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JACH (Spring 2026) The Spring 2026 issue of the Journal of American Constitutional History is now available here. Articles Constructing the Constitutional Legitimacy of the Administrative State: Congress and the Settlement of 1946 Johnathan O’NeillToday the legitimacy of the administrative state is being questioned more deeply than at any time since the New Deal. This article puts Congress at the center of the story to understand how this question was addressed in the New Deal’s immediate aftermath. It argues that Congress sealed the legitimacy of the administrative state in three pieces of legislation passed in 1946: the Employment Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Legislative Reorganization Act. This legislation marked the “settlement of 1946,” in which Congress acknowledged that modern governance required management of the economy and delegation of power to bureaucracies, but also that the administrative state must be disciplined with recognizably constitutional principles and procedures. It was through this legislative dynamic, traced in each of the three laws passed in 1946, that Congress acted to moderate constitutional conflict and legitimate its resolution: only it could accommodate and validate the administrative state while also limiting and controlling its reach. From this perspective, the constitutional changes of the New Deal look less like an event centered solely on the Supreme Court and its jurisprudence and more like an adaption that required action by the national legislature to be regarded as legitimate.The Civic Order of Progressive America: The Fitter Families Ideal and the Acquisition and Loss of U.S. Citizenship Rogers M. Smith In the first third of the twentieth century, American leaders affiliated with both political parties and the broader Progressive movement restructured what I term the nation’s “legal civic order” to advance a Fitter Families ideal of American citizenship. The model American family was industrious and prosperous, conventionally religious, patriotic, patriarchal, white, and prolifically fecund. This article analyzes American legislation and executive policies governing immigration, naturalization, denaturalization, and expatriation in the Progressive era to show how comprehensively they expressed this ideal, despite apparent anomalies. National policies sought to exclude persons thought incapable of conforming to Fitter Families standards and to subject Indigenous Americans, inhabitants of the insular territories, and most people of color in America to what Progressives viewed as beneficial “tutelary” forms of second-class citizenship designed to prepare them to approximate the Fitter Families ideal, if they proved capable of doing so. Some on the left of the Progressive movement joined in coalitions with representatives of allegedly “unfit” communities to contest these policies, but substantial changes would not come until succeeding eras in America’s civic development.Dialogue: The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise: An Introduction Maeva Marcus As the third general editor of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court, I had the good fortune to be in that position when Mark Tushnet and Robert Post produced their manuscripts on the Hughes and Taft Courts respectively—both truly monumental achievements. By way of introduction, I thought it might be helpful to give JACH readers a short account of the checkered progress of the Devise History, so they might better understand how Professors Tushnet and Post came to undertake such massive projects.Reflections on the Two Most Recent Holmes Devise Histories of the Supreme Court (Including Mine) Mark TushnetReading in full Robert Post’s magnificent Holmes Devise history of the Taft Court provoked me to compare the choices he and I made in writing Holmes Devise volumes at roughly the same time. Two choices Post and I made stood out for me: first, his hope to write a volume “of record” (xxv) compared to my (perhaps resigned) willingness to acknowledge that my volume, long as it is, is not comprehensive; second, his framing of his volumes around what he calls four “narratives about the nature and purpose of constitutional law” (xxvii) compared to my framing around what I called “attitudes” or, sometimes, “legal thought,” drawing upon Duncan Kennedy’s work. The bottom line should be that his choices were right for him, which in some sense they necessarily were, and mine right for me. Candor compels me to say, though, that I think my choices were better than his notwithstanding my admiration for his volume’s obviously great merit.Writing for the Holmes Devise Robert Post Although seventy-five years ago it was common for legal historians to focus on the decision-making of apex courts, this had begun to change by 1988. To-day the subject seems positively quaint. Legal historians are now drawn instead to topics like transgender history, or imperial violence, or black legal culture, or intellectual history. They conceptualize law as emerging from the bottom up, or as epiphenomenally emanating from the practices of governmentality, or as the precipitation of larger cultural developments. All this is very far from viewing law as the conscious, professional practice of judges striving to construct a semi-autonomous system of legal doctrine. --Dan Ernst http://dlvr.it/TSbFdZ