loading . . . I'm worried about West, particularly U.S. negotiating position — American analyst There are an exceptionally large number of unknowns in what is being called Donald Trump’s plan and in the specific points it includes. We understand that important meetings have just taken place in Berlin. Most likely, the situation may still change, but in your view, what could this plan mean for Ukraine, and how realistic is it that it will be implemented?Well, I don't know the exact details of this plan. So let me step back and kind of focus on one of its core objectives, and that's to get a ceasefire in place that will be enduring, and that can be the basis for longer term military stability, because I doubt there can ever be a peace with Russia as long as Putin is control in Moscow. So I'm very doubtful that a ceasefire will come anytime soon. Putin is showing no interest in peace. You know, he's refusing to budge from his core demands. He continues to pummel your country, its front lines, its cities, and its towns relentlessly and ruthlessly. He's using attacks on civilians to break your country's morale. Only two things will bring Putin to a ceasefire. The first and most optimal is a change in the correlation of forces that would threaten Putin's territorial gains. And I'm confident the moment he's at risk of losing any of the territory he has so illegally and brutally seized from Ukraine, he'll be the first to come to the negotiating table. The second I think is more concerning and that is an agreement that positions Putin to later achieve his objective, his core objective, complete control over Ukraine. "And here I'm worried about the West, particularly the United States’ negotiating position. One that pressures Ukraine to give up additional territory it controls, territory that includes strategically significant defenses in the Donbas. Second, pressuring Ukraine to put a ceiling on the size of Ukraine's military, as if Ukraine is a threat to Russia with 1/3 the size of Russia's military."They're pressuring Zelenskyy to accept new elections, which is a real recipe for political instability and certainly something that Russia would try to exploit with disinformation and other covert means to turn the elections in his favor. Fourth, the demand from the United States is for Ukraine to dilute its relationship with NATO, to give up its ambition for membership and to preclude NATO from being part of the security guarantees.That deflates the perception within the alliance of Ukraine as something more than a geographic neighbor and that's really important. I would add it also diminishes NATO's role in transatlantic security and that of course is a major Putin objective. So I'm a little concerned about the direction of these negotiations. Thank you, Mr. Brzezinski, but I would like to clarify. When we speak about global security guarantees, we are being promised a substitute, an analogue of what is stipulated in Article 5 of the Euro-Atlantic Treaty. But if we talk about realities, to what extent can those guarantees be trusted, particularly if, for example, one or another electoral process were to take place?"In order for security guarantees to effectively deter further Russian aggression, it has to be more than paper and rhetoric. It has to be guarantees that are effectuated through military action, which means a military presence on Ukrainian territory."So I'm going to be watching very closely to see how robust that international presence will be, what sort of offensive capability will it have in addition to defensive capability. And I would argue that it will be significantly diminished if it is not robust, if it's not robust and doesn't have a U.S. dimension to it on the ground. Because if it's a European only force backing up Ukraine with the United States standing on the outside, I think that's an invitation for Putin to test that force, to test American resolve with the hope that it'll create, actually, a strike against that force would create division with the transatlantic community. That's what I fear. So I think it's very important for the United States to be present on the ground in Ukraine for that force to have credibility. And as for elections, it's kind of the same thing. You need to have a security guarantee, but it's a more complex security guarantee because election interference can involve more than just physical intervention. In today's age, it's disinformation, it’s cyberattacks, it’s subterfuge. And I think it’s going to be very, very difficult to guard against in this day and age. That’s why I think it’s unwise to be holding elections so early or in the near future.And if we speak, for example, about providing Ukraine with heavy weaponry — the same Tomahawk missiles — as I understand it, this is a red line that Donald Trump won’t cross. But in any case, we must receive weapons whose use would depend on us, on Kyiv. Because the Russians are preparing, possibly, for new and larger-scale attacks. I do not know whether this will happen next year or in a year’s time, but guarantees, as you rightly noted, must not exist only on paper. What about heavy technologies and heavy weapons?"I fully support providing Ukraine with Tomahawks; I think it’s long overdue."But I would also emphasize that there’s no silver bullet to break Putin’s will in this conflict. It’s going to require what I call a major muscle movement, involving different elements of Western pressure on Ukraine — not an incremental escalation, but a real exercise of the full force of the capabilities of the transatlantic community and its allies around the world.First and foremost, it's unleashing more security assistance to Ukraine, including Tomahawks and others. It means the United States should reverse course and start providing some of that security assistance on its own instead of relying on Europeans to buy its equipment. You know, step up the security, the equipment going to the Ukrainians so they can more effectively defend themselves and threaten Russia's gains.Second, we still have yet to leverage the full economic force that the West can bring to the table. We need to body slam the Russian economy through secondary sanctions to really cut it off from the world economic system so we shut down its economic war machine.Third, we need to get on the political offensive. We need to get into Putin's backyard. We have the means to do that, you know, to generate greater awareness among the Russian public about what Putin is doing to the young men and women being sent to the front lines in this war, and about the corruption and brutality of the regime, create some unrest in Putin's own backyard. And the fourth element, I think, is to put Ukraine onto a clear path towards NATO membership, or at least have a core group of Allied nations including the United States, Germany, the Nordics, the Central Europeans supporting that goal. Because that is a clear signal of determination to support Ukraine and a clear articulation that the Transatlantic community regards Ukraine as a vital interest worth fighting for. That’s how you cause Putin to change course to ask for a ceasefire.Mr. Brzezinski, the United States of America has released, published its revised national security doctrine. When I read it the first time, I didn’t believe it. I read it a second time, reread it carefully, pencil in hand. I was shocked.I spoke with my American friends who have worked on national and global security issues. My American friends showed that they, too, were in shock. And we understand that the classic Pax Americana, the world we lived in, the American-led world, has not simply developed cracks — its conscious dismantling is beginning.And we find ourselves in that part of the world where American influence may either be significantly reduced or transformed. Yes, in particular, the American security doctrine states that “we don’t like your form of democracy, and we have alternative options.”European capitals are extremely alarmed. And my American friends said that the danger is not that these are someone’s plans, but that certain processes have already begun. And spheres of influence in the world may, in the literal sense, be divided. What would you say about this?Well, first, I, too, stand with those who are very concerned about this document and this articulation of U.S. national security policy. It is a real concern for me, and most importantly, it’s a concern for many Americans, if not most Americans. Let me just hold that thought for a second.What’s concerning to me is that, and there’s a lot in there, particularly its attack on our European allies and the EU, that I think are totally unjustified. But it abandons three key principles that have been the basis of U.S. national security policy for the last eight decades.The first is the principle that we learned from World War I and World War II: the need to defend forward to protect the U.S. homeland. National security strategies are always about defending the homeland. Ever since World War II, the United States has been defending forward through military presence in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, to defend forward to protect the U.S. homeland.The second assumption that’s being abandoned by this administration is the assumption that the United States has vital interests beyond the western hemisphere worth fighting and dying for. This national security strategy attacks the last eight decades of U.S. national security policy including that point. And that reflects to a certain degree how the president is approaching Russia's invasion of Ukraine.The third principle, which we certainly adhere to rhetorically but really got momentum in terms of being an active, an actualized element of national security policy, is the principle — and you refer to this — is we should never return to a world where there are spheres of influence. Unfortunately, this strategy signals a real embrace of great power influence. Trump is clear about that over the western hemisphere, where he wants to reanimate the Monroe Doctrine. His negotiations with Russia on Ukraine seem to reflect that he’s comfortable with allowing a Russian sphere of influence over the countries along its borders, including Ukraine if not other parts of Central Europe. That is certainly reflected in the pressure that we just discussed of what Trump is asking the Ukrainians, your country, to give up in these negotiations.But the good news is — and this does not relieve the pressure over the next 18 months to three years — but the good news is this strategy does not reflect the views of American politics as a whole. And here I'm talking about Congress, Republicans included, but also the American public.And let me just refer you to some polling that has been done that I think is really remarkable. It’s polling done by the Ronald Reagan Institute, a center-right organization in Washington, of the MAGA base and their views on foreign policy. MAGA base being the folks with red hats who are enthusiastically supporting President Trump. Seventy-one, or seventy-three, percent of them believe the United States should be internationally engaged; they’re not isolationist.Second, eighty-four percent of them — eighty-four percent of the MAGA base — believe the United States should have a values-based foreign policy, supporting democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. That, I think, is really interesting.Forty-nine percent of them — now, that’s not a great number — forty-nine percent of them believe NATO is important. But that’s in the context of the American public: somewhere between 65 and 70 percent consistently say that the United States should sustain its relationship and commitment to NATO, or increase it.But most fascinating is that when it comes to defending and supporting Ukraine, about 70 percent of them want Ukraine to win. Sixty-nine to seventy percent of them believe that if a NATO ally — let’s say Estonia — were attacked, the United States should militarily defend it. That MAGA base figure is higher than moderate Republicans and higher than Democrats.And more than a majority — 56 percent of them — believe the United States should sustain or increase its military presence in Central and Eastern Europe."So, this national security strategy is out of sync with the rest of the American public and politics."That makes me turn to my European friends, including Ukraine, and say: yes, this is not a good document. It portends a troubling three years, but you need to take a long view on American national security policy, take the long bet on the United States.Now, I’m not naive — that doesn’t make the situation any better for Ukraine today — but it’s a point that should be kept in mind when thinking about the long-term direction of American foreign policy and what the American public and the American Congress are ready to do when it comes to supporting Ukraine, regardless of what the president says.Yes, Mr. Brzezinski, thank you at least for a glimmer of hope, but we understand that the reality right now is rather unpleasant.In particular, we understand that any military decision will be made by President Trump and Secretary of Defense Hegseth. On the other hand, about six months ago, Michael Carpenter — a mutual acquaintance — warned me. He said that the United States would be withdrawing from our part of the world. That was a given. In other words, American analysts already knew where things could be heading.Accordingly, when we speak of consequences — serious, concerning consequences that are possible — I’m not saying they will necessarily happen, but we have to consider them. The Russians want to divide spheres of influence and want to seize Ukrainian territories. That is prevented by the valiant, literally heroic Ukrainian people and Western weaponry, including American arms. But at the same time, beyond valor and heroism, war requires money. We understand that the Russians will now try to pressure the European Union, while the Trump administration will try to prevent Europeans from giving us funds.The American administration does not like the European Union. And they say openly: “Europe is building a bad democracy.” What worries me is the possibility that America will remain passive. At the same time, the Trump administration could play Russia’s game. Sometimes, withholding assistance is also a form of wrongdoing.So, what would you say about this? Because we need funds. Whether it’s in the form of a reparations-style loan or another type of assistance, otherwise our economy simply will not be able to function next year. It would lead to social collapse.I agree with your assessment. First, any division between the United States and its allies and key European transatlantic institutions like the European Union, like NATO, or including both, is an opportunity for the Russians to weaken solidarity, transatlantic solidarity, and support of Ukraine. So when there is a food fight between Washington and Brussels over EU policy or any issue dealing with NATO, that is an opportunity, that is a blessing for Putin, and we should be aware of that."Regarding the administration's efforts to undermine the efforts of the Europeans to leverage seized Russian assets to finance support for Ukraine, it is scandalous in my view."It's completely unjustified and it does nothing but help Putin. At a minimum, it emboldens him to drive further on in his aggression against Ukraine. It gives him greater confidence that he can prevail. So I'm really disappointed to see the administration getting in the way of the Europeans. There's no justification for it.Mr. Brzezinski, we haven’t yet talked about China. Putin and Xi Jinping would like a new world order. They are actively cooperating, both at the inter-leader level and within military institutions. This is no secret.We understand that Donald Trump has begun the dismantling of the classic Pax Americana. What will the world look like now? What does China want? We can see that Russian aggression against Ukraine benefits China, and it benefits other global players as well.So I wanted to ask you: how do you see this new order? I don’t know whether it will be fully established or not. How would this new model of influence and global control function, given that China has become powerful, India is emerging, there’s also Europe, including Ukraine within it?Allow me to make one quick additional point about the EU's efforts to leverage seized Russian assets. The Trump administration's effort to derail that effort is contradictory to its own demand that the Europeans do more to support Ukraine on their own. Here they have these assets available to support Ukraine. They're acting on it and the president's getting in the way of it. It's a contradiction. It doesn't make sense to me. They should be embracing that effort to leverage those seized Russian assets.Regarding the world order. Well, when you look at the national security strategy that President Trump has rolled out a week or two ago, it is imbued with a vision of a world that returns to one of great power spheres of influence. A sphere of influence for Russia, certainly over its neighbors. A sphere of influence for the United States over the western hemisphere, Latin America, South America, which President Trump is trying to effectuate as we speak in his aggression against Venezuela. And while it doesn't explicitly state it, it infers a willingness to accept some sort of military dominance by the Chinese in the Indo-Pacific.That is a very dangerous world to turn to, particularly in light of the fact that over the last eight decades the rules-based, democratically principled world order that has been established following World War II is one that has brought unprecedented prosperity to the world, including the United States. It's brought greater stability to the world that benefits the United States. It's brought a greater sense of rule of law around the world, which leads to a more peaceful world. It's amazing that he wants to turn his back to that and go to a previous world that had been basically the root causes of World War I and World War II."So Trump, if he is successful in driving forward a return to an order of great power spheres of influence, we're going to see revanchism. We're going to see more hegemony. We're going to see more aggression."And this is particularly concerning today when we look at the world and the level of violence that has returned to it. Your nation, unfortunately, tragically, is the center of this — a high intensity war the likes we haven't seen since World War II in Europe. There's military instability across the Middle East with violence, always being on the cusp of violence. There's just news in the papers earlier this week about a potential breakout of violence between Israel and Lebanon. The Gaza peace is on thin ice, on eggshells. Go to the Indo-Pacific. China continues its aggressive posture over there, and we’ve seen a recent uptick in aggression against the Philippines just these last ten days. If we're not careful, we could see us sliding into a collusion of these instabilities and violence that could look a lot like global configuration.And remember the drivers of these is a coalition of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. And that collusion, those four powers of this axis of upheaval, doesn't get any mention in the national security strategy.So we're not headed in the right direction. And the way to turn course and to put us back toward a world where there aren't spheres of influence, where revanchism and hegemony is deterred — well, the most important battlefield is Ukraine. We have to win decisively in Ukraine. We have to defeat Russia's aggression in Ukraine to end the violence and Putin's hopes for hegemony in this part of the world, in Europe. And that will set momentum that will help stabilize the Middle East and stabilize the Indo-Pacific.And finally, Mr. Brzezinski, one last question. If we speak about the forms of control that Russia would like to impose on Ukraine, and that might, for example, be accepted by the U.S. administration — even if not publicly, even at the level of so‑called back‑channel arrangements, addenda to a peace plan — what kind of model could be used? Or is this entirely unrealistic, something no one would agree to?An agreement that brings a ceasefire that is gonna be enduring and the basis for long-term military stability in Ukraine, in my view, requires a ceasefire at the current line of contact, security guarantees in Ukraine, if not by NATO, then by a robust coalition of allied countries, involving a robust presence in Ukraine — not just observers, but a capacity that together with Ukrainian forces could jeopardize some elements of Russian territorial gains. That, in my view, would require some U.S. military presence. "And then complete nonrecognition of Russian sovereignty over the territories it seized from Ukraine, sustained economic sanctions on Russia until those seized territories are returned to Ukraine, including Crimea."As I said, enduring peace is going to require Putin to see, to use a Soviet term, a change in the correlation of forces that at a minimum threatens his ability to control his seized territories. And that's going to require a much more forceful exercise of western or transatlantic military power, economic power, and ideological power.The good news is we have the capability to do that. We have the resources to do that. As we've talked before, we're talking about an alliance — just the alliance alone — that has $55 trillion in GDP against Russia's less than $2 trillion in GDP.The West has unrivaled, unmatched military capability, and it has the ideological edge. There are Russians that are yearning for freedom. We should be leveraging this. All we lack right now is the political will. https://global.espreso.tv/world-about-ukraine-im-worried-about-west-particularly-us-negotiating-position-american-analyst?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=bluesky
