathani Constituency 7, and Saratsanun ‘Khaofang’ Unnopporn, MP for Khon Kaen. In Nakhon Ratchasima, the local powerhouses led by Wirat Rattanaset and Kosol Pattama will reportedly join Bhumjaithai.
By December last year, the Bhumjaithai Party was already testing its campaign machinery. In the elections for presidents of Provincial Administrative Organizations (PAOs), it mobilized its networks to support Jittawan “Madam Kob” Wangsuphakijkosol, a former Bhumjaithai ally who now runs her own local party, Thai Ruamphalang. Vehicles, field visits, and campaign speeches by Bhumjaithai figures were all deployed to support her campaign.
Although Jittawan unexpectedly lost to Pheu Thai incumbent Kan Kalptinan, Pratueng predicts that the Bhumjaithai Party will still win five to six out of eleven constituencies in Ubon in the next general election. In the party-list race, Bhumjaithai may gain a few additional seats, but not a significant number. The Pheu Thai Party and the People’s Party are likely to maintain their strongholds.
"I can predict that in the next election, the Bhumjaithai Party will have the opportunity to secure a number of MPs in the lower northeast. It has a very high chance of beating Pheu Thai. This is an assessment based mainly on Ubon Province, which can be used to compare with other provinces,” said Pratueng.
Sisaket
Sisaket is one of seven provinces bordering Cambodia. Amid the territorial dispute with Cambodia, a by-election in Constituency 5 (Phu Sing and Khun Han districts), a battleground between Pheu Thai and Bhumjaithai, has drawn close attention from observers.
Bhumjaithai won even though Pheu Thai’s vote share did not decline significantly. In Pratueng’s view, the winning margin for Bhumjaithai came from groups opposed to Pheu Thai, particularly supporters of the People’s Party, which did not field a candidate.
At any rate, the by-election is symbolically significant. It signals that in the next general election, the Bhumjaithai Party is prepared to deploy resources, Pratueng said.
Following the same pattern, Bhumjaithai used a two-pronged strategy in Sisaket: building ties with local groups to secure key political assets, and co-opting well-connected constituency MPs by offering tangible benefits. Again, some constituency MPs have worked in the area for a long time, and because of their strong ties with local voters, it is not necessary for them to be loyal to any particular party.
Cultivating good relations with local administrations helps with public relations in the area, making it easier to campaign in a general election. In February, Wichit Traisaranakul, from a political powerhouse in Sisaket closely linked to Bhumjaithai, won the PAO election with a vote tally far ahead of the Pheu Thai candidate. On the night of his victory, Anutin, as leader of the Bhumjaithai Party, travelled to congratulate Wichit.
These gestures are accompanied by tangible incentives. In the final stretch of campaigning for the by-election in Sisaket Constituency 5, Anutin brought Bhumjaithai ministers on stage and announced that he had appointed two people from Sisaket to key government positions: Traisuree “Kwang” Traisaranakul as Secretary to the Prime Minister, and Siripong Angkasakulkiat as government spokesperson.
Anutin’s move targeted a weakness of its rival. Pheu Thai MPs are defecting because of insufficient support. “There was news that there were a great number of MPs from the lower northeast provinces, but they did not receive any quota for ministerial positions," said Pratueng. Pheu Thai’s Phumin Leethiraprasert of Constituency 4 (Kantharalak District) and Nuchanat Jaruwongsathian of Constituency 9 did not vote for Chaikasem Nitisiri, Pheu Thai’s last prime minister candidate, but voted instead for Anutin. Their party affiliation in the next election remains unclear.
Realpolitik prevails over nationalism. Asst Prof Kittichai Khunthong from the Political Science Department at the College of Law and Government, Sisaket Rajabhat University, said that the instability of the Pheu Thai government led by former prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, who was dismissed over a leaked audio clip of her phone call with Hun Sen, may have influenced voting in Constituency 5, which directly borders Cambodia and has seen population evacuations due to the conflict.
However, this may not extend to other constituencies, where Pheu Thai remains popular or where political views are more moderate. On this point, Pratueng agrees with Kittichai.
"I see nationalism as only a trend or just an excuse, an excuse for finding a way to grow or just switch parties, because the local people are not such extreme nationalists. People in the area try to do everything to avoid war, because they are the people directly affected. They normally do everything to prevent war, to prevent bullets from reaching their homes. So with regard to nationalism, it is not as strong as people in the centre perceive it," said Pratueng.
Kittichai said that Bhumjaithai had secured 3 out of a total of 9 constituencies including constituencies 3, 8, and 5. So he thinks that in the next election, Bhumjaithai will get no less than 3 seats. It also has a chance to win in the fiercely contested constituencies 1 and 9. This still does not include potential defectors from Pheu Thai.
Southern Region
Assoc Prof Ekkarin Tuansiri of the Faculty of Political Science at Prince of Songkla University, who researches electoral behaviour in the three provinces of the upper south, said that three factors explain the Bhumjaithai Party’s growth in the South.
First, as in other regions, Bhumjaithai’s access to state power, even just for four months, and its abundant resources have helped attract local groups to join the party. According to reports, these include three MPs from Niphon Bunyamanee’s group, as well as an uncertain number of MPs from the group led by Akanat Promphan, a former Minister of Industry (with MPs in Phitsanulok, Chumphon, and Surat Thani) and Trang’s political powerhouse. Bhumjaithai’s strong ties to local canvassers in the region, particularly village health volunteers (VHVs), will further strengthen its election campaign.
Secondly, Bhumjaithai is not perceived as a threat to the nation’s key institutions, an important ideological concern for southern voters. Anti-Thaksin sentiment runs deep in the South. Once the political stronghold of the Democrat Party in the 1990s-2000s, southern voters later shifted to support junta leader Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha as prime minister.
While this sentiment still holds, it comes with an important caveat. Ekkarin noted that in previous elections, businessmen were not popular among voters and therefore operated mostly behind the scenes. Instead, voters tended to admire politicians who were lawyers, teachers, or volunteers with clean, trustworthy images such as the old-school figures of the Democrat Party. But the political landscape is changing.
After the COVID-19 pandemic, online businesses, both legitimate and questionable, began to flourish. Although southerners traditionally prefer to vote on moral grounds, they are now more open, albeit hesitantly, to politicians with questionable backgrounds. “I’m still speechless when I talk to the locals,” Ekkarin said. “They [the MPs with questionable business backgrounds] are always working in the area! They take care of their area and they are also hard-working.”
Thirdly, Bhumjaithai’s political competitors are faltering. The old image of the Democrat Party, now reinforced by the return of its former leader Abhisit Vejjajiva, no longer resonates in the South. Meanwhile, the military generals—Gen Prawit Wongsuwan, who led the Palang Pracharath Party, and Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, who led the Ruam Thai Sang Chart Party in the 2023 election—are fading from the political scene.
The Future Forward Party, led by Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, a progressive businessman with an activist image, was not successful in the South. But its successor, the Move Forward Party led by Pita Limjaroenrat, performed remarkably well despite its anti-establishment stance. Southern voters chose Move Forward for their party-list MPs, and several of its constituency candidates lost by only narrow margins, just hundreds of votes in Songkhla Constituency 2 and a thousand votes in Nakhon Si Thammarat Constituency 1.
The People’s Party will likely remain popular among young voters and continue to be a favourite for party-list seats. However, Ekkarin views next year’s election as more complex than previous ones. It will not be the politics of changing the country like in 2019 or 2023, he said. The 2026 election environment will be different, with multiple factors influencing voters’ choices for any party.
This political landscape presents an opportunity for Bhumjaithai to expand, especially in constituency elections where local powerhouses remain influential. In the 2019 elections, Bhumjaithai won eight constituency seats, increasing to twelve in 2023. For the next election, Phiphat Ratchakitprakarn, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Transport, and Bhumjaithai’s leader in the south, has set a goal of winning 30 southern MPs. In Krabi and Satun, where Bhumjaithai swept the province last time, Ekkarin predicts the party will win again.
How locals view ‘big houses’
While urban areas tend to view the realpolitik approach of local powerhouses negatively, experts say that local residents do not see it that way.
“On the ground, the big house is not viewed that negatively,” said Pratueng.
His data shows that the big houses in Ubon Ratchathani are concentrated in the city municipality. Those who view the big houses in a clearly negative light tend to be groups that have lost elections to them, disagree with their policies, suffer from political fatigue, or oppose the very idea of elections. Residents in districts outside the municipality do not view the big houses as negatively, however.
This aligns with Ekkarin’s view of the south: local residents see local political groups as capable of negotiating with the centralized bureaucracy and bringing resources and development projects to their communities.
The term ‘big house’ is often associated with mafia and corruption. However, he cautioned against viewing them solely in a negative light, as doing so can lead to misunderstanding and to underestimating the local population.
Instead of characterizing the big houses as cruel mafias who dominate by cheating and share no benefits with others, it is important to recognize that they must engage in political activities and share benefits with others to survive, said Ekkarin.
“For example, if you have some project coming into the area, it is very important that you share it with those involved, and it is very important that you let the public see that your presence and the projects you secure can bring change to the province or the locality. … We are not talking about politics in moralistic terms here.”
eng editor 1
Sat, 2025-12-06 - 21:30
* Feature
* Bhumjaithai Party
* Regional politics
* Anutin Charnvirakul
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